

# The Second Image Re-Analyzed: The Attitudinal Effects of Democracy on Conflict and Cooperation

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**ABSTRACT:** Democracy is in crisis, in retreat around the globe and under attack in International Relations (IR), as new scholarship challenges the “democratic triumphalism” that has dominated the field for the past two decades. We investigate democracy’s resilience a different way, re-analyzing all existing experiments on citizens and elites that randomize a country’s regime type ( $N = 205$  estimates from 158 studies, fielded in 51 countries). We find that the attitudinal effects of democracy are remarkably consistent, systematically decreasing support for the use of force against a country, and increasing support for cooperation with it. These effects are homogeneous across respondent-level characteristics, have not appreciably declined over time, and weaken but do not disappear across space. Democracies are also perceived as more moral, less threatening, and more powerful, but critically, also less resolved. Regardless of whether satisfaction with democracy has declined at home, democracy appears to have maintained its allure when evaluating countries abroad.

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Democracy faces dual crises. Observationally, democracy has had a difficult decade: both the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project and Freedom House suggest that democracy is in retreat around the globe, downgrading their evaluations of established democracies like the United States (Nord, Good God and Lindberg, 2026; Gorokhovskaia, Grothe and Slipowitz, 2026), lending support to the idea that there is a genuine “democratic recession” in governance (Diamond, 2015, 154). At the same time, the democratic “triumphalism” of the 1990s and 2000s has faced challenges as well. This influential literature on regime type—the “second image”—had come to the conclusion that democracy was a “blessing” in foreign policy (Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023, 1), evident in a substantial “democratic advantage” manifesting across a vast swath of foreign policy domains (Hyde and Saunders, 2020, 364). While most of the first wave of work in this area was observational and focused on foreign policy outcomes, much of the second wave has been experimental, studying the *attitudinal effects of democracy* by testing whether information about other countries’ regime type affects citizens’ preferences for the use of force (Johns and Davies, 2012; Tomz and Weeks, 2013) or cooperation (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023).<sup>5</sup>

However, recent work has argued that the democratic advantage has decayed over time, varies across space or perhaps never existed at all. Increased polarization (Myrick, 2025), for example, may have eroded democratic advantages through a number of causal pathways, while the poor performance of democracies in providing public goods (Drezner, 2022, 6-8) is a candidate explanation for declining satisfaction with democratic systems (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Democracy is also not as unique as once thought: there is *more* variation within democracies on some dimensions (e.g.,

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<sup>5</sup>This is in contrast to a literature in American and Comparative politics that focuses on citizens’ evaluations of and satisfaction with their *own* political institutions.

in their ability to make credible commitments, Saiegh, 2005) than current theories suggest and *less* variation across regime types on other dimensions (e.g., in attitudes towards uses of force, Bell and Quek, 2018).<sup>6</sup> Finally, the laudatory attitudes towards democracy and its salutary effects may not ever have really been present. Veneration of democracies and commitment to democratic norms may be quite shallow (Graham and Svobik, 2020), for example, while IR scholars have found little evidence of the democratic advantage in beliefs about credibility (Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023).

These crises are linked because the “democratic advantage” touted in IR often operates *through* the beliefs of citizens and elites about the qualities of different regime types and the ability of audiences to differentially constrain state behavior (Hyde and Saunders, 2020, 367; Hyde and Saunders, 2025, 72). Answering recent concerns about the importance of democracy in our theories—“does regime type still matter in IR?” (Hyde and Saunders, 2020, 366)—*and* addressing the potential impact of real-world democratic backsliding requires more than one more survey experiment on regime type; it requires a comprehensive examination of the effects of regime type across time and space.

To address these fundamental questions about regime type in our theories and our politics, we exploit an explosion of survey experiments that randomize regime type, conducting a “meta-reanalysis” of the *attitudinal effects of democracy*. By our count, there have now been 158 such survey experiments published (in 53 articles) in political science and IR journals over the period 2012-2026, fielded in 51 countries, on samples of elites (e.g., Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023) and masses (e.g., Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026*a*) alike. We collected the datasets from nearly all such vignette and conjoint experiments conducted to date, standardizing all outcomes, and reanalyzing

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<sup>6</sup>For another example, see Weeks (2008) on the ability of autocracies to generate audience costs.

each study to estimate the regime type treatment effect using consistent statistical tools. While many of them were designed to test regime type explanations for broader theoretical models, others included regime type only as an incidental “cross-randomization” – which is especially valuable for our purposes because it mitigates against publication bias.

Our overall results are striking. Citizens prefer peace with democracies over peace with autocracies, and cooperation with democracies over cooperation with autocracies. Of the 51 estimates of the democracy treatment effect on support for military force, 49 are negative: citizens are significantly less willing to endorse military action against a democratic state than a nondemocratic one by about 6.5 percentage points on average.<sup>7</sup> The results are even starker for cooperation, whether security or economic: all 41 estimates are positive, and being a democracy increases support for cooperation by about 8 percentage points. On the central question of sign, the experimental literature speaks with one voice on cooperation and nearly so on the use of force.

To ask what lies *behind* these results, we turn to 77 studies that measure the causal effect of democracy on perceptions of a country. These include beliefs about the morality of a country, how threatening it is perceived to be, and what its likelihood of standing firm in conflict or winning in a war is, among other beliefs. While these theories can be thought of as potential mechanisms that might help explain the consistent preferences of the public towards democracies, they also serve as the outcome of interest in other notable theories of IR, such as work on signaling and credibility as well as the democratic advantage. Here, we again find that the attitudi-

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<sup>7</sup>The two exceptions (one conjoint estimate and one vignette estimate) are each near zero and the associated 95% confidence intervals include zero. Four studies measure force used to *defend* the country whose regime is randomized rather than to attack it; their outcomes are reverse-coded so that this category means the same thing throughout, namely support for military action directed against the randomized country. See section 2.3.

nal effects of democracy are consistently positive, with one exception: on assessments of resolve, democracies are seen as being at a disadvantage.

To address the heterogeneity *within* our results, we consider a number of explanations at the individual and study level. We find very little evidence of heterogeneity at the individual level: the effects of regime type are very notably homogeneous across a wide range of measured characteristics, including levels of hawkishness. We also consider explanations located at the study-level, including *when* a study was fielded, in *what country* respondents were drawn from as well as elements of the experimental design itself (notably, the level of abstraction and the structure of the experimental design; Brutger et al. 2023). Crucially, while we cannot speak to actual levels of democratic decline across states (Little and Meng, 2024; Treisman, 2023), we find little evidence that the attitudinal effects of democracy on foreign policy preferences have declined over time. At least in the 158 experiments studied here, democracy appears to have maintained its allure in the eyes of both citizens and elites when evaluating countries abroad. However, we do find contextual heterogeneity related to regime type. Effects of democracy on support for war and cooperation are roughly two-and-a-half to three times smaller in autocracies than in democracies; enough to significantly attenuate the effect of regime type but not enough to either erase or reverse it.

## 1 The Attitudinal Effects of Democracy

As McDermott (2002), Hyde (2015), and others have chronicled, one of the major structural changes in the study of International Relations over the past two decades has been the growing popularity of survey experiments. Kertzer, Renshon and Xu (2025), for example, find that there have been over 773 IR survey experiments pub-

lished in 12 top political science and IR journals from 2000-2024.

One of the most common factors that IR scholars randomize in survey experiments is regime type: whether a country is described as democratic, autocratic, or something in between. Researchers randomize regime type for a variety of reasons. In some cases, they do so to test individual-level microfoundations for theories of IR that attribute variation in state behavior to variation in domestic political institutions – as in the proliferation of studies that turn to public opinion to look for evidence of the normative democratic peace, testing whether democratic publics prefer not to fight with one another (e.g., Mintz and Geva, 1993; Johns and Davies, 2012; Lacina and Lee, 2013; Kim, Kim and Kwak, 2024; Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2025). In other cases, they study the effects of democracy on foreign policy attitudes in its own right, as in scholarship testing whether the public is more likely to support trade agreements when the partner is democratic (Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023), or seek to adjudicate contemporary political debates, such as the depth of citizens’ commitment to democracy (Chu, Williamson and Yeung, 2025), or how democratic backsliding affects foreign citizens’ attitudes towards the United States (Goldsmith et al., 2025). Sometimes, researchers may not be intrinsically interested in regime type as a focal treatment, but randomize it alongside a wide range of other factors, whether to serve as one of a potential set of explanations for a phenomenon of interest (Guliford, Curtice and Donahue, 2025), to provide a benchmark from which to assess other effect sizes (Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021), or to control for potential confounds (Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026a). Often, researchers randomize regime type not to answer questions about democracy in IR directly, but to provide contextual variation in which to test their core theoretical claims, such as experimental work on audience costs that is primarily interested in whether publics punish leaders who issue empty threats, but who also test whether these effects hold across target regime

type (e.g., Tomz, 2007; Li and Chen, 2021).

These studies also manipulate regime type in a variety of ways, with Table 1 illustrating the variation. In some cases, they adopt relatively stark distinctions, describing a country as either “democratic” or “autocratic” (e.g., Musgrave and Ward, 2023); in others, they operationalize regime type based on variations in electoral institutions (e.g., Levin and Kobayashi, 2022), or the presence of liberal norms (e.g., Wick, 2014). These variations in treatments mirror the variation in level of detail and information in vignettes identified by Brutger et al. (2023). Yet, despite this variation in both theoretical motivation and experimental operationalization, what unites all of these approaches in a broad sense is their interest in the *attitudinal effect of democracy*.

|                                     | Democracy Treatment                                                                                                                               | Autocracy Treatment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Musgrave and Ward (2023)            | “democratic”                                                                                                                                      | “autocratic”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Rudolph, Freitag and Thurner (2024) | “Democratically elected”                                                                                                                          | “Not democratically elected”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Tomz and Weeks (2013)               | “... is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy”                                                                         | “... is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Levin and Kobayashi (2022)          | “... is a democracy. The president, the legislature, and local councils are elected by the people.”                                               | “... is not a democracy. The people do not have the power to choose the leader”.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Wick (2014)                         | “... is a democratic country whose people enjoy free and fair elections as well as basic human rights such as free speech and right of assembly.” | “... is led by an authoritarian government that is frequently being accused of human rights abuses. The news media in X is subject to strict government controls and citizens are often imprisoned, or worse, for speaking out against the government. Many Americans believe that the United States should stop trading with X until it improves its human rights record.” |

Table 1: Variation in regime type treatments across studies

Because democracy’s attitudinal effects span a wide range of potential outcomes—and have been studied in a multitude of ways—we distinguish between **preferences** (for the use of force or for cooperation) and **perceptions** (of democracies). In some cases, the perceptions function as mediators linking regime type to preferences while in other cases, the perceptions are themselves the outcome variables in IR theories we examine.



## 1.1 Preferences

Two outcome variables in particular cast a deep shadow over scholarship in IR: support for the use of force and support for cooperation. In both cases, the vast majority of theories predict a *positive* effect of democracy on cooperation and a *negative* effect of democracy on the use of force; overall, people are predicted to want to cooperate with democracies but not attack them.

Perhaps the most well-known experimental research program in IR investigates the democratic peace: the “widely accepted generalization” that democracies do not fight one another (De Mesquita et al., 1999, 791). Public opinion and preferences for the use of force are implicated in both “structural” and “normative” variants of the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993). In structural variants, institutions are primary cause of peace: democratic institutions require support from voters and are slow and cumbersome, giving time for non-military solutions to work in most cases. In contrast, normative variants of democratic peace theories focus on the distinctive values of democracies, which are thought to externalize habits of peaceful dispute resolution toward states they recognize as fellow democracies. Given the assumptions both hold about the beliefs and preferences of citizens, it is no surprise that a large literature has sprung up to test these models experimentally. Across these experiments (e.g., Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Lacina and Lee, 2013; Bell and Quek, 2018; Suong, Desposato and Gartzke, 2020; Carnegie, Kertzer and Yarhi-Milo, 2023; Kim, Kim and Kwak, 2024; Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2025; Tomz and Weeks, 2026), the common theme is the directional hypothesis that describing a state as a democracy—compared to an autocracy or other regime type—will reduce support for the use of force against that state. Even here, however, some works provide a counterbalance, arguing that the liberal norms underpinning the democratic peace

may be less universal than previously thought (Suong, Desposato and Gartzke, 2020). Particularly in an era when commitment to liberal norms is in question, and the modal democracy is now an “illiberal” one (Nord, Good God and Lindberg, 2026), this assumption should not be taken for granted.

While democratic peace experiments represent a significant portion of our “use of force” studies, other works examine the same outcome for different theoretical purposes. In work on civilian casualties and support for war, democracy is theorized as a moderator: citizens are theorized to pay more attention to civilian deaths in democratic states than in autocratic ones (Johns and Davies, 2019, 258). In theories of alliances (Tomz and Weeks, 2021), regime type is an important attribute of potential partners, particularly for subjects in democracies.

In explaining variation in **preferences for cooperation**, there is an “extensive political economy literature linking the economic and political features of states to their attractiveness as cooperative partners” (Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023, 317). For example, Spilker, Bernauer and Umaña (2016) argue that “individuals in democracies should prefer trade partners that have the same political institutions, such as free and fair elections, because they expect these countries to share similar interests.” Other arguments make the same directional predictions but highlight factors such as political stability and private property protection (Kiratli, 2021). In other theories, democracy is an important attribute mostly insofar as it helps researchers disentangle other concepts (such as the ally-adversary distinction) and their causal effects (as in Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022).

IR theories of cooperation are not solely the domain of political economy; much of this work implicates preferences about who states ought to engage in military cooperation with or what factors determine alliance networks. Democracy is thought to signal a number of positive virtues about potential alliance partners, as in works

by Alley (2023), Kiratli (2025) and Smetana, Vranka and Rosendorf (2026). In one example, Rudolph and Thurner (2025) manipulate regime type in order to learn about the “normative” inputs into decisions to provide arms to other states.

Not *all* theories predict salutary effects of democracy. For example, in some cases, democracies might actually be worse choices for alliance partners given their “periodic elections, vote of confidence procedures, and restrictions on tenure terms... shorter terms than autocrats and ... more frequent leadership turnover” (Mattes, 2012, 155; see also Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). Similarly, while it is certainly the case that most foundational theories predict that citizens will prefer trade with democracies, there are countervailing works suggesting that, empirically, democracies may not make better trade partners (Dai, 2002). More broadly, it is possible that other trends such as polarization (Myrick, 2025) or democratic backsliding (Drezner, 2022), by unraveling the sources of democratic constraint (Hyde and Saunders, 2025), might attenuate the positive effects of democracy in all these outcomes or even erase them altogether, whether because backsliding erodes the institutional constraints that make democracies reliable partners, or because polarization corrodes democracy’s function as a shared social identity (Hayes, 2012). This implies that democracy’s attitudinal effects would decline over time, becoming less robust in the face of affective polarization and democratic discontent. These attitudinal effects should also presumably vary across space, reflecting variations in the salience and applicability of democratic identity across countries with different political institutions, with citizens in less democratic countries displaying weaker attitudinal effects of democracy. These pessimist arguments imply observable patterns that we test directly below.

## 1.2 Perceptions

The second broad category of outcomes implicated in studies of regime type is **perceptions**, which enter the picture in two ways. In one body of theories, perceptions function as the causal mechanism *through which* regime type affects broader outcomes of support for cooperation or support for the use of force. In a different set of theories, the attitudinal effects of regime type are themselves the relevant outcomes. We are agnostic on where these belief-based DVs ought to be placed in a causal diagram—it depends on your theory—and outline several prominent theories in each camp.

In one group of theories, democracy is linked to support for cooperation and the use of force *through* perceptions about attributes or characteristics of democracy. For example, one prominent body of work in IPE suggests that people support trade with democracies more than other types of governments *because* they see democracies as better able to make credible commitments (Milner and Kubota, 2005; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2017) or *because* of their commitments to the rule of law (Haggard, MacIntyre and Tiede, 2008). It is also possible that support for attacking democracies is lower because democracies are perceived to be more likely to win in conflict (Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023), perhaps because of differences in relative costs paid by different regime types (Chaudoin, Gaines and Livny, 2021).

Another group of IR theories is less concerned with support for war or cooperation and more directly concerned with perceptions of democracy itself. Neundorff et al. (2026), Kim et al. (2025a), and Chu, Williamson and Yeung (2025) are emblematic of work that investigates views of democracies, providing an empirical complement to the debate about whether the “image” (or “soft power”; Goldsmith et al., 2025) of democracies is in decline. Another prominent body of work on audience costs, credibility and signaling argues that democracies can use public threats to signal

more effectively than autocracies because observers will understand that democratic leaders will pay disproportionately heavy prices for failing to live up to their word. In these theories, the relevant outcomes are perceptions of credibility or resolve (Dafoe, Zwetsloot and Cebul, 2021; Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021). Other theories are directly concerned with threat perception, arguing that democracies will be seen as less threatening either by generalized or democratic audiences (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, 2007) and that democratic audiences “harbor a ‘presumption of enmity’ towards non-democracies” (Farnham, 2003, 396).

These latter cases serve as a useful illustration of theoretical ambiguities surrounding the causal roles these variables play. While some theories invoke regime type to explain threat perception (Pomeroy, 2025, Garcia-Retamero, Müller and Rousseau, 2012), others use threat perception to explain the effect of regime type on support for war (e.g., in some variants of the democratic peace; Farnham, 2003; Tomz and Weeks, 2013) or cooperation (Gause III, 2003). Similarly, morality is in some theories a causal mediator between regime type and support for war (in fact, it is a bedrock of “normative” explanations for the democratic peace; Cederman 2001; Friedman 2008; Tomz and Weeks 2013; Carnegie, Kertzer and Yarhi-Milo 2023) or cast as the outcome of interest in theories of humanitarian law (Lupu and Wallace, 2024).

While most of the theories discussed above are concerned with the direct causal effects of democracy, some suggest differences in effects between “types” of observers or respondents. If scholars of American Politics lean on partisanship as a critical individual difference responsible for structuring political attitudes and moderating all manner of causal effects, then hawkishness plays a similar role for IR scholars. The hawk-dove distinction describes the “ubiquitous division . . . over the importance, effectiveness, and desirability of using coercion or force to reach foreign policy objectives” (Kertzer, Rathbun and Rathbun, 2020, 100). Doves “are intrinsically more

inclined to cooperate” (Goldfien, 2025, 168) while hawks “desire that the government assume an assertive, militant foreign-policy posture through military strength” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, 1107). When possible, we thus investigate whether the effects of democracy treatments differ for hawks compared to doves.

In sum, a host of theories in IR are *directly* concerned with the impact of regime type on preferences and perceptions. While the majority of these predictions are positive—in the sense that democracy treatments are assumed to lead to more favorable preferences and perceptions—this pattern is not universal. Nearly all significant research programs—e.g., democratic peace, theories of credibility/signaling, democratic advantages in war or trade—have developed their own version of “democratic pessimists” (e.g., Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Drezner, 2022; Myrick, 2025) whose arguments imply that democracy treatments should produce null effects, effects that vary across audiences, or effects that are declining over time, whether in response to erosion of liberal norms, the growth of political polarization, or collapse of domestic constraints.

## 2 Design

We take the “meta-reanalysis” approach (Galos and Coppock, 2023) to synthesize the effect of randomized regime type treatment on various outcomes in our studies. We obtain original study datasets, clean them using harmonized approaches for treatments, outcomes, and covariates, and reanalyze them using consistent statistical tools. We then combine and compare the resulting estimates using standard meta-analytic tools. Whereas traditional meta-analyses rely only on reported summaries, meta-reanalyses can generate estimates of quantities never included in original papers, standardize outcomes directly in the data, and conduct subgroup analyses in a

common way across studies.

Our procedures comprise four stages. First, we conduct a systematic literature search to identify relevant survey experiments. Second, we apply inclusion and exclusion criteria to determine which studies and samples enter the analysis. Third, we standardize and recode each study’s outcome measures, treatment variable, and covariates into a common format. Fourth, we estimate three sets of quantities of interest: per-study average treatment effects (ATEs) of regime type on each outcome; pooled ATEs by outcome category using multivariate random-effects meta-analysis; and conditional ATEs (CATEs) by respondent hawkishness and other moderators of interest.

## 2.1 Procedures for Literature Search

Full details of our literature search appear in Appendix B. In brief, we began by relying upon datasets or experiments compiled by Kertzer and Renshon (2022) and Bassan-Nygate et al. (2025). We then searched through every experiment published in 12 leading political science and IR journals from 2000–2024, and we keyword-searched a further 12 field and area journals for the term “experiment,” retaining only what met our inclusion criteria. We supplemented this initial step through database searches, citation chaining, conference programs, and pre-registration archives, yielding an initial pool of  $\approx 1,550$  papers and  $\approx 2,850$  studies. As a final step, we contacted authors of studies in our dataset soliciting additional papers/working papers.

## 2.2 Study Selection and Composition

We included studies (published and unpublished) in which researchers (1) **experimentally randomized the regime type of a country** in a vignette or conjoint

profile, (2) using, at minimum, categories including “**democracy**” and “**autocracy**” (or dictatorship), (3) measured a **foreign-policy attitude** toward that country as an outcome, and (4) for which **data were available**. The target of the inference (the country) could be real, hypothetical, fictional or set in the future.<sup>8</sup> This procedure led to a dataset of 158 studies across 53 papers, each catalogued in Appendix E. We present an overview of our process using the PRISMA guidelines (Page et al., 2021) in Appendix B.<sup>9</sup>

The included studies can be distinguished by their design, either vignette or conjoint. Eighty-six of our 158 studies are vignette designs which present respondents with a scenario about a single country in prose and elicit preferences or beliefs; regime type sometimes varies on its own and more often is one of several factors crossed within the text. 72 studies are conjoint designs which ask respondents to evaluate country profiles with randomly varying attributes. We define conjoint broadly to include both single-profile rating designs and dual-profile forced-choice designs (Kiratli, 2024; Rudolph, Freitag and Thurner, 2024).<sup>10</sup> The studies were fielded both in-person

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<sup>8</sup>There was quite a bit of variation in how regime type was treated, from bare-bones information to rich and detailed descriptions, in some cases bundled with other concepts and in others manipulated on its own. See Table 1 in the main text for examples.

<sup>9</sup>We excluded studies in which the treatment was related to regime type but not comparable to our focal contrast (democracy/autocracy). Mon and Yamada (2024), for example, assigned regime type by describing whether “elections were restored” or not. Other exclusions include studies manipulating backsliding (Goldsmith et al., 2025), or manipulating regime type only within an autocratic context (Escribà-Folch, Muradova and Rodon, 2021; Papp et al., 2024). Each study was counted once even if it appeared in multiple publications (e.g., Johns and Davies, 2012 and Johns and Davies, 2019 draw on the same study). We also excluded studies whose outcomes did not fit our eight broad categories, and a small number for which replication data could not be obtained after searching journal pages, author websites, and public repositories, along with contacting authors directly. We show in Appendix R that the estimates we could extract from the published pages of these papers are not distinguishable from the distribution of effects we estimate on the studies we could obtain (Welch  $t$ -test  $p = 0.32$ ).

<sup>10</sup>The term “conjoint” is sometimes reserved for dual-profile forced-choice designs on the grounds that choice between profiles is a necessary feature. We use it in its standard methodological sense: any design in which a respondent evaluates profiles whose attributes are independently randomized (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Single-profile rating conjoint and dual-profile forced-choice conjoint both satisfy this definition.



(Spilker, Bernauer and Umaña, 2016; Kiratli, 2021) and online (Lupu and Wallace, 2024), on samples ranging from students (Wick, 2014) to elites (Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023; Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023; Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021) to representative and diverse general-public samples (Johns and Davies, 2019; Donahue and Crescenzi, 2023). The data come from 51 different countries, with the United States ( $n = 65$ ) appearing most often, followed by the United Kingdom ( $n = 10$ ), India ( $n = 7$ ), and China ( $n = 6$ ). Figure 1 displays the full structure of the dataset: outcome categories on the y-axis, year fielded on the x-axis, with dot area proportional to sample size. A complete study-by-variable coverage matrix (outcomes, individual-level moderators, and cross-randomizations for all 158 studies) appears in Appendix D.




Figure 1: Study inventory: all studies by outcome category and year fielded.

*Note:* Each circle is one (year, outcome category, design) cell, and the number inside indicates how many studies fall in that cell. Circle area is proportional to the total number of respondents from those studies, above a certain threshold (with 122 in the smallest cell, and 33,330 in the largest). Vignette studies are depicted with a solid circle, and conjoint studies with a dashed one. The horizontal axis corresponds to the year a study was *fielded*, which for ten studies in six papers precedes the publication year, so the axis begins in 2008 while the corpus spans articles published from 2012-2026.

Table 2 summarizes the composition of the dataset by outcome category and by treatment manipulation type (how the democracy-versus-autocracy contrast is signaled to respondents), reporting the number of studies ( $k$ ), papers ( $p$ ), and total sample size ( $N$ ); the substantive scenario of each study is catalogued separately in Appendix K.

Table 2: Dataset overview by design, outcome category, and treatment manipulation type

|                                       | Studies | Papers | Respondents |
|---------------------------------------|---------|--------|-------------|
| <i>By design</i>                      |         |        |             |
| Vignette                              | 86      | 36     | 144,940     |
| Conjoint                              | 72      | 19     | 84,282      |
| <i>By outcome category</i>            |         |        |             |
| Support for cooperation               | 41      | 17     | 63,550      |
| Support for use of force              | 51      | 23     | 86,827      |
| Favorability                          | 57      | 10     | 73,714      |
| Threat perception                     | 11      | 6      | 15,926      |
| Morality                              | 11      | 5      | 15,858      |
| Success                               | 15      | 6      | 17,366      |
| Cost                                  | 8       | 4      | 9,600       |
| Resolve                               | 11      | 4      | 18,421      |
| <i>By treatment manipulation type</i> |         |        |             |
| Bare regime label                     | 75      | 30     | 119,944     |
| Electoral institutions                | 60      | 11     | 77,058      |
| Combined (elections + rights)         | 8       | 4      | 10,901      |
| Civil liberties / norms               | 5       | 2      | 7,403       |
| Governance score                      | 1       | 1      | 1,390       |
| Not yet classified                    | 9       | 5      | 12,526      |

*Note:* Each panel reports the same  $k = 158$  studies from  $p = 53$  papers a different way: by type of experimental design, by category of outcome variable (which contains overlaps, since the same study can measure multiple outcomes), and by the way democracy is manipulated. See Appendix K for information about the substantive focus of the experimental scenarios.

## 2.3 Standardization

We standardize the original studies in terms of the treatment versus control contrasts, outcome variables, and pre-treatment covariate information. Our main treatment, regime type, is coded as a factor variable with two main levels: “Non-democracy” (level = 0) and “Democracy” (level = 1). When studies include intermediate categories such as partial democracy, weak democracy, or anocracy, we restrict our main

analysis to the sample assigned to the two polar conditions only.<sup>11</sup> Neundorff et al. (2026) and Chu, Williamson and Yeung (2025) use this design, where three conjoint attributes (elections, executive constraints, free speech in the former; leadership selection, civil liberties, institutional checks in the latter) jointly define regime type; the resulting exclusions are documented in Appendix Table A2.

In addition to regime type, we include any cross-randomized treatment variables that may have been included in the original studies. These include the relationship with the home country, such as military alliances or trade relations (Bell and Quek, 2018; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; Levin and Kobayashi, 2022; Tomz and Weeks, 2013); the target country’s behavior, such as violations of humanitarian law or human rights abuses (Tomz and Weeks, 2020; Lupu and Wallace, 2024); and the stakes (e.g., low or high), as represented by military or economic costs (Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022). These treatment variables are not standardized into a common format across studies but are instead included as is, either as factors or numeric variables.

We analyze two cross-randomized treatment variables that appear frequently enough across studies to support meta-analytic pooling of their interaction with the democracy treatment: 1) target country’s alliance status (Smetana, Vranka and Rosendorf, 2026; Levin and Kobayashi, 2022; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; Tomz and Weeks, 2013, 2021), and 2) violation of human rights laws or practice (Lupu and Wallace, 2024; Tomz and Weeks, 2020). We estimate the regime-type ATEs within each level

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<sup>11</sup>We hold the intermediate arm out rather than fold it into the “Non-democracy” baseline. Appendix P reports the outcome means at all three levels for each of the sixteen studies. We apply the same logic when studies use multiple conjoint attributes to manipulate regime type: a country is coded as “Democracy” only when every regime-relevant attribute is democratic, and as “Non-democracy” only when every such attribute is autocratic. When attributes differ in whether they are democratic or autocratic, the observation is excluded from the main analysis. Excluding an intermediate or self-referential regime condition also reduces the number of respondents contributing to our estimate below the paper’s own reported sample size, as distinct from designs where the same condition is excluded at the task or profile level without dropping any respondent entirely.

of these variables, and then pool the interaction via random-effects meta-analysis.

Turning to our dependent variable measures, Table 3 lists the eight outcome categories into which we group the original studies’ measures, with the constituent question types in each. We rescale all outcomes to fall in the  $[0, 1]$  range, where 0 indicates the minimum possible response and 1 indicates the maximum. For outcomes measured on  $k$ -point Likert scales  $([1, k])$ , we apply the transformation  $(\text{raw response} - 1)/(k - 1)$ , and we leave binary outcomes as-is. We ensure higher values always indicate greater levels of the outcome (e.g., more supportive, favorable, or resolved), reverse-coding scales when necessary to maintain this convention.<sup>12</sup> In a small number of studies, our primary outcome averages two or more of the original paper’s own distinct survey items into a single index, rather than rescaling a single item the original authors already reported; each such case is a meta-analytic coding decision, not a misdescription of what the original study measured, and is noted individually in Appendix Table A2. Kiratli (2025), Mattes and Weeks (2025), Bassan-Nygate et al. (2025), and Lupu and Wallace (2024) are the cases in our corpus with this design.

One further harmonization applies specifically to the use-of-force category. In the great majority of these studies the country whose regime is randomized is the *target* of the contemplated military action, so a “negative democracy effect” means respondents are less willing to attack a democracy. Four studies reverse that framing: the randomized country is the party the force would *protect*. In Musgrave and Ward (2023), for example, it is the victim of an attack whose regime type is randomized separately from the aggressor’s, and respondents choose which victim they would

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<sup>12</sup>We report scale-standardized effects throughout the main text. Appendix O reports the main meta-analysis using variance-standardized effects (Cohen’s  $d$ ). We divide each raw effect by the control-group standard deviation, allowing us to compare effects across studies with different outcome scales. This is also the standard approach in psychological meta-analysis. The results are substantively unchanged.

more willingly defend; in Lin, Fu and Chang-Liao (2026) it is an invaded country the United States might defend. Each paper contributes two studies, which is where the four come from. We reverse-code these four outcomes before estimation so that they all have the same interpretation: support for military action against the country whose regime is randomized. We retain each paper’s original coding alongside the harmonized coding in the replication materials. Note that this is a property of the individual design rather than of the scenario family: three studies with superficially similar ally-defense framing (Muradova and Gildea, 2021; Kiratli, 2024) randomize the regime of the attack target or the aggressor, not of a protected party, and so require no adjustment.

To improve the precision of our estimates, we include relevant pre-treatment variables from the original studies as covariates in our model. These covariates include basic demographic variables such as gender, age, education, race, income, and marital status, as well as individual predispositions, such as political attitudes and foreign policy preferences (e.g., party identification, ideology, isolationism, internationalism, hawkishness, and military assertiveness). In some cases, baseline interest in and knowledge of political news or foreign policy issues are added. All included covariates are either linearly rescaled to  $[0, 1]$  (e.g., age, education, hawkishness), coded as a binary indicator (e.g., gender–male, race–white), or entered as an unordered factor variable (e.g., party identification; Democrat / Independent / Republican). If we encounter any missingness in the covariates, we use median imputation to ensure we do not lose any observations to listwise deletion (Gerber and Green, 2012). When study weights are provided in the original data, we include them; otherwise, we assign equal weights to all observations (weight = 1).

|                    | Outcome                  | N (%)       | Example                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Preferences</i> | Support for cooperation  | 41<br>(26%) | (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022) “Given the facts described in the article, do you support increasing trade with this country?”                                           |
|                    | Support for use of force | 51<br>(32%) | (Tomz and Weeks, 2013) “Would you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country’s nuclear development sites?”                                         |
| <i>Perceptions</i> | Favorability             | 57<br>(36%) | (Chu, Williamson and Yeung, 2025) “Which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?”                                                                         |
|                    | Threat perception        | 11 (7%)     | (Lacina and Lee, 2013) “How would you rate the potential threat that this country is building a nuclear weapon to use against U.S. allies?”                           |
|                    | Morality                 | 11 (7%)     | (Lupu and Wallace, 2024) “Do you think the [Foreign Government]’s conduct is morally acceptable?”                                                                     |
|                    | Success                  | 15 (9%)     | (Tomz and Weeks, 2020) “If the United States attacked this country’s nuclear development sites, how likely is it that the attack would succeed?”                      |
|                    | Cost                     | 8 (5%)      | (Chaudoin, Gaines and Livny, 2021) “If the United States attacked this country’s nuclear development sites, how many American soldiers do you think would be killed?” |
|                    | Resolve                  | 11 (7%)     | (Dafoe, Zwetsloot and Cebul, 2021) “What is your best estimate about whether Country A will back down in this dispute?”                                               |

Table 3: Outcome categories in meta-analysis dataset ( $k = 158$  studies)

We additionally test for heterogeneity across six individual-level moderators: hawkishness, ethnocentrism, nationalism, survey attentiveness, partisanship, and gender.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>To be clear, we never use imputed covariate values for descriptions of effect heterogeneity. Operationalization details for each appear in Appendix A.

**Design-level metrics** To examine whether design features moderate the democracy treatment effect, we code three study-level characteristics for all text-based studies: log vignette word count, number of non-regime informational cues, and a researcher-coded abstraction score on a 1–5 ordinal scale (1 = concrete, real-world referents; 5 = fully stylized, generic labels). The abstraction score captures scenario abstraction, rather than abstraction of the treatment itself, which we consider separately in other analyses. Full coding criteria and examples appear in Appendix C.

## 2.4 Estimands and Estimators

Our analysis recovers three main estimands. First, we estimate the per-study average effect of regime type on each outcome, both as a difference-in-means (DIM) and as a covariate-adjusted OLS estimate, with standard errors clustered on the respondent wherever a respondent contributes more than one observation. In a vignette study this is an ordinary average treatment effect. For conjoint studies, we use the average marginal component effect (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014), which captures the change in the outcome attributable to the democracy attribute, averaged over the distribution of the other attributes. The regression is estimated at the profile level. We do not distinguish between rating and forced-choice conjoint designs because the estimator is the same in both cases. In forced-choice designs, respondents make a choice between two profiles, while in rating designs, they evaluate each profile independently. Both designs still estimate the same average change in the outcome when a profile is assigned a democratic rather than a non-democratic regime type, where zero indicates no difference between democracy and non-democracy. We therefore pool the two designs.

Second, we pool per-study ATEs and AMCEs within each outcome category using



a multivariate random-effects meta-analysis (`metafor` package). The model treats each study as drawing its true effect from a distribution with mean  $\mu$  and between-study variance  $\tau^2$ , and uses a block-diagonal variance-covariance matrix to account for correlations among estimates from the same study. We estimate pooled effects on the full combined dataset of vignette and conjoint studies and use the `design_type` indicator (Vignette or Conjoint) tagged to each estimate as a moderator in secondary analyses. We use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the study level.

Third, we estimate conditional ATEs (CATEs) for individual-level moderators when these are available in the original studies. For each moderator, we divide respondents into subgroups, re-estimate the DIM and OLS models separately for each subgroup, and then pool the subgroup ATEs using random-effects meta-analysis. We do this for six individual-level moderators: hawkishness (Hawk / Neither / Dove), ethnocentrism (High / Low), nationalism (High / Low), survey attentiveness (Attentive / Inattentive), partisanship (Conservative / Liberal), and gender (Woman / Man). Whether a respondent comes from an elite or mass sample is a characteristic of the *sample* rather than the individual respondent. We therefore treat it separately, matching each elite study with comparable public samples in Appendix M rather than splitting respondents within studies. We report the hawkishness and elite results in the main text given their theoretical interest; results for the remaining five individual-level moderators appear in Appendix L.

### 3 The Meta-Analytic Effects of Democracy

#### 3.1 Effects on Preferences for Force and Cooperation

Figure 2 plots the democracy treatment effect for each study in our combined dataset of vignette and conjoint designs, for support for cooperation (top) and support for the use of force (bottom). Vignette and conjoint estimates appear in different colors; both are on the same scale. All 41 cooperation estimates are positive. Of the 51 “use of force” estimates, 49 (96%) are negative; the two positive exceptions (one conjoint estimate and one vignette estimate) are near zero and non-significant.<sup>14</sup> On the central issue of how regime type affects preferences for the use of force and cooperation with other states, our results are stark and consistent: describing a country as a democracy increases the desire to cooperate with them and decreases the desire to use force against them. Our analysis here aggregates different types of cooperation, and Appendix I shows that the two well-populated types return similar estimates: 9.1 pp for trade ( $k = 12$ ) and 7.6 pp for military alliances ( $k = 23$ ).<sup>15</sup> Effects are reported throughout the main text in percentage points on the common 0–1 outcome scale. Appendix O reproduces the analysis in control-group standard deviations (Cohen’s  $d$ ), where democracy lowers support for the use of force by 0.18 SD and raises support for cooperation by 0.23 SD, leaving our substantive conclusions unchanged.

#### 3.2 Effects on Beliefs about Democracies

Seventy-seven studies in our dataset measure the causal effect of the democracy treatment on respondents’ beliefs about the target country across six dimensions: gen-

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<sup>14</sup>Detailed forest plots by outcome category appear in Appendix F.

<sup>15</sup>The remaining two are thinner, and we report here for completeness: foreign aid at 13.6 pp ( $k = 2$ ) and a residual category of environmental and general cooperation at 7.0 pp ( $k = 4$ ).




Figure 2: Effect of democracy manipulation on support for the use of force and cooperation

*Note:* Each point is an OLS estimate from a single study; horizontal segments are 95% confidence intervals. Blue points are vignette designs; orange points are conjoint designs. The diamond marks the combined meta-analytic mean  $\hat{\mu}$ ; the thick grey bar is its 95% confidence interval, from a multilevel random-effects model with robust cluster standard errors by study. All estimates are in percentage points (pp); negative values for use of force indicate that democracy treatment reduces willingness to use force, while positive values for cooperation indicate a democracy treatment increases willingness to cooperate.

eral favorability ( $k = 57$ , predominantly forced-choice conjoints), threat perception ( $k = 11$ ), morality ( $k = 11$ ), expected military success ( $k = 15$ ), expected conflict cost ( $k = 8$ ), and resolve ( $k = 11$ ). Figure 3 presents pooled estimates for each belief category. Every category is plotted on its own natural scale, so a positive estimate means democracy raises the quantity the category names. The direction that favors democracy therefore differs across categories: for threat perception it is negative, and for the other five it is positive.

With one exception, every belief moves in a direction consistent with the pref-




Figure 3: Effect of democracy manipulation on beliefs about the target country

*Note:* Blue points are vignette studies; orange points are conjoints. Each diamond is a pooled random-effects estimate with a 95% confidence interval; all estimates in percentage points, coded so that positive estimates indicate that democracy raises that quantity.

erence findings. Democracy raises perceived morality of states by  $\hat{\mu} = 9.2$  pp.<sup>16</sup> Democracy lowers perceived threat,  $\hat{\mu} = -6.5$  pp: democratic adversaries are seen as less dangerous.<sup>17</sup> Attacking a democracy is seen as more costly by  $\hat{\mu} = 2.3$  pp and democracies are perceived as more likely to succeed militarily by  $\hat{\mu} = 3.9$  pp.<sup>18</sup> Finally, democracy substantially raises favorability ratings ( $\hat{\mu} = 14.9$  pp).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup>95% CI: [6.4, 12.1],  $p < 0.001$ ;  $k = 11$ .

<sup>17</sup>95% CI: [-9.7, -3.2],  $p = 0.001$ ;  $k = 11$ .

<sup>18</sup>Costly: 95% CI: [0.3, 4.3],  $p = 0.029$ ;  $k = 8$ . Militarily capable: 95% CI: [2.4, 5.3],  $p < 0.001$ ;  $k = 15$ .

<sup>19</sup>95% CI: [12.8, 17.0],  $p < 0.001$ ;  $k = 57$ , predominantly forced-choice conjoint designs.

Resolve is the systematic exception. Democracy *reduces* perceived resolve by  $\hat{\mu} = -2.2$  pp., a finding that is difficult to reconcile with myriad works on “democratic credibility” (e.g., Schultz, 1998; Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tarar and Leventoglu, 2009).<sup>20</sup> Our finding does, however, fit neatly with the pessimist school that called such credibility into question (e.g., Downes and Sechser, 2012; Crisman-Cox, 2022).

The democracy label activates a characteristic set of beliefs: democracies are seen as more moral, less threatening, more likely to succeed in war, and costlier to attack, but less resolute. We do not claim that these beliefs form a causal pathway from the treatment to preferences in a formal mediation sense. Rather, the experiments show that democracy treatments produce systematically different belief profiles, and that these differences are *consistent* with the direction of the preference effects.

Table 4 consolidates the pooled estimates for all eight outcome categories. The two preference outcomes show the largest effects in absolute magnitude. Among the six perception outcomes, morality, threat, success and cost all move in the expected direction; resolve is the single outcome that moves against the pattern.<sup>21</sup>

Notably, we find no smoking gun evidence for publication bias. As detailed in Appendix G, we cannot distinguish our estimated selection parameters from the no-selection null of  $\lambda = 1$ ; further, we find that the selection-adjusted estimates of the average effects (8.4 pp for cooperation and  $-6.9$  pp for use of force) are quite close to the unadjusted estimates (8.3 pp and  $-6.5$  pp, respectively). At least one partial explanation for the stability of the findings is that a large number of our estimates comes from studies in which democracy was *not* the focal treatment, and thus unlikely to result in selection for significant results.

Finally, between-study heterogeneity is substantial for all categories, indicating

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<sup>20</sup>95% CI:  $[-4.3, -0.1]$ ,  $p = 0.045$ ;  $k = 11$ .

<sup>21</sup>Study-level forest plots for every outcome category appear in Appendix F.

that these pooled estimates describe a distribution of effects rather than a single quantity. We turn to explaining that variation below.

Table 4: Meta-analytic estimates of the democracy treatment effect, by outcome category

| Outcome                  | $k$ | $p$ | $N$    | $\hat{\mu}$ (pp) | $\hat{\tau}$ (pp) | $p_Q$  |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|--------|------------------|-------------------|--------|
| <i>Preferences</i>       |     |     |        |                  |                   |        |
| Support for cooperation  | 41  | 17  | 63,550 | 8.3<br>(1.0)     | 6.2               | <0.001 |
| Support for use of force | 51  | 23  | 86,827 | -6.5<br>(0.9)    | 6.2               | <0.001 |
| <i>Perceptions</i>       |     |     |        |                  |                   |        |
| Favorability             | 57  | 10  | 73,714 | 14.9<br>(1.1)    | 7.7               | <0.001 |
| Threat perception        | 11  | 6   | 15,926 | -6.5<br>(1.5)    | 4.5               | <0.001 |
| Morality                 | 11  | 5   | 15,858 | 9.2<br>(1.3)     | 3.5               | 0.003  |
| Success                  | 15  | 6   | 17,366 | 3.9<br>(0.7)     | 2.2               | <0.001 |
| Cost                     | 8   | 4   | 9,600  | 2.3<br>(0.8)     | 1.7               | 0.042  |
| Resolve                  | 11  | 4   | 18,421 | -2.2<br>(0.9)    | 2.8               | <0.001 |

*Note:* Random-effects meta-analysis (`rma.mv`) with covariate-adjusted OLS estimates, and cluster-robust standard errors (`clubSandwich` CR2). All estimates are reported in percentage points, with vignette ATEs and conjoint AMCEs pooled on a common 0-1 scale. For each outcome,  $k$  denotes the number of studies,  $p$  papers, and  $N$  respondents;  $\hat{\mu}$  indicates the pooled average treatment effect of democracy, while  $\hat{\tau}$  captures between-study heterogeneity, and  $p_Q$  is Cochran's  $Q$   $p$ -value. All outcomes are reported on their natural scale, such that positive values indicate that democracy raises that quantity.

## 4 Explaining Variation in Democracy’s Attitudinal Effects

The estimates in Figure 2 are sign-consistent but spread in magnitude: democracy’s effects are *consistent* but *heterogeneous*. Table 4 quantifies the spread: the between-study heterogeneity standard deviation  $\hat{\tau}$  is 6.2 pp for both cooperation and use of force, large relative to the pooled estimates of 8.3 pp and  $-6.5$  pp, respectively. Cochran’s  $Q$  test rejects homogeneity for all eight outcome categories ( $p < 0.05$  throughout). We thus conclude that these pooled estimates summarize wide distributions of study-level effects, not a single underlying quantity. We consider three classes of explanation for this heterogeneity: individual-level respondent characteristics, study-level contextual features, and design features.

### 4.1 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

Figure 4 presents pooled CATE estimates by hawkishness group (Hawk / Neither / Dove) for the two preference outcomes from vignette studies with validated hawkishness measures.

We find that even if doves are intrinsically more likely to cooperate and hawks are more likely to use military force in a general sense, they are more or less equally affected by democracy treatments. For cooperation ( $k = 4$  studies), the hawk–dove difference is negligible (pooled interaction:  $b = 0.5$  pp,  $SE = 0.7$  pp). For use of force studies ( $k = 9$ ), the pattern is actually in the opposite direction: hawks are slightly *more* reluctant to use force against democracies (compared to doves) (pooled hawk–dove interaction:  $b = -4.4$  pp,  $SE = 2.1$  pp), suggesting that the democratic peace inhibition on the use of force is, if anything, *more* pronounced among those

most willing to use it. Full study-level forest plots for both outcomes appear in Appendix F.




Figure 4: Pooled democracy effects on preferences by respondent hawkishness group.

*Note:* Points are pooled meta-analytic estimates (multilevel random-effects model, robust cluster standard errors by study); horizontal lines are 95% CIs. Vignette studies with validated hawkishness measures only ( $k = 4$  cooperation,  $k = 9$  use of force). Note that these are a much smaller subsample than the one behind Figure 2. Full study-level forest plots appear in Appendix F.

One important alternate candidate for individual-level heterogeneity is the “elite-ness” of the sample. In Appendix M we match our four elite samples to similar studies fielded on mass public samples. Three of the four elite estimates are statistically indistinguishable from their matched public averages, reinforcing earlier work on the topic (Kertzer, 2022; Kertzer and Renshon, 2022), while the fourth, from Scholten and Zhirkov (2025), is not. Appendix L finds similar nulls for a variety of other individual-level factors: neither nationalism, ethnocentrism, partisanship nor gender provides much help in explaining individual-level variation in democracy treatment effects.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Survey attentiveness is a partial exception: respondents who passed every attention check their study fielded show democracy effects on support for the use of force that are 2.9 percentage points stronger (i.e., more negative) than respondents who failed at least one ( $k = 9$ , 95% CI:  $-5.6, -0.2$ ),



## 4.2 Study-Level Heterogeneity: Temporal Trends

One clear implication of the “crisis of democracy” argument is that democracy has lost its luster over the last decade. More broadly, it is possible that the geopolitical salience and meaning of democracy shifted over the time period in our dataset, which spans nearly two decades. To address these questions, we use actual study fielding dates (not publication years) to time-stamp each estimate in Figure 5, which plots the years-since-fielding trend for each outcome category. We center the year variable at 2014, so each intercept in Appendix Table A16 is the model-implied democracy effect in that year and each slope is the average change per year.

Our findings are clear. None of the four outcome categories with enough coverage to fit a trend shows a statistically significant one: cooperation ( $b = -0.1$  pp/yr,  $SE = 0.3$ ), use of force ( $b = -0.1$  pp/yr,  $SE = 0.2$ ), favorability ( $b = -1.1$  pp/yr,  $SE = 0.6$ ), and resolve ( $b = 0.1$  pp/yr,  $SE = 0.4$ ) are all indistinguishable from zero.<sup>23</sup> The democracy treatment effect on both main preference outcomes has been stable across the full observation window, including the post-2016 period of heightened concern about democratic backsliding. The allure of democracy in public opinion has not eroded over the past two decades.

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but the pooled interaction across all outcome categories is a precise null ( $-0.6$  points, 95% CI:  $-3.1, 2.0$ ). Two features of this analysis argue against reading it as evidence that inattentive respondents dilute the treatment effect. First, seven of its nine studies are country samples drawn from a single multi-country paper (Bassan-Nygate et al., 2025), so the cell carries much less independent information than  $k = 9$  suggests. Second, the checks are content-free screeners rather than manipulation checks, such that it can only speak to whether respondents were paying attention to the survey as a whole, rather than comparing between respondents who did and did not absorb the treatment. See Appendix A, alongside the study-level estimates in Figure A16.

<sup>23</sup>The remaining four categories (threat, morality, success, and cost) are each carried by too few studies spread over too short a window to support a trend, and are omitted from Figure 5 for that reason.




Figure 5: Democracy treatment effect by year of fielding, with meta-regression trend, by outcome category.

*Note:* Points are study-level OLS democracy treatment effects in percentage points with 95% confidence intervals; the line is the fitted meta-regression and 95% band. Each panel also depicts the meta-regression coefficient on years since 2014, in percentage points per year, with cluster-robust standard errors. See Appendix Tables A16- Table A17 for additional details.

### 4.3 Study-Level Heterogeneity: Political Context

Normative theories of the democratic peace rely on the argument that democracies externalize liberal values and norms of conflict-resolution in their foreign policy (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Friedman, 2008). The claim is not that democracies refrain from fighting altogether, but that they refrain from fighting each other. It follows that citizens in autocracies, who by assumption lack these norms, should be equally willing to use force against democracies and autocracies.

We find strong evidence that political context moderates support for the use of force against democracies, mixed evidence of moderation for cooperation with democracies and no evidence that studies fielded in autocratic contexts yield different estimates of the favorability of democracies. Figure 6 displays meta-regressions of study-level estimates on three categorical operationalizations of respondent-country democracy: Freedom House civil liberties, Polity5, and V-Dem Regimes of the World.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Freedom House: High: CL 1–2; Medium: 3–4; Low: 5–6. Polity: Democracy / Anocracy /

Plotted coefficients are deviations from the most-democratic reference category.<sup>25</sup>

In the studies fielded in democratic contexts, support for cooperation with democracies is around 9 percentage points higher than it is for cooperation with autocracies, consistent with the argument that respondents prefer to cooperate with democratic countries. That “democracy effect” in democratic contexts is roughly three times the size of the same estimate ( $\approx 2.5 - 3$  percentage points) generated from studies fielded in the most autocratic countries. All six less-democratic deviations (the difference between the most democratic contexts and less democratic ones) are negative, and the three least-free categories agree closely on magnitude.<sup>26</sup> While all estimates of moderation for this outcome are negative, only two of the six deviations exclude zero after cluster-robust adjustment: the anocracy/democracy contrast for Polity and the low/high civil liberties contrast from Freedom House.<sup>27</sup>

We also find evidence that political context moderates the effect of democracy on support for use of force. Overall, democracy *reduces* support for use of force in democratic contexts by between 6.4 and 6.8 percentage points, consistent with many democratic peace arguments. Estimates of deviations from this in the most autocratic contexts are positive; enough to make the effect smaller but not reverse the sign. The magnitude of the moderation is similar to the outcome of cooperation: use of force estimates from autocratic contexts are roughly two-fifths the size of corresponding estimates in democratic contexts, significant across all three operationalizations (V-

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Autocracy. V-Dem: Democracy / Electoral autocracy / Closed autocracy.

<sup>25</sup>Appendix Tables A18 to A20 report every coefficient with its standard error, study and paper counts, and measures of residual heterogeneity.

<sup>26</sup>−5.9 pp under Freedom House, −6.6 pp under Polity, and −6.4 pp under V-Dem.

<sup>27</sup>Freedom House Low:  $b = -5.9$  pp,  $SE = 1.5$ ; Polity Anocracy:  $b = -5.5$  pp,  $SE = 1.5$ . The other four are FH Medium (−0.3 pp,  $SE = 5.6$ ), Polity Autocracy (−6.6 pp,  $SE = 2.2$ ), V-Dem Electoral autocracy (−1.9 pp,  $SE = 3.5$ ) and V-Dem Closed autocracy (−6.4 pp,  $SE = 2.2$ ). The precision of the estimates is partly determined by the number of studies in a given category and more autocratic/less free categories have far fewer study observations in them than more free contexts in our dataset: there are only five studies in Freedom House “Low,” three in Polity Anocracy, and two each in Polity Autocracy and V-Dem Closed autocracy.

Dem, Freedom House and Polity).<sup>28</sup>

In sum, we find evidence that political context moderates the two preference outcomes, but does not appear change other, more general beliefs about democracies. Both preference patterns run in the direction predicted by identity-based accounts: respondents in the least free countries show a smaller cooperative premium for democracies, and among those same respondents, the reluctance to use force against a democracy is roughly two-fifths of what it is in the freest contexts. In both cases, the moderation is driven by the autocratic end of the spectrum rather than exhibiting a continuous effect across the full scale. Such evidence is inconsistent with the sharp intergroup distinction described by some variants of normative arguments. Favorability shows no significant moderation, suggesting that seeing democracies as attractive countries does not depend on the political context respondents inhabit, even where their willingness to act on that view does.<sup>29</sup>

## 4.4 Design Heterogeneity

The last design feature we consider is the experimental format itself. One may reasonably expect a conjoint, where regime type competes for attention with six or eight other attributes, to produce a smaller democracy effect than a vignette which regime type is one of only a very few bits of information. However, we find no evidence that that is the case in our data. Figure 8 regresses the study-level estimate on a conjoint indicator, with the full specification in Appendix Table A15. The deviation is  $-1.3$  pp (SE = 2.0) for cooperation,  $-0.9$  pp (SE = 3.5) for use of force, and  $+5.3$  pp

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<sup>28</sup>Estimates for “intermediate categories” are less clear, with both positive and negative deviations across the three measurements of political context, with none being significant. Thus, our evidence supports attenuation among respondents in the most autocratic contexts, rather than a monotonic gradient across the full range.

<sup>29</sup>Its six deviations are mixed in sign, three negative and three positive, ranging from  $-3.5$  to  $+3.4$  pp, and none is statistically significant.




Figure 6: Moderation by respondent-country democratic status

*Note:* Panel A operationalizes democratic status using Freedom House civil liberties scores; Panel B uses Polity5 data, and Panel C uses V-Dem. Each panel presents pooled estimates from multilevel random-effects meta-regression (`rma.mv`), with cluster-robust SEs; points are individual study estimates, while diamonds and bars are meta-analytic pooled estimates. See Appendix Tables A18, A19, and A20 for additional details.

(SE = 3.7) for favorability. None approaches conventional significance, the three do not agree in sign, and for cooperation and use of force the moderator leaves *more* residual heterogeneity than the intercept-only model does. Whatever divides these studies from one another, it is not the format their designers chose.

Within vignette studies, we examined another source of variation: the abstractness of the vignette (Brutger et al., 2023). We focus on three characteristics of the experimental instrument that moderate effect size: log word count, number of non-regime informational cues, and a researcher-coded abstraction score (1 = concrete, real-world referents; 5 = fully stylized, generic labels). Figure 7 plots each characteristic against the democracy treatment effect with the fitted bivariate meta-regression, run separately within each outcome category; Appendix Tables A10 to A12 report the full specifications.

Interestingly, despite evidence from other studies that the level of abstraction can affect the results researchers obtain, the regime type treatments are robust to this design feature. Not one of the twelve slopes in Appendix Tables A10 to A12 reaches conventional significance: not for cooperation or use of force ( $k = 43$  for use of force in all three, and  $k = 24$  for cooperation in the information-cue and abstraction fits, 18 in the word-count fit, where several studies report no word count), and not for the two perception outcomes, where the estimates are in any case carried by a handful of vignette studies apiece. In sum, we do not find that longer, more complex, or more abstract vignettes produce systematically larger effects on the main preference outcomes.

One final source of design heterogeneity concerns the scenarios used in the experiments. Fully 29 of 51 use of force studies use the *exact* scenario introduced by Tomz and Weeks (2013).<sup>30</sup> This heavy reliance on one important experimental

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<sup>30</sup>Of course, some uses of the same scenario are in the context of methods papers that simply

paradigm opens the field up to the downsides of “design harmonization” highlighted by Wilke and Samii (2026). While exact replications do enhance our ability to estimate cross-contextual differences in effects, they also repeat whatever idiosyncratic design artifacts that might be present. Fortunately, in Appendix [K](#), we are able to show that other scenario designs do not yield significantly different results, suggesting that the meta-analytic results are not an artifact of one particular design choice.

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replicate high profile papers, as in Bassan-Nygate et al. (2025).




Figure 7: Democracy treatment effects by design characteristics

*Note:* Each row operationalizes the level of abstraction of the experimental vignette in a different way: based on the logged number of words in the vignette, the number of non-regime information cues, and the researcher-coded abstraction score. Points depict study-level OLS democracy treatment effects in percentage points, accompanied by 95% CIs, the line depicts the fitted meta-regression with its own 95% band. None of the moderator coefficients (shown on each panel its cluster-robust SE) are significant. See Appendix Tables A10, A11 and A12 for details.






Figure 8: Comparing democracy treatment effects between vignette and conjoint experiments

*Note:* Each point is a study-level democracy treatment effect in percentage points; black diamonds are the model-predicted level for each experimental design type, with 95% CIs. Each panel lists the difference between conjoint experiments and vignette experiments, with cluster-robust standard errors. See Appendix Table [A15](#) for details.

## 5 Discussion

Just as democracy has been under retreat around the globe, it has also been under attack in IR, as a new wave of revisionist scholarship has challenged established understandings about democratic advantages across a wide swath of foreign policy domains. Since many of these theories of democratic advantages operate through the beliefs of citizens and elites, whether normative theories of the democratic peace arguing that citizens perceive attacking fellow democracies as morally wrong, or theories of trade preferences arguing that democratic citizens prefer trading with democracies because they perceive them as sharing their interests – we can harness the proliferation of experimental research in IR that randomizes regime type to study the robustness and generalizability of democracy’s attitudinal effects at a scale not possible when analyzing a single experiment at a time. Aggregating across 158 survey experiments published in political science and IR journals from 2012-2026 that randomize regime type, we obtain four key findings.

First, the attitudinal effects of democracy are remarkably sign-consistent: among the 51 experiments studying support for the use of force, for example, 49 of them display a negative effect of democracy; of the 41 experiments studying support for cooperation, all 41 display a positive effect for democracy. In Appendix [H](#), we present estimates of sign-generalizability that, even accounting for the uncertainty in the effect estimates, are substantively very high. Just as Levy (1988, 661-2) argued that the democratic peace was the closest thing the field of International Relations has to a law, we find something similarly law-like at the individual level, holding across nearly two decades, 51 countries, and every experimental framing we observe. Crucially, this law applies to the sign of the effect, rather than its size: the 2 exceptions for the use of force, one conjoint and one vignette, are near zero rather than reversed.

Second, despite growing popular concerns about democracies in crisis, we find that the allure of democracies persists over time in our data. We find no significant time trend on either support for the use of force, or support for cooperation, even through the post-2016 backsliding period. Our data cannot tell us whether publics' commitments to democratic norms are eroding (Valgarosson et al., 2025; Hyde and Saunders, 2025), or whether citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with their own democratic political institutions, but they do tell us that preferences to cooperate with, ally with, and not attack democracies have not dissipated during this period.

Third, the attitudinal effects of democracy do vary across political contexts, though perhaps less than identity-based accounts would predict. The democracy effect on "support for cooperation" is highest among subjects in the most democratic countries, but it remains positive (if attenuated) even in the most autocratic states. The reluctance to use force against a democracy behaves the same way, shrinking by four to five percentage points among the least free respondents under all three measures while remaining negative. And, inconsistent with arguments about ingroup favoritism, favorability does not move at all across political contexts: not one of its six contextual deviations is distinguishable from zero, so how attractive a democracy looks does not depend on the political context a respondent inhabits.

In ingroup-based accounts of the democratic peace, individuals favor other democracies because they see them as fellow democrats, so citizens of autocracies should have little reason to show the same effect. However, the moderation we find is only partial, which is difficult to reconcile with a strong ingroup interpretation. Whatever produces this effect seems to be at work even for respondents who do not themselves live under the political system they are evaluating. The results are also inconsistent with explanations of the democratic peace that rely on the content of public opinion; if citizens of both democracies and autocracies are reluctant to use force against

democratic states, public preferences alone are unlikely to explain the broad finding that democracies rarely go to war with each other.

Finally, we find a corresponding lack of heterogeneity along other dimensions as well. We find similar results for hawks versus doves, nationalists versus cosmopolitans, identifiers with conservative versus liberal political parties, political elite versus mass public respondents, and so on. Similarly, the effects of regime type on preferences and perceptions do not meaningfully vary with the level of abstraction of the experimental design (Brutger et al., 2023).

These results suggest a number of important implications. First, we see the directional question as settled: we are unlikely to learn more from further vignette experiments estimating the effect of democracy on support for the use of force or support for cooperation. However, we are on less sure footing regarding *how* and *why* democracy has such effects. We found results for our “belief-based mediators” that were consistent with an account in which democracy changes preferences through a constellation of beliefs associated with the concept. However, these were intent-to-treat estimates on post-treatment outcomes and sequential ignorability cannot be assumed, so this notion should be treated with caution.

We suggest three theoretical possibilities—institutions, reputation, and identity—that might help to explain democracy’s effects, though more work is required to test and adjudicate between them. For example, one explanation consistent with our findings is common understanding of the value of democratic institutions. If democracies are better able to credibly commit to cooperative ventures and thus safer to trade with and less risky to ally with—and observers in autocracies are aware of this—then this helps explain the positive democracy effect on support for cooperation even in autocracies. However, the institutional explanation falls short in explaining our resolve finding: if those same institutions are seen as enabling democracies to

credibly commit to alliances and trade ventures, why is there a *negative* effect on perception of their resolve, given the same underlying explanations?

Similarly, it is possible to construct a reputational (or informational) account. In this framework, democracies have reputations (Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023), which individuals learn from observing the world around them. As democracies conduct themselves on the world stage, beliefs about democratic behavior should update accordingly in response to global events; if democracies fare well (poorly) on the battlefield, for example, observers should tend to believe that democracies have an advantage (disadvantage) in war more generally.

Finally, it is possible that democracy works through identity-based mechanisms. If democracy functions as a signal of group membership or shared identity (Hayes, 2012; Renshon and Powers, 2026), then its effects follow from subjects envisioning it as part of a common ingroup, such that evaluations of and policy preferences towards the country are characterized by ingroup favoritism. In this mechanism, the attitudinal effects of democracy are driven less by prior beliefs about the behavioral implications of political institutions, and more about the affective pull of collective identity. We find some evidence consistent with this pattern, in that aversion to the use of force against democratic targets, or support for cooperation with democratic targets, are both higher in democracies than in their most autocratic counterparts. At the same time, however, although effects vary in size with regime type, they remain statistically significant, and do not disappear, let alone reverse; citizens in autocratic countries also are less supportive of using force against democratic targets than non-democratic ones, and are also more supportive of cooperating with democratic targets than non-democratic ones. Moreover, the outcome variable that would be the most obvious place to look for signs of ingroup favoritism driving attitudinal effects of democracy, favorability, displays no such heterogeneity. Furthermore, a country's regime type is

a noisy proxy for the strength of democratic identification amongst its citizens, which is what a more direct test of identity-based mechanisms would require. This suggests that more than identity may be driving these results, an important question that we hope future studies will take up.

## AI Disclosures

*Cleaning and analysis code:* we wrote cleaning and reanalysis code by hand for the first third of included studies. We then used AI agents to check those files and write the cleaning and analysis code for the remainder.

*Primary study search:* our search was initialized from a human-maintained list of hundreds of IR survey experiments. After we had formalized our inclusion and exclusion criteria, we used AI agents to search for studies we may have missed using those same criteria.

*Bibliographic correctness:* we used AI agents to cross-check every cited reference to obtain the version of record in every case.

*Generation of tables and figures:* We wrote figure and table code by hand that we then used AI agents to improve.

*Soundness of analysis:* we used AI agents to ensure that the estimates reported in the text match the numbers generated by the analysis pipeline exactly.

*Soundness of interpretation:* we used AI agents to check that our prose interpretations were consonant with the statistical results in every instance.

All prose was written by humans, though we admit some typographical errors were identified by AI agents. JR and JK have been using em-dashes since well before Claude existed.

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## **Appendices**

The Second Image Re-Analyzed: The  
Attitudinal Effects of Democracy on  
Conflict and Cooperation

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## A Individual-Level Moderators: Operationalization

We test for heterogeneity in the democracy treatment effect across six individual-level moderators. For each moderator, we construct a binary subgroup indicator within each study and pool the resulting conditional ATEs using a random-effects meta-analysis.

**Hawkishness** In the OLS models, we include hawkishness as a continuous covariate, rescaled to range from 0 to 1. For the heterogeneity analysis, we instead divide respondents into three groups: “Hawk” for scores above 0.5, “Neither” for scores equal to 0.5, and “Dove” for scores below 0.5.

**Ethnocentrism** Available in studies that include a validated in-group favoritism or national-identity scale (Tomz and Weeks, 2013, 2020; Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2025; Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; Kiratli, 2021). The ethnocentrism variable is linearly rescaled to  $[0, 1]$  and then split at each study’s median into ‘High’ and ‘Low’. We used this method within each study to account for distributional differences across survey platforms and respondent populations.

**Nationalism** Where available, we use study-specific nationalism or national identity scales, linearly rescaled to  $[0, 1]$  and split at the study-specific median into ‘High’ and ‘Low’ subgroups. Studies contributing to this analysis span multiple outcome categories and respondent countries (Suong, Desposato and Gartzke, 2020; Johns and Davies, 2019; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022; Tomz and Weeks, 2021; Lupu and Wallace, 2024).

**Survey attentiveness** Operationalized as a binary indicator of whether the respondent passed every attention check embedded in the original survey (1 = passed all; 0 = failed at least one). We count only content-free screeners: instructed-response items, arithmetic, and factual trivia. We exclude manipulation checks, since a question asking the respondent to recall the treatment has an answer that is a function of the treatment. Eighteen studies contain usable attentiveness data (Bassan-Nygate et al., 2025; Chen and Xiong, 2026; Kiratli, 2025; Levin and Kobayashi, 2022; Levin and Musgrave, 2023; Smetana, Vranka and Rosendorf, 2026). Pass rates range from 37% to 98% across those studies.

**Partisanship** Partisanship measures vary by study: some use a 7-point party identification scale, others use a left-right ideological self-placement scale, and still others a binary party affiliation dummy. In all cases, *higher values correspond to more conservative or right-wing identification*, and the variable is linearly rescaled to  $[0, 1]$ . Respondents are split at the study-specific median into ‘Conservative’ and ‘Liberal’

subgroups. We examine partisanship across all four outcome categories where sufficient covariate coverage exists (total 35 studies, including Tomz and Weeks, 2026; Johns and Davies, 2019; Rudolph and Thurner, 2025; Levin and Kobayashi, 2022; Lupu and Wallace, 2024; Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2023).

**Gender** We use each study’s recorded gender variable to construct a binary *Woman* indicator. Studies that record gender as a numeric code without interpretable labels are excluded. We estimate the democracy treatment effect separately for men and women within each study, then pool the gender interaction (Women – Men) via univariate random-effects meta-analysis (REML).

## B Literature Search

We took a two-pronged approach to collecting literature. We began by collecting published papers that utilized experiments in 12 top journals in political science and international relations, combining the four top general-interest journals (*American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*) and 8 IR and comparative field journals (*Comparative Political Studies*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *International Security*, *International Organization*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and *World Politics*) from 2000–2024.

We supplemented this systematic search by adding any papers we could find that fit our inclusion criteria from (1) journal-specific online databases, (2) Google Scholar, (3) papers that cited well-known experimental papers, and, to combat the file-drawer problem (Moniz, Druckman and Freese, 2025), (4) major conference websites (e.g., APSA, MPSA), and (5) TESS pre-registrations. The gathering stage of our search yielded  $\approx 1,550$  papers containing  $\approx 2,850$  studies.

For the following journals, we searched for the term “experiment” and then retained only studies that met our inclusion criteria: *Democratization*, *Review of International Organizations*, *West European Politics*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *European Political Science Review*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *Review of International Studies*, *International Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Following the construction of a working paper, we emailed all authors of included papers to ensure we did not misinterpret their studies. In those communications, we also solicited published or unpublished papers that we may have missed.




Figure A1: PRISMA diagram for study identification and inclusion. Our corpus was assembled from a primary journal search and augmented by a reproducible systematic citation search.

*Note:* Studies excluded from the meta-reanalysis (because e.g., their regime type was not randomized, the contrast was not democracy vs. autocracy (e.g. backsliding, within-autocracy reform, or “elections restored”), the outcome did not fit in our eight categories, the study was duplicated elsewhere in our corpus, or the data were unavailable) follow the same criteria shown, but were not counted at the time. For citation search, we used Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex; successive rounds and the keyword, author, and archive passes found no additional studies with available data. We report full per-record counts in the replication archive.

## C Design-Level Metrics: Coding Criteria

For all text-based studies we code three design-level moderators.

**Vignette word count.** We measure the length of each treatment arm’s text in words, averaging across arms to obtain a single study-level word count. Since the count measure is skewed, we apply a log transformation.

**Number of non-regime informational cues.** We count the number of attributes other than regime type that are included in the vignette or profile (for example, alliance status, trade relations, past conflict history, and so on). These additional attributes may make respondents’ decisions more complex and thus reduce the weight of the regime-type cue.

**Abstraction score.** We code each study’s level of abstraction on a 1–5 ordinal scale capturing how concretely the experimental scenario is grounded in real-world referents. As noted in the main text, this scale captures *scenario* abstraction, rather than the level of abstraction of the treatment itself. Thus, a conjoint that randomizes regime type as “Democracy / Autocracy” without any additional context and a vignette that embeds the same treatment in a contextually rich crisis narrative use identical treatment wording, but differ in how much surrounding context anchors the manipulation to the real world.

- *Score 1 (concrete).* The scenario names real countries or real institutions, or presents attribute tables whose values map directly to real-world referents: real regions, alliance types, power rankings, and institutional records. Respondents can locate the scenario in the real world.

→ For example: Donahue and Crescenzi (2023) ask respondents “Which of these two countries would you prefer as an alliance partner for the United States?” and present profiles varying six attributes (government type, power rank, region, alliance type, past reliability, human rights record). Mattes and Weeks (2025) reach the same level by naming the actors in their scenario outright: respondents are reminded that “Russian forces illegally invaded Ukraine and committed atrocities” and then read a future-dated scenario in which Russia either remains a nondemocracy or transitions to democracy. Their two studies are the only Level 1 cases in our corpus for vignette-only abstraction scores.

- *Score 2 (lightly abstracted).* An unnamed country is described with real-world institutional and economic features (democracy status, income level, trade behavior, military size, cultural similarity to the US) that collectively suggest a real-world analog.



→ For example: Chen, Pevehouse and Powers (2023) describe a trade partner whose “trade policy, past compliance with trade agreements, and treatment of US firms in domestic legal proceedings” vary alongside regime type, with no country name attached.

- *Score 3 (moderately abstract)*. This is the modal category in our studies. A paragraph-length crisis narrative embeds regime type, without utilizing specific geographic or cultural anchors.

→ For example: Tomz and Weeks (2013) describe a country—its regime type, military strength, trade relations, and motivations—that has issued a public threat, then ask respondents whether the US should use military force.

- *Score 4 (substantially abstract)*. Explicit unnamed actor labels substitute for country names within a sequential narrative.

→ For example: Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (2018) (study 3) present a scenario in which “Country A, [a fragile democracy / a military dictatorship], is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. Country A could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against any country in the world.” The largest single Level 4 design in our corpus is Suong, Desposato and Gartzke (2020) and its companion (Suong, Desposato and Gartzke, 2023), which replicate the Tomz and Weeks nuclear scenario but replace both parties with unnamed actors. Respondents are advised in a preamble that the scenario is hypothetical and should not be read as referring to any particular country, and then read that “a country in the same part of the world as ‘Country A’ is developing nuclear weapons,” with “Country B” randomized as a democracy or not. Whereas Tomz and Weeks keep one real actor in their scenario, the United States; these studies keep none.

- *Score 5 (fully stylized)*. Scenarios use fictional country names or maximally generic labels.

→ Example: Levin and Kobayashi (2022) describe a crisis in “Ardania,” a country the president has decided to stop defending: “The first part of the scenario describes the president as deciding to terminate an American military commitment to help defend a country called Ardania in case of an attack by its neighbor.” Bakker (2020) and Bakker (2024) use a similar approach, telling respondents that “these countries are completely fictitious” and ask them to imagine a scenario in one of two neighboring states on an invented island, labeled only “My Country” and “Other Country”, presented in a table in which the two countries are near-identical in population, territory, economy and military power, before the other actor’s regime type is randomized. See also Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2012), who use two invented ex-Soviet republics that respondents are told are fictitious.

Table A1: Distribution of studies across the abstraction scale

| Level |                        | Corpus, $k$ (papers) | Fitted, $k$ (papers) |
|-------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1     | Concrete               | 55 (11)              | 2 (1)                |
| 2     | Lightly abstracted     | 39 (17)              | 21 (9)               |
| 3     | Moderately abstract    | 32 (13)              | 32 (13)              |
| 4     | Substantially abstract | 17 (9)               | 16 (9)               |
| 5     | Fully stylized         | 15 (5)               | 15 (5)               |
| Total |                        | 158 (53)             | 86 (36)              |

*Note:* “Corpus” counts every study in the analytic dataset; “Fitted” counts the studies entering the abstraction meta-regressions, which are restricted to vignette designs.

As Table A1 shows, the scale is unevenly populated, reflecting the extent to which authors employ different levels of abstraction in different types of experimental designs. Level 1 is overwhelmingly composed of forced-choice conjoint experiments: 53 of its 55 studies are conjoints (the two exceptions are the Mattes and Weeks (2025) studies). Because the abstraction meta-regressions are fitted only vignette designs only, most of these Level 1 studies (overwhelmingly conjoints) are excluded from the analysis.

Level 3—the modal category—contains 32 of the 86 studies in the abstraction meta-regressions. In practice, this means that that our estimates represent a contrast between one large modal category (3) and smaller numbers of studies on either side of it.

Figure 7 in the main text plots the bivariate meta-regressions of these three moderators, and Appendix Tables A10 to A12 report their full specifications. Regression lines and confidence bands were derived from the `rma.mv` coefficients and variance-covariance matrix with the band given by  $\hat{y} \pm 1.96 \sqrt{\widehat{\text{Var}}(\hat{b}_0) + x^2 \widehat{\text{Var}}(\hat{b}_1) + 2x \widehat{\text{Cov}}(\hat{b}_0, \hat{b}_1)}$  propagated from the CR2 variance-covariance matrix. Cells with  $k < 3$  studies are left blank.

## D Study Coverage

Figures [A2](#)–[A4](#) display variable coverage across all 158 studies (97 vignette, 61 forced-choice). Each row is one study; sample size appears in brackets. Columns are grouped into four categories: blue = preference outcomes (Cooperation, Use of Force); red = perception outcomes (Favorability, Threat, Morality, Success, Cost, Resolve); green = individual-level moderators (Hawkishness, Ethnocentrism, Attentiveness, Nationalism, Partisanship); orange = cross-randomizations (Ally status, HR violation, Race cue, Commitment). Studies are sorted by the number of outcome categories covered, descending.



Figure A2: Study coverage, studies 1–53 (sorted by breadth of outcome coverage, descending).

*Note:* Blue = preference outcomes; red = perception outcomes; green = individual moderators; orange = cross-randomizations. Sample size in brackets. Continued in Figures A3–A4.



Figure A3: Study coverage, studies 54–106.  
*Note:* Continuation of Figure A2.




Figure A4: Study coverage, studies 107–158.  
*Note:* Continuation of Figures A2–A3. Studies in this panel cover one or two outcome categories.

## E Study-Level Overview

Table A2 lists every study in the dataset with its design and scenario, the democracy-versus-nondemocracy treatment contrast, and the outcome measure.

These entries describe how *we* code and include each study’s design for the meta-analysis. Notably, they are *not* a full reproduction of how the original authors themselves operationalized or measured their variables.

Three coding conventions recur across the table:

1. First, where regime type is manipulated through more than one conjoint attribute rather than a single item with an intermediate level, we code a profile as “Democracy” only if every regime-relevant attribute is concordantly democratic and “Non-democracy” only if every attribute is concordantly autocratic, excluding profiles where the attributes disagree (Neundorf et al., 2026; Chu, Williamson and Yeung, 2025 in our corpus).
2. Second, where our outcome averages two or more of a paper’s own distinct survey items into a single index rather than rescaling a single item the authors already reported, that averaging is *our* decision, not the original authors’ (Kiratli, 2025; Mattes and Weeks, 2025; Bassan-Nygate et al., 2025; Lupu and Wallace, 2024).
3. Third, where excluding an intermediate or self-referential regime condition drops those respondents from the data entirely the number of respondents contributing to our estimate falls below the paper’s own reported sample size (Levin and Kobayashi, 2022; Kiratli, 2025; Donahue and Crescenzi, 2023). When our recreation of a study’s treatment, outcome, or sample construction diverges from the original paper—beyond the standard  $[0, 1]$  rescaling—we flag it with an explicit *Note*.

Table A2: Study-level overview: design, treatment contrast, and outcome by study

| Study                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Support for cooperation</b>                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Alley (2023)<br><i>US public 1</i><br>$N = 1494$ | Conjoint (14 attributes, 5 profiles per respondent). Respondents rate hypothetical US military alliances on a 0–100 scale and approve/disapprove each. Study 1 = alliance maintenance (five hypothetical existing alliances); Study 2 = alliance formation (five hypothetical new alliances). | <i>Dem.</i> Partner political regime: "This country is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy." (or fragile democracy: "This country is a democracy, but shows signs that it may not remain a democracy.")<br><i>Non-dem.</i> Partner political regime: "This country is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy." | How would you rate this alliance? (0-100 slider rating of maintaining alliance)<br><i>Scale:</i> continuous 0-100 slider<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |
| Alley (2023)<br><i>US public 2</i><br>$N = 1497$ | Conjoint (14 attributes, 5 profiles per respondent). Respondents rate hypothetical US military alliances on a 0–100 scale and approve/disapprove each. Study 1 = alliance maintenance (five hypothetical existing alliances); Study 2 = alliance formation (five hypothetical new alliances). | <i>Dem.</i> Partner political regime: "This country is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy." (or fragile democracy: "This country is a democracy, but shows signs that it may not remain a democracy.")<br><i>Non-dem.</i> Partner political regime: "This country is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy." | How would you rate this alliance? (0-100 slider rating of forming alliance)<br><i>Scale:</i> continuous 0-100 slider<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation     |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                             | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Carnegie & Gaikwad (2022)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>N = 1209 | Newspaper-article vignette. A country signs a free trade agreement with a partner that has specified characteristics; respondents asked about trade support and favorability. | <i>Dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is a democracy and has a large military.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is not a democracy and has a large military. | [Same question as above dichotomized]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Carnegie & Gaikwad (2022)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>N = 1209 | Newspaper-article vignette. A country signs a free trade agreement with a partner that has specified characteristics; respondents asked about trade support and favorability. | <i>Dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is a democracy and has a large military.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is not a democracy and has a large military. | Forced-choice conjoint: Which country would you prefer the US to have a free trade agreement with? Plus per-profile 1-10 support rating. Index = average of selected (0/1) and support rating rescaled.<br><i>Scale</i> : index (forced choice + 10-point rating)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation |
| Carnegie & Gaikwad (2022)<br><i>Indian public</i><br>N = 480         | Newspaper-article vignette. A country signs a free trade agreement with a partner that has specified characteristics; respondents asked about trade support and favorability. | <i>Dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is a democracy and has a large military.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The other country in the free trade agreement is not a democracy and has a large military. | Given the facts described in the article do you support increasing trade with this country?<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation                                                                                                                     |

Continued on next page

Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                              | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chen, Pevehouse & Powers (2023)<br><i>US Policy professionals</i><br>$N = 212$ | Vignette: the US considers trade policy toward a country with specified characteristics. Respondents across four samples (policy professionals, general public) asked about support for trade. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy, which means it holds free and fair elections on a regular basis.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy, which means it does not hold free and fair elections on a regular basis. | Do you support or oppose the US adopting policies that would encourage trade with the country described above?<br><i>Scale</i> : 6-point ordinal with leaners<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |
| Chen, Pevehouse & Powers (2023)<br><i>US residents 1</i><br>$N = 764$          | Vignette: the US considers trade policy toward a country with specified characteristics. Respondents across four samples (policy professionals, general public) asked about support for trade. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy, which means it holds free and fair elections on a regular basis.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy, which means it does not hold free and fair elections on a regular basis. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 6-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                                                                           |
| Chen, Pevehouse & Powers (2023)<br><i>US residents 2</i><br>$N = 3037$         | Vignette: the US considers trade policy toward a country with specified characteristics. Respondents across four samples (policy professionals, general public) asked about support for trade. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy, which means it holds free and fair elections on a regular basis.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy, which means it does not hold free and fair elections on a regular basis. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 6-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                                                                           |

Continued on next page

Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                              | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chen, Pevehouse & Powers (2023)<br><i>US residents 3</i><br>$N = 1659$ | Vignette: the US considers trade policy toward a country with specified characteristics. Respondents across four samples (policy professionals, general public) asked about support for trade. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy, which means it holds free and fair elections on a regular basis.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy, which means it does not hold free and fair elections on a regular basis.                   | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 6-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                                                   |
| Doherty et al. (2020)<br><i>American public</i><br>$N = 1390$          | Forced-choice conjoint of foreign-aid proposals (recipient profiles, 6 attributes including a 0–100 political-freedom score). US respondents chose which proposal the US should fund.          | <i>Dem.</i> : Level of Political Freedom in Country (100 = Most Free) attribute scoring 50 or above<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Same attribute scoring below 50; the underlying attribute is continuous, not a binary label, and the midpoint cut is imposed here | Forced choice: which of the two foreign-aid proposals (recipient profiles) should the US fund?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                    | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Donahue & Crescenzi (2023)<br><i>US adults</i><br>$N = 294$<br><i>Note:</i> Paper N = 295 respondents (12 tasks each; regime type is assigned per task). We exclude task-level observations coded “Anocracy.” Only 1 of 295 respondents loses all 12 tasks to this condition and is absent from the N shown here. | Conjoint of hypothetical ally profiles (forced choice + rating). Respondents choose a preferred alliance partner from pairs of profiles varying on reliability and other attributes. | <i>Dem:</i> Government type = “Democracy”<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Government type = “Autocracy” (or “Anocracy”; Anocracy excluded from meta-analysis)                                                                                                  | Per-profile support rating for potential alliance partner<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-7 rating<br><i>Category:</i> Support for co-operation                                          |
| gafuri.2024<br><i>Serbian Adults</i><br>$N = 2500$                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | —                                                                                                                                                                                    | <i>Dem:</i> In the donor country, the politicians in power are elected by citizens through regular elections.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> In the donor country, the politicians in power are chosen by political elites, they are not elected by citizens. | To what extent would you support the local government that cooperates with this foreign donor?<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                 | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                              | Treatment vs. control                                                                       | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Inouye & Horiuchi (2026)<br><i>American public (forced choice)</i><br><i>N</i> = 1006 | Forced-choice side-selection conjoint: two hypothetical governments in conflict, 9 attributes each. Respondents choose which government the US should support. | <i>Dem</i> : Democratic governance = "Yes"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Democratic governance = "No" | Which government do you believe the United States should support?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                            |
| Inouye & Horiuchi (2026)<br><i>American public (Neither option)</i><br><i>N</i> = 927 | Forced-choice side-selection conjoint: two hypothetical governments in conflict, 9 attributes each. Respondents choose which government the US should support. | <i>Dem</i> : Democratic governance = "Yes"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Democratic governance = "No" | Which government do you believe the United States should support? (includes Neither=0.5 block)<br><i>Scale</i> : forced choice + Neither<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation            |
| Inouye & Horiuchi (2026)<br><i>British public</i><br><i>N</i> = 909                   | Forced-choice side-selection conjoint: two hypothetical governments in conflict, 9 attributes each. Respondents choose which government the US should support. | <i>Dem</i> : Democratic governance = "Yes"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Democratic governance = "No" | Which government do you believe the United States should support? (UK sample; includes Neither=0.5 block)<br><i>Scale</i> : forced choice + Neither<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                        | Outcome                                                                                                                               |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kiratli (2021)<br><i>Turkey citizens</i><br>$N = 1588$ | Vignette (Turkey and Greece samples): country considers a free trade agreement with a hypothetical partner with specified cultural and political characteristics. | <i>Dem:</i> ...Country C ruled by a democratic regime...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> ...Country C ruled by an authoritarian regime... | Should Turkey sign a free trade agreement with country C?<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |
| Kiratli (2021)<br><i>Greek citizens</i><br>$N = 602$   | Vignette (Turkey and Greece samples): country considers a free trade agreement with a hypothetical partner with specified cultural and political characteristics. | <i>Dem:</i> ...Country C ruled by a democratic regime...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> ...Country C ruled by an authoritarian regime... | Should Greece sign a free trade agreement with country C?<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kiratli (2025)<br><i>US Adults</i><br><i>N</i> = 1977<br><i>Note:</i> Paper <i>N</i> = 1,993 respondents (5 tasks each; regime type is assigned per task, not per respondent). We exclude task-level observations where the ally is coded “partially democratic.” Only respondents who lose all 5 of their tasks to this condition (16 of 1,993) are absent from the <i>N</i> shown here; the rest retain at least one qualifying task. | Vignette: a NATO ally commits one of five uncooperative acts (e.g., underspending on defense, purchasing arms from a rival, refusing troop deployment, vetoing a NATO decision, breaking sanctions); the ally’s regime type is a separately randomized attribute, not part of the uncooperative act itself. US respondents asked whether the US should take corrective measures (sanctions, reduced cooperation). | <i>Dem:</i> Country X has a democratic regime.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Country X has an authoritarian regime. | Average of <i>Y_favorability</i> (alliance favorability) and <i>Y_contributions</i> (alliance contributions support)<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-10 ordinal averaged<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation<br><i>Note:</i> Averages two of the paper’s items (alliance favorability, alliance contributions) into one DV; a third item (approval of the corrective measure) is excluded because the democracy effect on it is near zero and it is conceptually distinct (approval of the punitive measure, not of the ally). |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                         | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                           | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Levin & Kobayashi (2022)<br><i>US public 1</i><br>$N = 2314$<br><i>Note:</i> Paper N = 3,465. We restrict the primary regime contrast to the two polar conditions (Non-democracy, Full democracy) and exclude respondents assigned to the Partial democracy arm. | Vignette: a major power publicly withdraws from or maintains an alliance commitment. Respondents asked about approval of the decision and likely effects. | <i>Dem:</i> The main scenario is set in 2026.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Regime treatment (Non-democracy): "Ardania is not a democracy. | Do you approve of the president's decision to terminate the American military commitment to help defend Ardania? (reversed: 1 - mdv1)<br><i>Scale:</i> binary reversed<br><i>Category:</i> Support for co-operation |
| Levin & Kobayashi (2022)<br><i>US public 2</i><br>$N = 381$<br><i>Note:</i> Paper N = 568. Same exclusion as Study 1: the Partial democracy arm is dropped from the primary regime contrast.                                                                     | Vignette: a major power publicly withdraws from or maintains an alliance commitment. Respondents asked about approval of the decision and likely effects. | <i>Dem:</i> The main scenario is set in 2026.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Regime treatment (Non-democracy): "Ardania is not a democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale:</i> binary reversed<br><i>Category:</i> Support for co-operation                                                                                                                     |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mattes & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br><i>N</i> = 4955 | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                     | Should the US increase, not change, or decrease cooperation with Russia?<br><i>Scale</i> : 3-option increase / no change / decrease<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation |
| Mattes & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br><i>N</i> = 2852 | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                     | Should the US increase, not change, or decrease cooperation with Russia?<br><i>Scale</i> : 3-option increase / no change / decrease<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rhein & Bernauer (2026)<br><i>British public 1</i><br>$N = 1451$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired CO2-storage-abroad projects (6 attributes; 5 analyzed tasks per respondent). UK and Swiss respondents choose which project they would support. The storage country's form of government is randomized as democratic, partly democratic, or authoritarian. | —                     | If you had to decide in a vote today, which project would you support? Project A / Project B (paired-profile forced choice over CO2-storage-abroad projects; profiles are partner countries)<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice between two profiles<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |
| Rhein & Bernauer (2026)<br><i>Swiss public 1</i><br>$N = 1512$   | Forced-choice conjoint of paired CO2-storage-abroad projects (6 attributes; 5 analyzed tasks per respondent). UK and Swiss respondents choose which project they would support. The storage country's form of government is randomized as democratic, partly democratic, or authoritarian. | —                     | If you had to decide in a vote today, which project would you support? Project A / Project B (paired-profile forced choice over CO2-storage-abroad projects; profiles are partner countries)<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice between two profiles<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                    | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rudolph, Freitag & Thurner (2024)<br><i>French public</i><br><i>N</i> = 3367             | Conjoint of hypothetical arms export profiles (9 attributes: normative, strategic, economic). French and German respondents choose and rate proposed arms transfers.                    | <i>Dem</i> : "Government elected democratically?" = "Democratically elected"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : "Government elected democratically?" = "Not democratically elected" | Rate your approval of this arms export (1 = reject in any case 7 = approve in any case)<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation           |
| Rudolph, Freitag & Thurner (2024)<br><i>German public</i><br><i>N</i> = 3250             | Conjoint of hypothetical arms export profiles (9 attributes: normative, strategic, economic). French and German respondents choose and rate proposed arms transfers.                    | <i>Dem</i> : "Government elected democratically?" = "Democratically elected"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : "Government elected democratically?" = "Not democratically elected" | Rate your approval of this arms export (1 = reject in any case 7 = approve in any case)<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation           |
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>United States of America</i><br><i>N</i> = 1003 | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy.                                               | Do you favor or oppose sending [country]'s military to stop the invasion?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4 in data)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                     | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>United Kingdom</i><br>$N = 1001$ | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem.</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>Russia</i><br>$N = 1604$         | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem.</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>China</i><br>$N = 1200$          | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem.</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Outcome                                                                                                                                              |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>India</i><br>$N = 1201$           | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem.</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy.                                                                                              | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                         |
| Smetana, Vranka & Rosendorf (2026)<br><i>Brazil</i><br>$N = 1200$          | Factorial vignette (4 attributes: alliance, regime type, stakes, costs). Six-country sample (US, UK, Russia, China, India, Brazil) asked about military defense of an attacked country. | <i>Dem.</i> : Victim country described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Victim country described as a non-democracy.                                                                                              | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert (stored as 0-4)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                         |
| Spilker, Bernauer & Umaña (2016)<br><i>Costa Rican public</i><br>$N = 820$ | Conjoint of hypothetical FTA partner countries (7-8 attributes). Face-to-face survey in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam; respondents choose preferred trade partner.                 | <i>Dem.</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by citizens (voters) through general elections"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by the ruling political party on its own (no elections)" | How much do you support a preferential trade agreement with this country?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                               | Outcome                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spilker, Bernauer & Umaña (2016)<br><i>Nicaraguan public</i><br><i>N</i> = 800 | Conjoint of hypothetical FTA partner countries (7–8 attributes).<br>Face-to-face survey in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam; respondents choose preferred trade partner. | <i>Dem</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by citizens (voters) through general elections"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by the ruling political party on its own (no elections)" | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                      |
| Spilker, Bernauer & Umaña (2016)<br><i>Vietnam citizens</i><br><i>N</i> = 700  | Conjoint of hypothetical FTA partner countries (7–8 attributes).<br>Face-to-face survey in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam; respondents choose preferred trade partner. | <i>Dem</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by citizens (voters) through general elections"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Political leaders attribute: "Chosen by the ruling political party on its own (no elections)" | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                      |
| Tomz & Weeks (2021)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1200                   | Vignette: a country invades a US ally. Respondents asked about US military defense of the ally; regime type of the ally is randomized.                                     | <i>Dem</i> : The country that was attacked: Type of government = "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The country that was attacked: Type of government = "Not a democracy"                                              | Do you favor or oppose sending the U.S. military to stop the invasion?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation |
| Tomz & Weeks (2021)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 2703                   | Vignette: a country invades a US ally. Respondents asked about US military defense of the ally; regime type of the ally is randomized.                                     | <i>Dem</i> : The country that was attacked: Type of government = "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The country that was attacked: Type of government = "Not a democracy"                                              | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for co-operation                                                                 |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Williamson<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>$N = 1000$ | Vignette: the US considers funding and training the military of a hypothetical country. Regime type (democracy that respects human rights vs. autocracy that violates them) is crossed with terrorist-threat presence; four US samples. | —                     | Based on the information you just read, do you agree or disagree that the US government should fund and train this country's military?<br><i>Scale:</i> 7-point agree-disagree dichotomized (explicit supporters=1)<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |
| Williamson<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>$N = 1000$ | Vignette: the US considers funding and training the military of a hypothetical country. Regime type (democracy that respects human rights vs. autocracy that violates them) is crossed with terrorist-threat presence; four US samples. | —                     | Based on the information you just read, do you agree or disagree that the US government should fund and train this country's military?<br><i>Scale:</i> 7-point agree-disagree dichotomized (explicit supporters=1)<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Williamson<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br><sup>3</sup><br><i>N</i> = 1299 | Vignette: the US considers funding and training the military of a hypothetical country. Regime type (democracy that respects human rights vs. autocracy that violates them) is crossed with terrorist-threat presence; four US samples. | —                     | Based on the information you just read, do you agree or disagree that the US government should fund and train this country's military?<br><i>Scale:</i> 7-point agree-disagree dichotomized (explicit supporters=1)<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation                  |
| Williamson<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br><sup>4</sup><br><i>N</i> = 3982 | Vignette: the US considers funding and training the military of a hypothetical country. Regime type (democracy that respects human rights vs. autocracy that violates them) is crossed with terrorist-threat presence; four US samples. | —                     | Based on the information you just read, do you agree or disagree that the US government should fund and train this country's military?<br><i>Scale:</i> fully-anchored 7-point Likert dichotomized (strongly/agree/somewhat agree=1)<br><i>Category:</i> Support for cooperation |
| <b>Support for use of force</b>                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bakker (2020)<br><i>university students 1</i><br>$N = 243$ | Vignette: fictional island dispute between My Country and Other Country over a contested uranium field. Respondents play the role of a government advisor. | <i>Dem.</i> : Other Country described as a liberal democracy: multi-party elections since 1919, citizens can hold representatives accountable, independent media, right of assembly and free expression.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Other Country described as an autocracy: single-party with irregular elections, state-controlled media and internet, assembly requires government permission, citizens lack free expression. | Indicate your approval for the foreign-policy option to attack Other Country with a preventive strike<br><i>Scale</i> : 7-point Likert (1=very strongly disapprove, 7=very strongly approve)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Bakker (2020)<br><i>university students 2</i><br>$N = 227$ | Vignette: fictional island dispute between My Country and Other Country over a contested uranium field. Respondents play the role of a government advisor. | <i>Dem.</i> : Other Country described as a liberal democracy: multi-party elections since 1919, citizens can hold representatives accountable, independent media, right of assembly and free expression.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Other Country described as an autocracy: single-party with irregular elections, state-controlled media and internet, assembly requires government permission, citizens lack free expression. | [Same as study_1; Russia sample]<br><i>Scale</i> : 7-point Likert (1=very strongly disapprove, 7=very strongly approve)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                      |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                          |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bakker (2020)<br><i>university students 3</i><br><i>N = 277</i>     | Vignette: fictional island dispute between My Country and Other Country over a contested uranium field. Respondents play the role of a government advisor. | <i>Dem.</i> : Other Country described as a liberal democracy: multi-party elections since 1919, citizens can hold representatives accountable, independent media, right of assembly and free expression.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Other Country described as an autocracy: single-party with irregular elections, state-controlled media and internet, assembly requires government permission, citizens lack free expression. | [Same as study_1; China sample]<br><i>Scale</i> : 7-point Likert (1=very strongly disapprove, 7=very strongly approve)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force             |
| Bakker (2026)<br><i>Bakker (2023/2024) France</i><br><i>N = 264</i> | Same uranium-field scenario as Bakker (2020); France and India samples.                                                                                    | <i>Dem.</i> : In Other Country there are several political parties.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : In Other Country only 1 political party exists.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Indicate your approval for the foreign-policy option to attack Other Country with a preventive strike<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Bakker (2026)<br><i>Bakker (2023/2024) India</i><br><i>N = 280</i>  | Same uranium-field scenario as Bakker (2020); France and India samples.                                                                                    | <i>Dem.</i> : In Other Country there are several political parties.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : In Other Country only 1 political party exists.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                     |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate et al. (2024)<br><i>Brazilians</i><br>$N = 3141$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | Average of two items: (1) Would you favor or oppose using the [country] military to attack the country's nuclear development sites? (2) Would you favor or oppose [country] joining a joint international military mission? Each 5-point Likert.<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate<br>et al. (2024)<br><i>Germans</i><br>$N = 3082$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | Average of two items: (1) Would you favor or oppose using the [country] military to attack the country's nuclear development sites? (2) Would you favor or oppose [country] joining a joint international military mission?<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate<br>et al. (2024)<br><i>Indians</i><br>$N = 3128$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate<br>et al. (2024)<br><i>Israeli</i><br>$N = 3141$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate<br>et al. (2024)<br><i>Japanese</i><br>$N = 3172$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                         | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate et al. (2024)<br><i>Nigerians</i><br>$N = 3218$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country]. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                         | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                         | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bassan-Nygate et al. (2024)<br><i>Americans</i><br>$N = 3082$ | Multi-country replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country will have a nuclear bomb within six months; respondents asked about a preventive military strike and a multilateral mission. | <i>Dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : - The country has not signed a military alliance [respondent's country].          | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point Likert (averaged)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Averages two of the paper's own separate outcome items (military strike approval; joining a joint international military mission) into one DV. The paper's Table 1 labels the outcome singularly as "Support for military attack"; its appendix lists these as two distinct instrument questions with no stated combination rule. |
| Bell & Quek (2018)<br><i>Chinese public</i><br>$N = 2922$     | Chinese replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). A country is developing nuclear weapons; Chinese respondents are asked whether to support an attack on its nuclear sites.                    | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Would you favor or oppose the Chinese military participating in an attack on the country's nuclear development sites? (Paper describes 5-point scale but replication data is binary)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                                                                                                                                    |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Carnegie,<br>Kertzer & Yarhi-<br>Milo (2023)<br><i>American public</i><br>$N = 1803$ | Vignette: Country B<br>conducts military oper-<br>ations (overt or covert)<br>against Country C.<br>US respondents asked<br>whether the US should<br>take military action.                          | <i>Dem:</i> Country B was a democ-<br>racy, with free and fair elections<br>and a history of respecting the<br>rights of all its citizens.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Country B was a dic-<br>tatorship, without free and fair<br>elections, and without a history<br>of respecting the rights of all of<br>its citizens. | Given what you know<br>would you say that you<br>support or oppose the US<br>president's action?<br><i>Scale:</i> 7-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force                                     |
| Chaudoin,<br>Gaines & Livny<br>(2021)<br><i>US residents</i><br>$N = 1036$           | Replication of Tomz &<br>Weeks (2013) with al-<br>liance and trade held<br>fixed at non-allied / no<br>trade. Between-subjects<br>only; each respondent<br>sees one condition.                      | <i>Dem:</i> The target country is de-<br>scribed as a democracy (exact<br>wording follows Tomz & Weeks<br>2013).<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The target country<br>is described as not a democracy<br>(exact wording follows Tomz &<br>Weeks 2013).                                                                        | Would you favor or oppose<br>using the US armed forces<br>to attack the country's<br>nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point di-<br>chotomized to binary<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force |
| Dafoe, Zhang &<br>Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 1</i><br>$N = 1043$                 | Three-design test (ba-<br>sic, elaboration, prob-<br>ability) of information<br>equivalence using a nu-<br>clear weapons scenario.<br>US MTurk respondents<br>asked about a preven-<br>tive strike. | <i>Dem:</i> A country is developing<br>nuclear weapons and will have<br>its first nuclear bomb within six<br>months.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> A country is de-<br>veloping nuclear weapons and<br>will have its first nuclear bomb<br>within six months.                                                                | Do you favor or oppose the<br>U.S. using its armed forces<br>to attack the country's nu-<br>clear development sites?<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force                 |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Outcome                                                                                        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 2</i><br>$N = 1043$ | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem:</i> A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 3</i><br>$N = 1042$ | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem:</i> A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale:</i> 5-point Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2012a)</p> <p><i>Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2012a)</i></p> <p><i>Swiss students 1</i></p> <p><math>N = 34</math></p> <p><i>Note:</i> Paper <math>N = 55</math>. We restrict the regime contrast to the two polar arms and exclude the 20 respondents assigned to the control arm, in which the paragraph describing the target's political system is omitted entirely. One further respondent is absent for missing outcome data.</p> | <p>Vignette: two fictitious ex-Soviet republics. Bachtaran has de facto seceded and Abkazie is preparing to retake it by force. Respondents rate support for a UN Security Council military intervention against Abkazie at three stated civilian death tolls. Abkazie's political system is randomized; Study 1 adds a no-information control arm and Study 2 crosses regime with manipulated Abkaze public support for the invasion.</p> | <p><i>Dem:</i> Abkazie described as having historically egalitarian relations, always electing its representatives, and a strongly democratic organization; it democratized after the fall of the USSR.</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Abkazie described as having historically hierarchical relations, never electing its representatives, leaders self-proclaimed by coup, and a strongly totalitarian organization; it has refused to democratize.</p> | <p>Dans quelle mesure seriez-vous contre ou en faveur d'une intervention militaire internationale [de l'ONU contre l'Abkazie] impliquant les trois actions contre les envahisseurs mentionnees ci-dessus (les bombardements et l'envoi de troupes terrestres)?</p> <p>Three items at stated civilian death tolls of 100-500, 1,000-5,000 and 10,000-50,000</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> 0-10: totalement contre to totalement en faveur</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2012a)<br><i>Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2012a)</i><br><i>Swiss students 2</i><br>$N = 122$ | Vignette: two fictitious ex-Soviet republics. Bachtaran has de facto seceded and Abkazie is preparing to retake it by force. Respondents rate support for a UN Security Council military intervention against Abkazie at three stated civilian death tolls. Abkazie's political system is randomized; Study 1 adds a no-information control arm and Study 2 crosses regime with manipulated Abkaze public support for the invasion. | <i>Dem:</i> Abkazie described as having historically egalitarian relations, always electing its representatives, and a strongly democratic organization; it democratized after the fall of the USSR.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Abkazie described as having historically hierarchical relations, never electing its representatives, leaders self-proclaimed by coup, and a strongly totalitarian organization; it has refused to democratize. | [Same three items as study_1]<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-10: totalement contre to totalement en faveur<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force                                                    |
| Johns & Davies (2019)<br><i>American public</i><br>$N = 2072$                                                       | Vignette: a country conducts airstrikes against a neighbor that has attacked it. US and UK respondents asked about supporting their own country's military response.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <i>Dem:</i> The democratically-elected President of Country A...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The unelected dictator of Country A...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | On a scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly support) how do you feel about American air strikes in this case?<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-6 ordinal<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                   | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                             | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Johns & Davies (2019)<br><i>British public</i><br><i>N</i> = 2628       | Vignette: a country conducts airstrikes against a neighbor that has attacked it. US and UK respondents asked about supporting their own country's military response.                          | <i>Dem:</i> The democratically-elected President of Country A...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The unelected dictator of Country A...                                                                | On a scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly support) how do you feel about British air strikes in this case?<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-6 ordinal<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force        |
| Kim, Kim & Kwak (2024)<br><i>South Korean public</i><br><i>N</i> = 4002 | South Korean replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). Respondents asked about supporting South Korean military participation in an attack on nuclear development sites.                            | <i>Dem:</i> The country is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The country is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Would you favor or oppose the South Korean military participating in an attack on the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale:</i> 1-5 ordinal<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |
| Kiratli (2024)<br><i>American citizens</i><br><i>N</i> = 1490           | Forced-choice conjoint of two military operations against a hypothetical target state that deployed troops to an ally. US and Turkish respondents approve one of the two proposed operations. | <i>Dem:</i> Aggressor country's regime = "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Aggressor country's regime = "Authoritarian"                                                                      | Which crisis should the US send military troops for?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force                                                              |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Outcome                                                                                                                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kiratli (2024)<br><i>Turkey citizens</i><br>$N = 1002$          | Forced-choice con-<br>joint of two military<br>operations against a hy-<br>pothetical target state<br>that deployed troops to<br>an ally. US and Turkish<br>respondents approve<br>one of the two proposed<br>operations. | <i>Dem:</i> Aggressor country's<br>regime = "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Aggressor country's<br>regime = "Authoritarian"                                                                                                                   | Which crisis should Turkey<br>send military troops for?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force |
| Levin & Mus-<br>grave (2023)<br><i>US public 3</i><br>$N = 930$ | Vignette: a great power<br>considers covertly inter-<br>fering in a foreign elec-<br>tion. US respondents<br>asked about support for<br>the intervention.                                                                 | <i>Dem:</i> "Next year, a foreign<br>country will hold national elec-<br>tions between its two leading<br>parties."<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Next year, a foreign<br>country will hold national elec-<br>tions between its two leading<br>parties. | <i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force                                                                                                  |
| Levin & Mus-<br>grave (2023)<br><i>US public 4</i><br>$N = 221$ | Vignette: a great power<br>considers covertly inter-<br>fering in a foreign elec-<br>tion. US respondents<br>asked about support for<br>the intervention.                                                                 | <i>Dem:</i> "Next year, a foreign<br>country will hold national elec-<br>tions between its two leading<br>parties."<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Next year, a foreign<br>country will hold national elec-<br>tions between its two leading<br>parties. | <i>Category:</i> Support for use<br>of force                                                                                                  |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                          | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Li & Chen<br>(2021)<br><i>Chinese adults</i><br>$N = 3261$ | Vignette (Chinese respondents): China faces a military dispute with a country that has varied characteristics. Respondents evaluate the Chinese government's escalatory response. | <i>Dem:</i> "The following question concerns China and its relation with other countries in the world.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> ...country A sent its military to take over a neighboring country B. | Do you approve disapprove or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the Chinese government handled the situation? (approval of military escalation)<br><i>Scale:</i> binary from branching<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                    | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lin, Fu & Chang-Liao (2026)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>$N = 2580$ | Vignette: Country A, an autocracy in every arm, invades Country B despite a US call for a peaceful settlement, interrupting Country B's semiconductor production. The regime type of the INVADED country is randomized, crossed with its chip-manufacturing capability (average / advanced in Study 1; average / advanced / advanced plant in the US in Study 2). | —                     | Given the aforementioned situation, please indicate your support level for the following action taken by the U.S. government. 0 means extremely not support, and 5 means extremely support: Direct Military deployment in Country B to defend Country B<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-5: extremely not support to extremely support<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force<br><i>Note:</i> The released data carry four support items on the same scale, but only one (direct military deployment to defend Country B) is documented in the article or its supplemental appendix, and only that one is used in the authors' own analysis. We use the documented item. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lin, Fu & Chang-Liao (2026) <i>American public</i> 2<br>N = 2109<br><i>Note:</i> Paper's own analysis N = 1,335. The authors restrict to respondents who correctly identify the invader's regime type (a 63.5\{\}% pass rate). We retain all 2,109 assigned respondents and estimate the intention-to-treat effect, since conditioning on a manipulation check conditions on a post-treatment variable and no other study in this corpus does so. | Vignette: Country A, an autocracy in every arm, invades Country B despite a US call for a peaceful settlement, interrupting Country B's semiconductor production. The regime type of the INVADED country is randomized, crossed with its chip-manufacturing capability (average / advanced in Study 1; average / advanced / advanced plant in the US in Study 2). | —                     | Given the aforementioned situation, please indicate your support level for the following action taken by the U.S. government. 0 means extremely not support, and 5 means extremely support: Direct Military deployment in Country B to defend Country B<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-5: extremely not support to extremely support<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Muradova & Gildea (2021)<br><i>US citizens</i><br><i>N</i> = 496     | Conjoint of hypothetical military strike targets (forced choice). US respondents choose between paired countries varying in oil wealth, regime type, and other features.                                         | —                                                                                                                                                                       | Which one [of the two country profiles] would you most favor using US armed forces to attack?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Musgrave & Ward (2023)<br><i>American public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 912 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired intervention scenarios (8–9 attributes; aggressor and victim regime type both randomized). US respondents choose the scenario they would more willingly support intervening in. | <i>Dem</i> : Victim regime type attribute: "Democratic"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Victim regime type attribute: "Autocratic" (aggressor regime type is randomized separately) | Which scenario would you more willingly support US military intervention in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                  |
| Musgrave & Ward (2023)<br><i>American public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 818 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired intervention scenarios (8–9 attributes; aggressor and victim regime type both randomized). US respondents choose the scenario they would more willingly support intervening in. | <i>Dem</i> : Victim regime type attribute: "Democratic"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Victim regime type attribute: "Autocratic" (aggressor regime type is randomized separately) | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                             |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                       | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rathbun, Pomeroy & Parker (2024)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>N = 1626 | Two vignettes: a hypothetical country conducting a military build-up. Race and regime type crossed; respondents asked about support for US military action.                                                            | <i>Dem.</i> : Additional bullet point: "The country is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy."<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Additional bullet point: "The country is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy." | Would you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Rathbun, Pomeroy & Parker (2024)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>N = 2659 | Two vignettes: a hypothetical country conducting a military build-up. Race and regime type crossed; respondents asked about support for US military action.                                                            | <i>Dem.</i> : Additional bullet point: "The country is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy."<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Additional bullet point: "The country is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy." | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                    |
| Scholten & Zhirkov (2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>N = 985              | Forced-choice conjoint: paired profiles of hypothetical countries (6 attributes incl. political regime). US mass and foreign-policy-expert respondents choose which country military action is more justified against. | <i>Dem.</i> : Political regime attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Political regime attribute: "Autocracy"                                                                                                                                  | Military action against which of the two countries is more justified in your opinion?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force      |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                       | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                              | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Scholten & Zhirkov (2025)<br><i>US foreign policy experts</i><br>$N = 147$  | Forced-choice conjoint: paired profiles of hypothetical countries (6 attributes incl. political regime). US mass and foreign-policy-expert respondents choose which country military action is more justified against. | <i>Dem.</i> : Political regime attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Political regime attribute: "Autocracy" | Military action against which of the two countries is more justified in your opinion?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Suong, De-sposato & Gartzke (2020)<br><i>Brazilian public</i><br>$N = 4214$ | Vignette: Country B develops nuclear weapons threatening Country A's region. Respondents in Brazil, China, and Ukraine asked whether Country A should use force.                                                       | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy.                     | Should Country A attack and use force to resolve the situation?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary: Attack / Not attack<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                |
| Suong, De-sposato & Gartzke (2020)<br><i>Chinese public 1</i><br>$N = 5744$ | Vignette: Country B develops nuclear weapons threatening Country A's region. Respondents in Brazil, China, and Ukraine asked whether Country A should use force.                                                       | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy.                     | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                              |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                   | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                | Treatment vs. control                                                                          | Outcome                                                                                                                                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Suong, De-<br>sposato &<br>Gartzke (2020)<br><i>Chinese public</i> 2<br><i>N</i> = 2500 | Vignette: Country B develops nuclear weapons threatening Country A's region. Respondents in Brazil, China, and Ukraine asked whether Country A should use force. | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy. | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                               |
| Suong, De-<br>sposato &<br>Gartzke (2023)<br><i>Swedish public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1797   | Same nuclear-threat vignette as Suong et al. (2020). New samples from Sweden, Japan, and Ukraine; Brazil and China data reused from the 2020 paper.              | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy. | Should Country A attack and use force to resolve the situation?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary: Attack / Not attack<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Suong, De-<br>sposato &<br>Gartzke (2023)<br><i>Japanese public</i><br><i>N</i> = 888   | Same nuclear-threat vignette as Suong et al. (2020). New samples from Sweden, Japan, and Ukraine; Brazil and China data reused from the 2020 paper.              | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary: Attack / Not attack<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                               |
| Suong, De-<br>sposato &<br>Gartzke (2023)<br><i>Ukrainian public</i><br><i>N</i> = 200  | Same nuclear-threat vignette as Suong et al. (2020). New samples from Sweden, Japan, and Ukraine; Brazil and China data reused from the 2020 paper.              | <i>Dem.</i> : 'Country B' is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : 'Country B' is not a democracy. | [Same as SDG 2020]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                   |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                           | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1273   | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites.                  | <i>Dem.</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy" | Would you favor or oppose using the UK armed forces to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary: favor/oppose<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>British public</i><br><i>N</i> = 762     | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites.                  | <i>Dem.</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy" | Would you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary: favor/oppose<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force   |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1430 | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                 | Do you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                           | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>$N = 763$ | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy. | [Same MTurk Africa]<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                      |
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>UK public</i><br>$N = 1450$           | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy. | Do you favor or oppose using the British Armed Forces to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force |
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>American public</i><br>$N = 1211$     | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy. | Do you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-5 Likert<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force        |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                         | Treatment vs. control                                                       | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1626 | Vignette: race and regime type jointly manipulated. Respondents asked about military action against a country developing nuclear weapons. | <i>Dem:</i> nukes_regime = "dem"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> nukes_regime = "nondem" | Do you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?<br><i>Scale:</i> 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 2659 | Vignette: race and regime type jointly manipulated. Respondents asked about military action against a country developing nuclear weapons. | <i>Dem:</i> nukes_regime = "dem"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> nukes_regime = "nondem" | [Same Prolific sample]<br><i>Scale:</i> 1-7 Likert<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force                                                                            |
| <b>Favorability</b>                                             |                                                                                                                                           |                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                            |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chen & Xiong (2026)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>N = 1895 | Multi-factorial vignette about a hypothetical Country A, rated by US respondents. Study 1 randomizes regime type (described as “free and fair elections”), dispute type, the disputant’s response, ally status, and relative power. Study 2 (the paper’s Study 3) pairs a bare-bones regime label with no institutional content with an orthogonal cue about citizen influence, official accountability, and policy responsiveness. | <i>Dem:</i> Non-democracy version: Country A is “not a democracy, meaning it does not hold free and fair elections” The authors’ stated rationale: defining democracy by elections “follows the public’s own usage and keeps the manipulation concrete,” and the e...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The authors’ stated rationale: defining democracy by elections “follows the public’s own usage and keeps the manipulation concrete,” and the election cue is “exactly the kind of single attribute that, by information equivalence, leads respondents ... | Favorability toward Country A’s government (paraphrase: the working paper has no appendix and no instrument; the authors describe the item as favorability toward A’s government on a five-point Likert scale running from extremely negative to extremely positive)<br><i>Scale:</i> 1-5 Likert: extremely negative to extremely positive<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> The paper measures favorability toward the foreign government and, separately, toward its citizens, and its own variable of interest is the gap between them. We use the “favorability towards the foreign government” to match with the other studies in this category. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chen & Xiong (2026)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>N = 1821 | Multi-factorial vignette about a hypothetical Country A, rated by US respondents. Study 1 randomizes regime type (described through free and fair elections), dispute type, the disputant's response, ally status, and relative power. Study 2 (the paper's Study 3) pairs a bare regime label carrying no institutional content with an orthogonal cue about citizen influence, official accountability, and policy responsiveness. | <i>Dem:</i> Non-democracy version: Country A is "not a democracy, meaning it does not hold free and fair elections" The authors' stated rationale: defining democracy by elections "follows the public's own usage and keeps the manipulation concrete," and the e...<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The authors' stated rationale: defining democracy by elections "follows the public's own usage and keeps the manipulation concrete," and the election cue is "exactly the kind of single attribute that, by information equivalence, leads respondents ... | Favorability toward Country A's government (paraphrase: the working paper has no appendix and no instrument; the authors describe the item as favorability toward A's government on a five-point Likert scale running from extremely negative to extremely positive)<br><i>Scale:</i> 1-5 Likert: extremely negative to extremely positive<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> The paper measures favorability toward the foreign government and, separately, toward its citizens, and its own construct of interest is the gap between them. We use the "favorability towards foreign government" to match with other studies in this category. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson & Yeung (2025)<br><i>Egypt public</i><br>$N = 1008$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..."</p> | <p>If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson & Yeung (2025)<br><i>India public</i><br>$N = 1022$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..."</p> | <p>If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson<br>& Yeung (2025)<br><i>Italy public</i><br>$N = 1047$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..."</p> | <p>If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson & Yeung (2025)<br><i>Japan public</i><br>$N = 1012$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..."</p> | <p>If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson & Yeung (2025)<br><i>Thailand public</i><br>$N = 1037$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..."</p> | <p>If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Outcome                                                                                                                                                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chu, Williamson & Yeung (2025)<br><i>US public</i><br>$N = 1024$ | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical country profiles (10 attributes; 3 pairs per respondent). Respondents in six countries choose which of two countries they would prefer to be born and grow up in. | <i>Dem:</i> The "democratic" profile is constructed from the combination of three attributes: - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to power through free and fair elections" - Civil liberties: "In politics, people can express themselves and organize..."<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the most-autocratic level (concordance required; other combinations, including the intermediate leader-selection levels, are excluded see Notes): - Leadership selection: "Political leaders come to po..." | If you had to choose which country would you prefer to be born and grow up in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability           |
| Guliford, Cur-<br>tice & Donahue<br>(2025)<br>$N = 1528$         | Forced-choice conjoint of hypothetical atrocity headlines from conflict zones where the US supported the government (5 attributes). US respondents choose the headline most harmful to US reputation.    | <i>Dem:</i> Government type = "Democratic"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Government type = "Non-democratic"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Which headline is more harmful to the United States' reputation among American citizens?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                 | Outcome                                                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Inouye & Horiuchi (2026b)<br><i>Inouye &amp; Horiuchi (2026b)</i><br><i>Study 1</i><br>$N = 1198$ | Forced-choice conjoint of two hypothetical groups in a dispute, attributes modeled on Israeli and Palestinian societies (8 attributes). US respondents choose which side they sympathize with more. | <i>Dem.</i> : Democracy = "Yes"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Democracy = "No" | Which side do you sympathize more with: Group A or Group B?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |
| Inouye & Horiuchi (2026b)<br><i>Inouye &amp; Horiuchi (2026b)</i><br><i>Study 2</i><br>$N = 1001$ | Forced-choice conjoint of two hypothetical groups in a dispute, attributes modeled on Israeli and Palestinian societies (8 attributes). US respondents choose which side they sympathize with more. | <i>Dem.</i> : Democracy = "Yes"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Democracy = "No" | Which side do you sympathize more with: Group A or Group B?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                   | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Brazil public</i><br>$N = 1787$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>India public</i><br>$N = 1013$  | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Indonesia public</i><br>$N = 1640$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Kenya public</i><br>$N = 1113$     | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                        | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Philippines public</i><br>$N = 1675$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Thailand public</i><br>$N = 1171$    | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                    | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kim et al. (2025)<br><i>Vietnam public</i><br>$N = 1252$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired foreign-aid packages the respondent's own country may receive (7 attributes). Publics in seven developing recipient countries choose the preferred package. Donor regime type is a bare two-level label with no further descriptive text. | <i>Dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Democracy"<br><i>Non-dem:</i> Donor country regime type attribute: "Non-democracy" | Forced choice between two hypothetical foreign-aid packages the respondent's country may receive: which project would you prefer to see implemented?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                       | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>French public</i><br>$N = 2051$ | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem:</i> The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Composite favorability: rowMeans of (1) approve/disapprove of foreign government's war conduct, (2) helped/hurt reputation. Morality item is broken out as a separate Y_moral outcome under the morality category.<br><i>Scale:</i> composite of 5-pt + 5-pt + binary<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> Averages the paper's approval item (its own dependent variable, used as the outcome in the authors' mediation analysis) with the paper's reputation item (one of the authors' own mediator variables, analyzed separately from approval in their ACME models). |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                        | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>British public</i><br>$N = 2198$ | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem:</i> The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Composite favorability: rowMeans of (1) approve/disapprove of foreign government's war conduct, (2) helped/hurt reputation. Morality item is broken out as a separate Y_moral outcome under the morality category.<br><i>Scale:</i> composite<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> Averages the paper's approval item (its own dependent variable, used as the outcome in the authors' mediation analysis) with the paper's reputation item (one of the authors' own mediator variables, analyzed separately from approval in their ACME models). |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                        | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                               | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>US public</i><br><i>N</i> = 2009 | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem</i> : The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Composite favorability: rowMeans of (1) approve/disapprove of foreign government's war conduct, (2) helped/hurt reputation. Morality item is broken out as a separate Y_moral outcome under the morality category.<br><i>Scale</i> : composite<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability<br><i>Note</i> : Averages the paper's approval item (its own dependent variable, used as the outcome in the authors' mediation analysis) with the paper's reputation item (one of the authors' own mediator variables, analyzed separately from approval in their ACME models). |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                      | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mattes & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br><i>N</i> = 4955 | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                     | Average of two image items toward Russia: favorability view; willingness to buy Russian products (each rescaled to 0-1)<br><i>Scale:</i> composite mean of a 4-pt favorability item and a 4-pt buy-products item<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> Averages two of the paper's image items (favorability, willingness to buy Russian products) into one DV. The paper's third image item, preference for US cooperation with Russia, is reported separately under support for cooperation. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mattes & Weeks<br>(2025)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>2</i><br><i>N</i> = 2852 | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                     | Average of two image items toward Russia: favorability view; willingness to buy Russian products (each rescaled to 0-1)<br><i>Scale:</i> composite mean of a 4-pt favorability item and a 4-pt buy-products item<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability<br><i>Note:</i> Averages two of the paper's image items (favorability, willingness to buy Russian products) into one DV. The paper's third image item, preference for US cooperation with Russia, is reported separately under support for cooperation. |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Argentina public</i><br><i>N = 2381</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Mexico public</i><br><i>N</i> = 684 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Nicaragua public</i><br><i>N</i> = 909 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Paraguay public</i><br><i>N = 797</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Peru public</i><br><i>N</i> = 841 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                 | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>El Salvador public</i><br><i>N = 889</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                          | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Venezuela public</i><br>$N = 809$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                         | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>US public</i><br><i>N</i> = 659 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Australia public</i><br>$N = 408$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                         | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>UK public</i><br><i>N = 810</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Philippines public</i><br><i>N = 586</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                 | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Bangladesh public</i><br><i>N = 1476</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Ghana public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1240 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Hong Kong public</i><br><i>N = 561</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>India public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1553 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Kenya public</i><br><i>N = 1813</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Malaysia public</i><br><i>N = 648</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Nigeria public</i><br><i>N</i> = 2238 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Pakistan public</i><br><i>N = 1300</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Singapore public</i><br><i>N</i> = 483 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                    | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>South Africa public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1220 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Tanzania public</i><br><i>N</i> = 903 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Bolivia public</i><br><i>N</i> = 859 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                        | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Uganda public</i><br>$N = 1178$ | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Zambia public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1470 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Turkey public</i><br><i>N = 3149</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Chile public</i><br><i>N</i> = 663 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Outcome                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorff et al. (2026)<br><i>Colombia public</i><br><i>N = 1539</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <p><i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...</p> <p><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts...</p> | <p>Which country would you prefer to live in?</p> <p><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice</p> <p><i>Category:</i> Favorability</p> |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Dominican Republic public public</i><br><i>N = 760</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Ecuador public</i><br><i>N</i> = 735 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem</i> : Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem</i> : Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts... | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Guatemala public</i><br><i>N = 804</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Outcome                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Neundorf et al. (2026)<br><i>Honduras public</i><br><i>N = 916</i> | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 randomized dimensions in democracy, security, and society blocks). Respondents in 32 countries choose which country they would prefer to live in. | <i>Dem:</i> Composite of three democratic conjoint attributes, all at the democratic level: Elections = "Citizens elect their leaders in free and fair elections"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders are constrained by parliament and courts"; Free spec...<br><br><i>Non-dem:</i> Composite of the same three attributes, all at the autocratic level: Elections = "Citizens go to the polls, but elections are neither free nor fair"; Executive constraints = "Political leaders can rule without constraints from parliament or courts..." | Which country would you prefer to live in?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary forced choice<br><i>Category:</i> Favorability |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                     | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rzazade (2026)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br>N = 1002                 | Forced-choice conjoint of paired hypothetical country profiles (7 attributes; 7 analyzed tasks per respondent). US respondents choose which country has higher status in world politics. Type of government is randomized as highly, mostly, somewhat, or not at all democratic; the paper's own hypotheses concern the AI, emerging-military-technology and aircraft-carrier attributes. | <i>Dem.</i> : Type of government attribute: "Highly democratic"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Type of government attribute: "Not at all democratic"                                                                                                                                                                | Considering the attributes they possess across various dimensions, in your opinion, which of the countries below has a higher status in world politics? Country A / Country B (paired-profile forced choice over hypothetical country profiles)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice between two profiles<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability |
| Wick (2014)<br><i>US public (economy + security scenarios)</i><br>N = 122 | Two vignettes: Study 1 = economic relations with a powerful country; Study 2 = security/territorial dispute with a powerful country. US respondents rate favorability toward the country.                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <i>Dem.</i> : Country X [Y] is a democratic country whose people enjoy free and fair elections as well as basic human rights such as free speech and right of assembly.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Country X [Y] is led by an authoritarian government that is frequently being accused of human rights abuses. | What is your overall opinion of Country X?<br><i>Scale</i> : 1-7 Likert (inverted)<br><i>Category</i> : Favorability                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>Threat</b>                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chaudoin,<br>Gaines & Livny<br>(2021)<br><i>US residents</i><br><i>N</i> = 1036 | Replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013) with alliance and trade held fixed at non-allied / no trade. Between-subjects only; each respondent sees one condition.             | <i>Dem</i> : The target country is described as a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The target country is described as not a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).         | Threats to the United States that [country] poses (5-point: not at all serious to extremely serious)<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Threat     |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043          | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | If the U.S. does NOT attack, will [country] threaten/attack the U.S.? (mean of didnot_3, didnot_4, didnot_5)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Threat |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043          | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                                                                                            |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                   | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 3</i><br><i>N</i> = 1042  | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                                                                                                                                          |
| Kim, Kim & Kwak (2024)<br><i>South Korean public</i><br><i>N</i> = 4002 | South Korean replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013). Respondents asked about supporting South Korean military participation in an attack on nuclear development sites.     | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The country is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy.                                      | Threat perception of [country] (composite, rescaled to [0,1])<br><i>Scale</i> : composite<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                                                                                                |
| Lacina & Lee (2013)<br><i>US citizens 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1162          | Two vignettes (war initiation; civilian casualties). Respondents evaluate a country's foreign policy behavior; regime type and religious culture are crossed.          | <i>Dem.</i> : The democratic government needs arms...<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The nondemocratic government needs arms...                                                                                                              | On the basis of this description how would you rate the potential threat that this country is helping terrorists who want to attack the United States?<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Threat |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                         | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lacina & Lee (2013)<br><i>US citizens 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 1162     | Two vignettes (war initiation; civilian casualties). Respondents evaluate a country's foreign policy behavior; regime type and religious culture are crossed.                     | <i>Dem</i> : The democratic government needs arms...<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The nondemocratic government needs arms...                                                                           | On the basis of this description how would you rate the potential threat that this country is building a nuclear weapon to use against US allies?<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Threat |
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1273   | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites.                  | <i>Dem</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy" | How serious a threat does the country pose to the [respondent's country]? (5-point)<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                                                               |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1430 | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                 | How threatening is the country to the U.S.? (0-100 slider)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                                                                                           |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                     | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>UK public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1450                | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                            | [Same as study_1, UK sample]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Threat                     |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1211          | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                            | [Same as study_1, US ballistic Lucid sample]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Threat     |
| <b>Morality</b>                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                             |
| Chaudoin, Gaines & Livny (2021)<br><i>US residents</i><br><i>N</i> = 1036 | Replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013) with alliance and trade held fixed at non-allied / no trade. Between-subjects only; each respondent sees one condition.                        | <i>Dem.</i> : The target country is described as a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The target country is described as not a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013). | Would attacking [country] be morally wrong (binary)?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Morality |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Outcome                                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043 | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | Would attacking [country] be morally wrong? (2=wrong, 3=not wrong)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Morality |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043 | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Morality                                                  |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 3</i><br><i>N</i> = 1042 | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Morality                                                  |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                        | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>French public</i><br>$N = 2051$  | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem:</i> The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | Was [foreign government]'s conduct of the war morally acceptable?<br><i>Scale:</i> binary<br><i>Category:</i> Morality |
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>British public</i><br>$N = 2198$ | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem:</i> The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | [Same as study_1, UK sample]<br><i>Scale:</i> binary<br><i>Category:</i> Morality                                      |
| Lupu & Wallace (2024)<br><i>US public</i><br>$N = 2009$      | Vignette (France, UK, US): a foreign military force conducts operations resulting in civilian casualties. Respondents asked about supporting a military response. | <i>Dem:</i> The Foreign Government is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The Foreign Government is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy. | [Same as study_1, US sample]<br><i>Scale:</i> binary<br><i>Category:</i> Morality                                      |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                           | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1273   | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites.                  | <i>Dem.</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy" | Would it be morally wrong to use military force to attack the country's nuclear sites? (binary)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Morality                  |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1430 | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                 | How morally acceptable would it be to attack the country? (0-100 slider; recoded so higher = more immoral)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Morality |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>UK public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1450         | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                 | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Morality                                                                                          |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                     | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Outcome                                                                                                                                             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1211          | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                                    | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Morality                                                                      |
| <b>Success</b>                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                     |
| Chaudoin, Gaines & Livny (2021)<br><i>US residents</i><br><i>N</i> = 1036 | Replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013) with alliance and trade held fixed at non-allied / no trade. Between-subjects only; each respondent sees one condition.                        | <i>Dem.</i> : The target country is described as a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : The target country is described as not a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).         | How likely is the attack to succeed? (composite)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-2 composite<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                       |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043    | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike.            | <i>Dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | If the U.S. attacks, will the attack succeed at preventing nukes? (mean of did_5, did_6)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Success |

Continued on next page

Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                            | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                           | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043           | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike.      | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                                                                                                               |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 3</i><br><i>N</i> = 1042           | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike.      | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                                                                                                               |
| Kertzer, Ren-shon & Yarhi-Milo (2021)<br><i>Israeli Knesset</i><br><i>N</i> = 89 | Study 1: Conjoint of leader profiles varying signals of resolve. Study 2: Vignette about a foreign country's behavior in a military crisis; respondents assess its resolve. | <i>Dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a dictatorship"                                                                                                | If the dispute were to escalate and war were to break out what is your best estimate about whether Country A will win ranging from 0% to 100%?<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - Israeli public I</i><br>N = 1101  | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - Israeli public II</i><br>N = 1111 | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success            |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - South Korea</i><br>N = 1797       | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success            |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - UK I</i><br>N = 1105              | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success            |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                             | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                           | Outcome                                                                                                                                                      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - UK II</i><br><i>N</i> = 1186     | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior.          | <i>Dem</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                                                                           |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - US public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1377 | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior.          | <i>Dem</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                                                                           |
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1273                                  | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites. | <i>Dem</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy"                   | How likely is the attack to succeed in destroying the country's nuclear sites? (rescaled to [0,1])<br><i>Scale</i> : scaled 0-1<br><i>Category</i> : Success |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                    | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                           | Treatment vs. control                                                                                   | Outcome                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>American public</i><br>1<br><i>N</i> = 1430 | Vignette: a country<br>commits human rights<br>abuses while also devel-<br>oping nuclear weapons.<br>Respondents asked<br>about military action;<br>regime type crossed<br>with human rights<br>violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democ-<br>racy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not<br>a democracy. | How likely is the attack to<br>succeed? (0-100 slider)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success |
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>UK public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1450            | Vignette: a country<br>commits human rights<br>abuses while also devel-<br>oping nuclear weapons.<br>Respondents asked<br>about military action;<br>regime type crossed<br>with human rights<br>violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democ-<br>racy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not<br>a democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                      |
| Tomz & Weeks<br>(2020)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1211      | Vignette: a country<br>commits human rights<br>abuses while also devel-<br>oping nuclear weapons.<br>Respondents asked<br>about military action;<br>regime type crossed<br>with human rights<br>violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democ-<br>racy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not<br>a democracy. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Success                                      |
| <b>Cost</b>                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                    |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                  |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chaudoin,<br>Gaines & Livny<br>(2021)<br><i>US residents</i><br><i>N</i> = 1036 | Replication of Tomz & Weeks (2013) with alliance and trade held fixed at non-allied / no trade. Between-subjects only; each respondent sees one condition.             | <i>Dem</i> : The target country is described as a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The target country is described as not a democracy (exact wording follows Tomz & Weeks 2013).         | How costly would the attack be? (composite)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-4 composite<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                                                    |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043          | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | If the U.S. attacks, will it incur casualties / hurt the economy / hurt relations? (mean of did_2, did_3, did_4)<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Cost |
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public 2</i><br><i>N</i> = 1043          | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike. | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                                                                                |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                  | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Outcome                                                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dafoe, Zhang & Caughey (2018)<br><i>US public</i> 3<br><i>N</i> = 1042 | Three-design test (basic, elaboration, probability) of information equivalence using a nuclear weapons scenario. US MTurk respondents asked about a preventive strike.            | <i>Dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : binary mean<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                                                 |
| Tomz & Weeks (2013)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1273       | Vignette: a country will have a nuclear bomb within six months. US and UK respondents asked about a preventive military strike on its nuclear development sites.                  | <i>Dem</i> : [regime] = "is a democracy, and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : [regime] = "is not a democracy, and shows no sign of becoming a democracy"                                    | How costly would the attack be in lives, money, and relations? (rescaled to [0,1])<br><i>Scale</i> : scaled 0-1<br><i>Category</i> : Cost |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public</i> 1<br><i>N</i> = 1430     | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                                    | How costly would the attack be? (0-100 slider)<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                   |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                                     | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>UK public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1450                                                | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                   | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                                                                                        |
| Tomz & Weeks (2020)<br><i>American public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1211                                          | Vignette: a country commits human rights abuses while also developing nuclear weapons. Respondents asked about military action; regime type crossed with human rights violations. | <i>Dem.</i> : The country is a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : "The country is not a democracy.                                                                                                                   | [Same as study_1]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Cost                                                                                                        |
| <b>Resolve</b>                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Dafoe, Zwetsloot & Cebul (2021)<br><i>Readers of Stephen Walt's Foreign Policy blog</i><br><i>N</i> = 854 | Multi-attribute factorial crisis scenario between two states over a contested resource. Respondents advise whether their country should stand firm or back down.                  | <i>Dem.</i> : Country A is a democracy where the leader has limited authority over foreign policy.<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : Country A is a dictatorship where the leader has extensive authority over foreign policy. | What is your best estimate given the information available about whether Country A will back down in this dispute?<br><i>Scale</i> : 5-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kertzer, Ren-shon & Yarhi-Milo (2021)<br><i>American adults</i><br><i>N</i> = 1994 | Study 1: Conjoint of leader profiles varying signals of resolve. Study 2: Vignette about a foreign country's behavior in a military crisis; respondents assess its resolve.                                                       | <i>Dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a dictatorship" | If you had to choose between them which of the two countries is more likely to stand firm in the current dispute?<br><i>Scale</i> : binary forced choice<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve                   |
| Kertzer, Ren-shon & Yarhi-Milo (2021)<br><i>Israeli Knesset</i><br><i>N</i> = 89   | Study 1: Conjoint of leader profiles varying signals of resolve. Study 2: Vignette about a foreign country's behavior in a military crisis; respondents assess its resolve.                                                       | <i>Dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a democracy"<br><i>Non-dem</i> : Government type = "The country is a dictatorship" | Given the information available what is your best estimate about whether Country A will stand firm in this dispute ranging from 0% to 100%?<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve |
| Mattes & Weeks (2025)<br><i>American public 1</i><br><i>N</i> = 4955               | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                                                                                                                                 | Agree/disagree that Russia is a force to be reckoned with (reverse-coded so higher = more perceived weakness)<br><i>Scale</i> : agree-disagree dichotomized<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve                |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                              | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                         | Outcome                                                                                                               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mattes & Weeks (2025)<br><i>American public</i><br>2<br>N = 2852                                   | Factorial vignette: a hypothetical 2030 scenario in which Russia may apologize to Ukraine. Sender (Russia) regime type is randomized (democracy vs. non-democracy) alongside apology factors; US respondents rate Russia's image. | —                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Agree/disagree that Russia is a weak country<br><i>Scale:</i> agree-disagree dichotomized<br><i>Category:</i> Resolve |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - Israeli public I</i><br>N = 1101  | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior.                                                                           | <i>Dem:</i> RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem:</i> RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same as study_1 Israeli public I]<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-100 slider<br><i>Category:</i> Resolve                          |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - Israeli public II</i><br>N = 1111 | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior.                                                                           | <i>Dem:</i> RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem:</i> RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same Israeli public II]<br><i>Scale:</i> 0-100 slider<br><i>Category:</i> Resolve                                    |

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Table A2 continued

| Study                                                                                               | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                       | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                             | Outcome                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - South Korea</i><br><i>N</i> = 1797 | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same South Korea]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - UK I</i><br><i>N</i> = 1105        | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same UK I]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve        |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - UK II</i><br><i>N</i> = 1186       | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same UK II]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve       |
| Renshon, Yarhi-Milo & Kertzer (2023)<br><i>Renshon et al. 2023 - US public</i><br><i>N</i> = 1377   | Multi-country vignette (US, Israel, UK, Australia; elite sample). A foreign country is in crisis; respondents assess its resolve and expected behavior. | <i>Dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Democracy" (coded as 2 in Israeli data; 1 in ROK data; text in UK/US data)<br><i>Non-dem.</i> : RegimeA = "Dictatorship" (coded as 1 in Israeli data; 2 in ROK data; text in UK/US data) | [Same USA]<br><i>Scale</i> : 0-100 slider<br><i>Category</i> : Resolve         |

## F Detailed Forest Plots

Each figure displays one outcome category. Studies are sorted by point estimate (ascending). The bottom row (diamond) is the pooled meta-analytic estimate. Inline labels show estimate and standard error in percentage points. Blue circles are vignette studies; orange triangles are conjoints.






Figure A5: Forest plot: democracy effect on support for cooperation (pp).  
Note: All vignette and forced-choice studies with a cooperation outcome. Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.










Figure A8: Forest plot: democracy effect on threat perception (pp).  
*Note:* Threat is on its own natural scale, so a negative estimate means democracy lowers perceived threat. Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.




Figure A9: Forest plot: democracy effect on perceived morality (pp).  
*Note:* Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.




Figure A10: Forest plot: democracy effect on perceived success likelihood (pp).  
*Note:* Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.




Figure A11: Forest plot: democracy effect on perceived cost of attack (pp).  
*Note:* Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.




Figure A12: Forest plot: democracy effect on perceived resolve (pp).  
*Note:* Inline labels: estimate (SE) in pp.

## G Publication Bias

We assess potential publication bias using the three-parameter selection model (3PSM; Vevea and Hedges, 1995). The 3PSM jointly models publication probability and the true effect distribution. In this model, publication probability is fixed at 1 for statistically significant results ( $p \leq .05$ ) and estimated as  $\hat{\lambda}_1 \in [0, \infty)$  for non-significant results. The model estimates  $(\mu, \tau^2, \lambda_1)$  simultaneously via composite marginal likelihood. We use the `metaselection` method (Pustejovsky, Citkowitz and Joshi, 2025). The step is placed at a conventional two-sided .05 threshold ( $z = 1.96$ ). We orient each outcome so its predominant direction is positive; the “use of force” effect is predominantly negative and is oriented accordingly. We report every fit under two clustering choices, at the study level (treating each estimate as independent) and at the paper level (accounting for multiple studies within a single paper), with standard errors from both a cluster-robust sandwich estimator and a clustered bootstrap at the same level. We believe the 3PSM to be the best alternative here—over competitors such as PET/PEESE, p-curve, and funnel-based methods—on both theoretical and empirical grounds.<sup>31</sup>

Table A3 reports estimates separately for support for cooperation ( $k = 41$  studies, 17 papers) and support for use of force ( $k = 51$  studies, 23 papers). **We find no evidence of publication selection for either outcome.** For cooperation,  $\hat{\lambda}_1 = 1.03$ ; for use of force,  $\hat{\lambda}_1 = 1.18$ . Every interval, at both clustering levels and by both the sandwich and the bootstrap method, comfortably includes one, so non-significant results are neither under- nor over-represented. Critically, the selection-adjusted pooled effects (8.4 pp for cooperation and  $-6.9$  pp for use of force) stay close to their unadjusted counterparts and remain distinguishable from zero. This conclusion is robust to the clustering unit: paper-level intervals are modestly wider than study-level (as expected when pooling dependent estimates), but no substantive interpretation changes.

One caveat applies. The 3PSM assumes that studies enter the published record based on whether they achieve  $p < .05$ . Yet much of the use of force literature consists of deliberate replications of Tomz and Weeks (2013), motivated by a specific research question rather than by statistical significance; such programmatic replication differs from a conventional file drawer. We thus view the stability of the adjusted estimates as the key takeaway, rather than the specific  $\hat{\lambda}_1$  values.

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<sup>31</sup>Funnel-plot inspection and the Egger test (Egger et al., 1997) are qualitative or detect only one symptom of asymmetry without providing a bias-corrected estimate. Trim-and-fill (Duval and Tweedie, 2000) imputes missing studies symmetrically, an assumption that rarely holds. P-curve (Simonsohn, Nelson and Simmons, 2014) discards all non-significant results and cannot accommodate the dependent-effects structure of our corpus. PET/PEESE imposes a linear relationship between precision and effect size that can produce artifacts and lacks an explicit selection mechanism. Simulation studies comparing these approaches find that selection models are better calibrated under realistic conditions, particularly when the degree of selection is moderate (McShane, Böckenholt and Hansen, 2016; Carter et al., 2019).

Table A3: Hedges–Vevea selection model estimates for preference outcomes

| Outcome                  | Cluster | $k$ | Pooled effect $\hat{\beta}$ (pp) |                |                 |                   | Selection $\hat{\lambda}_1$ |              |              |  |
|--------------------------|---------|-----|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--|
|                          |         |     | $\hat{\beta}$                    | 95% CI         | Boot. 95% CI    | $\hat{\tau}$ (pp) | $\hat{\lambda}_1$           | 95% CI       | Boot. 95% CI |  |
| Support for cooperation  | Study   | 41  | 8.36                             | [5.62, 11.10]  | [5.15, 11.15]   | 6.14              | 1.03                        | [0.27, 3.91] | [0.21, 3.13] |  |
|                          | Paper   | 17  | 8.36                             | [5.16, 11.55]  | [4.88, 11.33]   | 6.14              | 1.03                        | [0.18, 5.93] | [0.11, 3.89] |  |
| Support for use of force | Study   | 51  | -6.86                            | [-9.28, -4.44] | [-10.25, -4.27] | 6.06              | 1.18                        | [0.39, 3.60] | [0.36, 3.16] |  |
|                          | Paper   | 23  | -6.86                            | [-9.59, -4.13] | [-10.68, -4.82] | 6.06              | 1.18                        | [0.42, 3.30] | [0.40, 3.10] |  |

*Note:* Three-parameter step selection model (Vevea and Hedges, 1995) estimated via composite marginal likelihood (CML), with a step at one-sided  $p = .025$  (a conventional two-sided .05 cutoff,  $z = 1.96$ ). Each outcome is estimated under two clustering choices: study-level clustering treats each study’s estimate as independent, so the number of clusters  $k$  equals the number of estimates, whereas paper-level clustering accounts for the multiple studies contributed by a single paper. Standard errors and intervals come from a cluster-robust (sandwich) variance estimator and, for the bootstrap columns, from a clustered bootstrap at the same level (multinomial cluster resampling, 999 replicates, percentile intervals) (Pustejovsky, Citkowitz and Joshi, 2025).  $\hat{\beta}$ : selection-adjusted pooled average effect (pp), reported on its original sign.  $\hat{\tau}$ : between-study heterogeneity SD (pp).  $\hat{\lambda}_1$ : relative publication probability for non-significant results (two-sided  $p > .05$ ) versus results significant in the outcome’s operative direction;  $\hat{\lambda}_1 = 1$  implies no selection,  $\hat{\lambda}_1 < 1$  implies non-significant results are underrepresented. Because the model scores significance one-sidedly, effects are oriented so each outcome’s predominant direction is positive (the military-strike effect is predominantly negative and is oriented accordingly). OLS (covariate-adjusted) estimates only.

## H Sign Generalizability

In this section we report estimates of sign generalizability, answering the question, for what fraction of the literature can we affirm that the true effect points the same way as the pooled estimate? We report three answers:

1. The first is purely descriptive:  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{raw}}$  is the share of study point estimates falling on the same side of zero as  $\hat{\mu}$ , with no inferential claim attached.
2. The certification fraction  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{sign}}$ , following Egami and Hartman (2023), applies a one-sided test to each study (null: the true effect lies on the opposite side of zero from  $\hat{\mu}$ ) and corrects for multiple comparisons with the Benjamini–Heller partial-conjunction procedure, which directly tests the family-level claim that at least  $r$  of  $k$  studies are correctly signed. A study is certified when its adjusted  $p$ -value falls below 0.05;  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{sign}}$  is the certified share. Because it relies on individual-study precision,  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{sign}}$  is constrained by how well each study is powered: an underpowered literature certifies few studies even when every true effect is correctly signed.
3. The distributional fraction  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{dist}}$  complements it with a model-based summary, the proportion of the fitted  $N(\hat{\mu}, \hat{\tau}^2)$  distribution of true effects that shares the pooled sign, computed with a  $t_{k-1}$  correction that propagates the uncertainty in  $\hat{\tau}$ . Less formally,  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{raw}}$  describes the studies collected, while  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{sign}}$  indicates how many of them have adjusted  $p$ -values below 0.05, and  $\hat{\pi}^{\text{dist}}$  describes our best estimates of the aggregate distribution of effects itself. Uncertainty for the latter two quantities comes from a study-level nonparametric bootstrap.

Table A4 reports the results. Favorability is essentially unanimous. Nearly every study is individually precise enough to rule out a negative democracy effect ( $\hat{\pi}^{\text{sign}} = 0.98$ ), and the model implies that 97% of true effects are positive. Support for cooperation and the morality and threat perceptions are also strongly directional, with certification fractions between 0.73 and 0.91. The certification fraction is much lower for the low-power perception outcomes (success 0.40, cost 0.25) and for resolve (0.45), yet for these same outcomes the distributional fraction stays high (0.76 to 0.94). The likely reason for this gap is that most true effects share the pooled sign, but individual studies are too imprecise to certify it.

Support for the use of force shows the most directional heterogeneity of the eight outcomes. Descriptively, the literature is close to unanimous, with 49 of 51 estimates negative and the two exceptions near zero rather than reversed. Only 0.57 of studies certify, and the distributional fraction of 0.80 is the second lowest in the table.



Table A4: Sign generalizability of the democracy treatment effect, by outcome category

| Outcome                  | $k$ | $\hat{\mu}$ (pp) | $\hat{\tau}$ (pp) | Share | Sign gen. [95% CI] | Dist. frac. [95% CI] |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------|-------------------|-------|--------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Preferences</i>       |     |                  |                   |       |                    |                      |
| Support for cooperation  | 41  | 8.3 (1.0)        | 6.2               | 1.00  | 0.78 [0.63, 0.90]  | 0.90 [0.87, 0.94]    |
| Support for use of force | 51  | −6.5 (0.9)       | 6.2               | 0.96  | 0.57 [0.41, 0.71]  | 0.85 [0.76, 0.96]    |
| <i>Perceptions</i>       |     |                  |                   |       |                    |                      |
| Favorability             | 57  | 14.9 (1.1)       | 7.7               | 1.00  | 0.98 [0.95, 1.00]  | 0.97 [0.93, 1.00]    |
| Threat perception        | 11  | −6.5 (1.5)       | 4.5               | 0.91  | 0.73 [0.36, 1.00]  | 0.90 [0.80, 0.99]    |
| Morality                 | 11  | 9.2 (1.3)        | 3.5               | 0.91  | 0.91 [0.73, 1.00]  | 0.98 [0.91, 1.00]    |
| Success                  | 15  | 3.9 (0.7)        | 2.2               | 0.93  | 0.40 [0.13, 0.67]  | 0.94 [0.85, 1.00]    |
| Cost                     | 8   | 2.3 (0.8)        | 1.7               | 0.75  | 0.25 [0.00, 0.62]  | 0.87 [0.74, 1.00]    |
| Resolve                  | 11  | −2.2 (0.9)       | 2.8               | 0.73  | 0.45 [0.18, 0.73]  | 0.76 [0.58, 0.93]    |

*Note:* Random-effects meta-analysis (`rma.mv`) with cluster-robust standard errors (`clubSandwich` CR2), OLS (covariate-adjusted) estimates on a common 0–1 scale, reported in percentage points (pp).  $k$  = number of studies;  $\hat{\mu}$  is the pooled democracy effect (SE in parentheses);  $\hat{\tau}$  is the between-study heterogeneity SD. The three rightmost columns answer three different questions. *Share* is descriptive: the raw proportion of study point estimates that fall on the same side of zero as  $\hat{\mu}$ .

*Sign gen.* is the certification fraction: the share of studies whose true effect is affirmed to lie on the same side of zero as  $\hat{\mu}$  by the Egami–Hartman one-sided test with a Benjamini–Heller partial-conjunction correction.

*Dist. frac.* is the model-based proportion of the (fitted  $N(\hat{\mu}, \hat{\tau}^2)$ ) distribution of true effects that shares the pooled sign. Both certification bounds and their 95% intervals come from a study-level nonparametric bootstrap ( $B = 1000$ ). These are percentile intervals on statistics bounded above by one, so they are not centered on their point estimates. Every outcome is reported on its own natural scale such that a positive number means democracy raises that quantity and a negative number for “threat perception” means democracy lowers perceived threat, (the pro-democracy direction). The generalizability fractions are invariant to the sign convention.

# I Cooperation Outcomes: Trade vs. Alliance and Defense

One natural question is whether the democracy treatment effect on cooperation support differs by cooperation type. We code each cooperation outcome into one of four types: trade (preferential trade agreements, economic integration), alliance/defense/arms (mutual defense pacts, military cooperation, arms transfers), foreign aid, and a residual category covering environmental and general cooperation, running the pooled meta-analysis separately for each group.

Figure A13 shows study-level estimates and meta-analytic averages for each cooperation type. The dotted vertical line marks the overall pooled estimate across all cooperation outcomes (8.3 pp) for reference. Table A5 reports the numerical estimates.




Figure A13: Democracy treatment effect on cooperation support, by cooperation type.

*Note:* Each point is one study (OLS, covariate-adjusted); horizontal lines are 95% CIs. Blue: vignette studies; orange: conjoints. Diamond and thick bar: meta-analytic pooled estimate and 95% CI (random-effects, cluster-robust). Dotted vertical line: overall pooled estimate across all cooperation outcomes (8.3 pp).

Trade cooperation shows a somewhat larger democracy effect (9.1 pp, SE = 1.3,  $k = 12$ ) than alliance, defense, and arms cooperation (7.6 pp, SE = 1.5,  $k = 23$ ), although both estimates are strongly positive and the difference between them is well inside the margin of sampling error. Heterogeneity is modest for trade ( $\hat{\tau} = 4.2$  pp) and somewhat larger for alliance and defense ( $\hat{\tau} = 7.0$  pp). Foreign aid and the environmental category are based on only two studies each (13.6 pp and 2.4 pp), so caution should be taken when interpreting those results. All four types of

cooperation show a positive effect of democracy framing on cooperation support, with the environmental effect (2.4 pp, SE = 0.6) representing the smallest effect.

Table A5: Democracy treatment effect on support for cooperation, by cooperation type

| Type                                     | $k$ | $N$    | $\hat{\mu}$ (pp) | $\hat{\tau}$ (pp) | $p_Q$  |
|------------------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------|-------------------|--------|
| Trade                                    | 12  | 13,080 | 9.1<br>(1.3)     | 4.2               | <0.001 |
| Alliance / defense / arms                | 23  | 35,810 | 7.6<br>(1.5)     | 7.0               | <0.001 |
| Foreign aid                              | 2   | 3,890  | 13.6<br>(6.4)    | 9.0               | <0.001 |
| Other (environmental, general)           | 4   | 10,770 | 7.0<br>(2.8)     | 5.4               | <0.001 |
| <i>Overall (support for cooperation)</i> | 41  | 63,550 | 8.3<br>(1.0)     | 6.2               | <0.001 |

*Note:* Random-effects meta-analysis (`rma.mv`) with cluster-robust standard errors (`clubSandwich` CR2). OLS (covariate-adjusted) estimates only. “Trade” = trade agreements, preferential trade, and economic integration outcomes; “alliance / defense / arms” = mutual defense pacts, military cooperation, and arms-transfer outcomes; “foreign aid” = development-assistance outcomes; “environmental” = bilateral agreements on storing captured CO<sub>2</sub> abroad.  $\hat{\mu}$ : pooled average treatment effect of democracy (vs. non-democracy), in percentage points (pp); standard errors in parentheses.  $\hat{\tau}$ : between-study heterogeneity SD (pp).  $p_Q$ : Cochran’s  $Q$   $p$ -value.  $k$  = studies;  $N$  = total respondents.

## J Vignette vs. Forced-Choice: Design-Type Comparison

Table [A15](#) reports a meta-regression that directly tests whether the democracy treatment effect differs between vignette and conjoint designs. For each of the three outcome categories with adequate coverage of both design types, we regress the study-level OLS estimate on a forced-choice conjoint indicator (1 = forced-choice, 0 = vignette), fitting a single model that pools both design types and includes the study-level variance-covariance structure from `rma.mv` with cluster-robust standard errors.

The results do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, whether for support for cooperation ( $p = 0.51$ ), support for the use of force ( $p = 0.81$ ), or favorability ( $p = 0.19$ ). In two of the three categories the residual  $\hat{\tau}$  exceeds the baseline, which means that the moderator accounts for a negative share of the between-study variance: that is to say, adding design type to the model leaves more heterogeneity unexplained, rather than less.

## K Treatment Family Classification

The studies in our meta-analysis differ not only in design format but in the information used to manipulate regime type. Below, we classify each study into one of seven treatment “families” based on the experimental vignette or conjoint structure.

**TW nuclear (near-verbatim).** This family consists of studies closely following the setup of Tomz and Weeks (2013): an unnamed country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first bomb within months; the respondent’s country can conduct a preemptive strike on the nuclear development sites. The key attributes of studies in this group are the “nuclear-bomb-development countdown” and the outcome related to military strikes on the possible nuclear sites. We classify a study as near-verbatim if it replicates this scenario structure with minimal modification. This includes the original Tomz and Weeks 2013 studies and their direct replications in multiple countries (e.g., Bassan-Nygate et al., 2025; Bell and Quek, 2018; Chaudoin, Gaines and Livny, 2021; Kim, Kim and Kwak, 2024; Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2025; Suong, Desposato and Gartzke, 2020, 2023).

**TW nuclear (extended).** This group contains only Johns and Davies (2019), which adds modifies the above category with a civilian casualty treatment and uses named political roles (president/dictator) rather than an abstract country.

**Ally defense.** This family of scenarios involves defense of an ally or fulfillment of a military commitment. The respondent’s country is asked to send military forces to stop an invasion of (or aggression against) another country. Includes Tomz and Weeks (2021) (defending an attacked country), Levin and Kobayashi (2022) (US alliance disengagement), Smetana, Vranka and Rosendorf (2026) (cross-national armed-aggression experiment), and conjoint ally-selection studies (e.g., Alley, 2023; Donahue and Crescenzi, 2023; Musgrave and Ward, 2023). Kiratli (2024) also belongs in this family, but its conjoint varies the proposed military response to a fixed ally-invasion scenario rather than the choice of ally: respondents compare two proposed operations and approve one.

**Trade / cooperation.** This family consists of scenarios about trade agreements, preferential trade arrangements, or economic cooperation, and includes both narrative vignettes about bilateral free trade agreements (e.g., Kiratli, 2021; Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023) and conjoint studies selecting preferred trade partners (Spilker, Bernauer and Umaña, 2016).

**Conjoint (general).** This group of studies are conjoints in which regime type appears as one attribute in a multi-attribute profile. It includes arms-export conjoints

(Rudolph, Freitag and Thurner, 2024), territorial-dispute conjoints (Takei, 2024), and residential-preference conjoints (Neundorff et al., 2026).

**Foreign aid.** This group of studies feature scenarios in which a respondent’s country is deciding whether to give, increase, or direct development or humanitarian assistance to a recipient country whose regime type is randomized. It also includes conjoints with paired aid packages (e.g., Doherty et al., 2020; Gafuri, 2024). The latter group include both a cooperation outcome (whether to provide the aid) and a favorability outcome (evaluations of the recipient), which is why it appears in two columns of Table A6.

**Other.** Our final group features studies that do not fit any of the above categories: general crisis vignettes without a nuclear or alliance framing, legitimacy experiments, and studies whose primary outcome is threat or resolve perception rather than behavioral support.

Table A6 reports study counts and pooled democracy treatment effects for each family, restricted to the three outcome categories with sufficient coverage. The table shows the ubiquity of Tomz/Weeks scenario in this literature: 29 of the 51 studies with a use of force outcome use this scenario near-verbatim, with a pooled ATE of  $-7.5$  pp (SE = 1.3,  $k = 29$ ). The remaining use of force studies (ally-defense and other scenarios,  $k = 7$  and  $k = 11$ ) show noisier estimates in the same direction, suggesting that the effect of regime type in these experiments is not an artifact of any particular nuclear framing.<sup>32</sup> In the cooperation literature, trade and ally-defense families yield similar pooled ATEs ( $+9.1$  pp and  $+8.0$  pp respectively), consistent with a domain-general democracy effect (and not one specific to a particular substantive context). The large favorability effect in the conjoint-general family ( $+16.1$  pp,  $k = 42$ ) tracks the pattern in Appendix J, where conjoints return a larger favorability effect than vignettes do, although that difference does not reach conventional significance.

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<sup>32</sup>The ally-defense pool is the least precise of the three ( $-6.2$  pp, SE = 3.0), and the widest single estimate in it is Muradova and Gildea (2021) at  $-23.5$  pp, a conjoint in which respondents choose which of two countries to attack.

Table A6: Democracy treatment effect by treatment family

| Family                     | $k$ (studies) | Use of force    | Coop. support  | Favorability    |
|----------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| TW nuclear (near-verbatim) | 29            | -7.5 (1.3) (29) | —              | —               |
| TW nuclear (extended)      | 2             | -2.6 (1.8) (2)  | —              | —               |
| Ally defense               | 28            | -6.2 (3.0) (7)  | 8.0 (1.6) (21) | —               |
| Trade / cooperation        | 12            | —               | 9.1 (1.3) (12) | —               |
| Foreign aid                | 9             | —               | 13.6 (6.4) (2) | 13.2 (1.3) (7)  |
| Conjoint (general)         | 50            | -9.4 (6.4) (2)  | 3.7 (0.6) (4)  | 16.1 (1.2) (42) |
| Other                      | 28            | -4.1 (1.6) (11) | 11.6 (1.8) (2) | 10.6 (3.8) (8)  |

*Note:* OLS estimates, pooled via multilevel random-effects meta-analysis (`rma.mv`, cluster-robust). Cells show estimate (standard error) (number of studies). The  $k$  column counts every study in the family and does not equal the sum of the cells beside it because (1) a study measuring more than one of these three outcomes is counted once in  $k$  but appears in each column it contributes to (2) a study whose only outcome falls outside these three categories (threat, morality, success, cost, or resolve) is counted in  $k$  and appears in no cell at all. The category “Conjoint (general)” has two such studies and “Other” has nine. “—” = fewer than 2 studies. TW nuclear (near-verbatim): near-identical nuclear-weapons-development scenario from Tomz and Weeks (2013). TW nuclear (extended): same nuclear-strike premise with meaningful structural modifications. Ally defense: scenario involves defending an ally or fulfilling alliance commitments. Trade/cooperation: support for trade agreements or economic cooperation. Foreign aid: support for giving or receiving development assistance. Conjoint (general): conjoint not fitting other categories. Other: studies fitting none of the above.

## L Individual-Level Heterogeneity: Additional Moderators

Figures A14–A18 present conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) for five individual-level moderators beyond hawkishness: ethnocentrism, nationalism, survey attentiveness, partisanship, and gender. Each figure shows the democracy treatment effect estimated separately within each subgroup level, across all outcome categories with sufficient coverage. Operationalization details for each moderator appear in Appendix A.




Figure A14: Conditional ATEs by respondent ethnocentrism (High / Low, split at study-specific median).

*Note:* Vignette studies with validated ethnocentrism measures only. Pooled estimates from multilevel random-effects meta-regression, cluster-robust SEs.






Figure A15: Conditional ATEs by respondent nationalism (High / Low, split at study-specific median).

*Note:* Vignette studies with validated nationalism measures only. Pooled estimates from multilevel random-effects meta-regression, cluster-robust SEs.




Figure A16: Conditional ATEs by survey attentiveness (Attentive / Inattentive).

*Note:* The democracy effect estimated separately among respondents who passed every attention check their study fielded and respondents who failed at least one. Attention checks are content-free screeners only; manipulation checks and self-reported political interest are excluded, and subgroup cells below 30 respondents are dropped. Diamonds are pooled random-effects estimates within each subgroup; small points are the study-level estimates they pool. Operationalization is in Appendix A.




Figure A17: Conditional ATEs by respondent partisanship (Conservative / Liberal, split at study-specific median).  
*Note:* Studies with party identification or ideological self-placement measures. Higher values = more conservative. Pooled estimates from multilevel random-effects meta-regression, cluster-robust SEs.




Figure A18: Conditional ATEs by respondent gender (Men / Women).  
*Note:* All vignette studies with a gender variable and at least one qualifying outcome category (support for cooperation, support for use of force, favorability, threat, resolve). Gender interaction (Women – Men) pooled via random-effects meta-analysis (REML). Operationalization in Appendix A.




Figure A19: Conditional ATEs by hawkishness: support for use of force. Each study contributes three subgroup estimates (Hawk, Neither, Dove).

*Note:* Vignette studies only. Studies sorted by the Hawk estimate. Pooled meta-analytic estimates use a multilevel random-effects model with robust cluster standard errors by study.




Figure A20: Conditional ATEs by hawkishness: support for cooperation. Each study contributes three subgroup estimates (Hawk, Neither, Dove).

*Note:* Vignette studies only. Studies sorted by the Hawk estimate. Pooled meta-analytic estimates use a multilevel random-effects model with robust cluster standard errors by study.

## M Elite versus Public Samples: Matched Comparisons

Almost every experiment in our corpus was fielded on a mass-public sample. Only four studies estimate the regime-type treatment on an elite sample, so the evidence that regime type shifts foreign-policy attitudes come mostly from ordinary citizens (in keeping with the tendency in the literature more generally; Kertzer and Renshon, 2022). We use these four elite studies to assess whether elites and masses systematically differ in how they respond to democracy treatments.

Because a pooled “elite versus public” moderator analysis would be uninformative with only four elite studies, we instead compare each elite estimate to a small set of public experiments selected to match it, and ask: “does the elite estimate falls inside the distribution of those matched public effects?” Every estimate in this section is the Lin-adjusted average effect of the democracy treatment: an ordinary least squares regression of the outcome on the treatment fully interacted with mean-centered respondent covariates (Lin, 2013), with standard errors clustered by respondent in conjoint and repeated-task designs. Where a study’s replication data carry no pre-treatment respondent covariates, the Lin estimator reduces to the difference in means.

### The elite samples

The resolve experiment of Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2021) was fielded on 89 current and former members of the Israeli Knesset, several of whom served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Chen, Pevehouse and Powers (2023) surveyed 212 senior United States trade and development policy practitioners, comprising Senate-confirmable political appointees and Senior Executive Service civil servants, recruited through the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project. The reputations-for-resolve experiment of Dafoe, Zwetsloot and Cebul (2021) recruited roughly one thousand readers of Stephen Walt’s *Foreign Policy* blog. This set of respondents are not necessarily government officials, but they are a self-selected and unusually foreign-policy-attentive readership. Scholten and Zhirkov (2025) fielded a paired conjoint on 147 United States State Department officials recruited through LinkedIn, alongside a 985-respondent Lucid sample answering the identical instrument. The four samples span elected officials, executive-branch professionals in two policy domains, and an attentive elite public.

### Choice of matched experiments

For each elite study, we restrict the comparison set to public experiments that estimate the democracy treatment on the same outcome category, and among those we chose experiments that shared the elite study’s design format, treatment family, response scale, and country.

The Chen, Pevehouse and Powers (2023) outcome is support for trade and economic cooperation. The paper’s own three United States public arms provide the cleanest benchmark, since they administer the identical vignette to the general public. We add the United States trade-cooperation vignette of Carnegie and Gaikwad (2022) and the Turkish and Greek trade experiments of Kiratli (2021), which share the outcome and the vignette design while extending the comparison beyond the United States.

The Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2021) outcome is perceived resolve. The paper’s own American adult sample is the closest match, because it runs the same resolve conjoint on the public. Because the elite respondents are Israeli, the most valuable external comparisons are the Israeli public resolve experiments of Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer (2023), which hold the country fixed while changing the population; we include that study’s United States public arm as well as the resolve conjoint of Takei (2024) for breadth.

The Dafoe, Zwetsloot and Cebul (2021) outcome is also resolve, but the study has no public arm of its own, so every comparison is somewhat further removed. The closest single match is Takei, Moon and Imada (2026), a United States vignette measuring perceived resolve, which matches the elite study on outcome, design, and country. We add the United States public resolve experiments of Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2021) and Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer (2023) and the resolve conjoint of Takei (2024). These last comparisons are conjoints while the elite study is a vignette, so the match on design is weaker than in the other two cases, and we read this comparison more cautiously.

The Scholten and Zhirkov (2025) outcome measure asks respondents which of two countries’ military actions are more justified. As with Chen, Pevehouse and Powers and Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, the paper’s own public arm is the strongest benchmark: 985 Lucid respondents answered the identical conjoint. The closest external match is Muradova and Gildea (2021), which randomizes the regime type of a target country and asks which of two countries the respondent would prefer the the United States attack, putting nearly the elite study’s own question to a United States public sample in the same format. We add the United States forced-choice conjoints of Musgrave and Ward (2023) and the United States arm of Kiratli (2024), which share the outcome category, the instrument, and the country; both are further from the elite study’s scenario, since Musgrave and Ward randomize the regime types of an aggressor and a victim and ask about intervening to defend, and Kiratli randomize the regime type of an ally.

## Results

Figure A21 displays each elite estimate against its matched public distribution. In all four cases the elite estimate falls inside the range of the matched public effects. In three of the four it is also statistically indistinguishable from the public average,

and in the fourth it is not.

For trade support the elite estimate is +16.0 percentage points, near the top of a public range that runs from +4.0 to +19.0, and the gap from the pooled public average does not reach conventional significance ( $p = 0.08$ , and the  $p$ -value rises further once heterogeneity among the public studies is acknowledged). For resolve in the Knesset sample, the elite estimate is  $-5.0$  points, within a public range of  $-6.7$  to  $-1.1$  and almost identical to the same-country Israeli public estimates; it is also the least precise of the four, reflecting the sample size of 89 ( $p = 0.67$ ). For resolve in the blog sample, the elite estimate is  $-2.8$  points, again inside the public range and essentially identical to the public average ( $p = 0.99$ ).

The State Department LinkedIn sample is the exception. Its estimate is  $-14.8$  points against a matched public average of  $-3.8$ , a gap of 11.0 points ( $p < 0.001$ ). However, this gap also partially reflects the pull of the Muradova and Gildea (2021) results, which displays a large treatment effect of democracy in the opposite direction.



### Elite estimate vs. the distribution of matched public experiments

Red line/band: elite study (95% CI). Blue: matched public experiments (95% CI).




Figure A21: Lin-adjusted democracy treatment effect in each elite study (red) against the distribution of matched public experiments (blue), one panel per elite paper.

*Note:* Each panel shows one elite study. The red line and shaded band give the elite study's Lin-adjusted average democracy treatment effect (in pp) and its 95% confidence interval; blue point ranges give the same quantity for matched public experiments, sorted by estimate. Matched experiments share the elite study's outcome category and are selected on design format, treatment family, response scale, and country, as described in this appendix. Two studies (the third Chen, Pevehouse and Powers, 2023 public sample and the Dafoe, Zwetsloot and Cebul, 2021 elite sample) carry no pre-treatment respondent covariates in their replication data, so their Lin estimate reduces to the difference in means.

## N Time Trends: Functional-Form Robustness

The temporal analysis in the main text (Figure 5) models the democracy treatment effect as a linear function of the year a study was fielded. Because a linear specification could mask nonmonotonic change, we re-estimate each outcome category’s time trend with two more flexible forms: a quadratic in year, and a natural cubic spline with two degrees of freedom. Figure A22 plots the fitted trajectories, and Table A7 compares specifications by corrected AIC.

For all four outcome categories, the added flexibility does not affect our results: no quadratic or spline term is distinguishable from zero (all  $p > 0.6$ ), and the fitted curves are visually flat. Put simply, the stability of the democracy effect over time is not an artifact of assuming linearity in the functional form.




Figure A22: Democracy treatment effect by year of fielding under linear, quadratic, and natural-spline specifications, by outcome category.

*Note:* Grey points are study-level OLS-adjusted democracy treatment effects (percentage points), pooling the vignette and forced-choice estimates. Lines are fitted meta-regression trajectories with 95% confidence bands from `rma.mv`: linear (green), quadratic (orange), and natural spline with two degrees of freedom (purple).

Table A7: Time-trend robustness: linear, quadratic, and natural-spline specifications

| Outcome                  | Linear slope (pp/yr) | Quadratic term, $p$ | Spline terms, $p$ |
|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Support for cooperation  | -0.12 (0.27)         | 0.588               | 0.857             |
| Support for use of force | -0.07 (0.20)         | 0.393               | 0.731             |
| Favorability             | -1.14 (0.62)         | 0.772               | 0.632             |
| Resolve                  | 0.15 (0.40)          | 0.638               | 0.890             |

*Note:* Meta-regressions of the study-level OLS democracy treatment effect on year of fielding, using the combined (vignette + conjoint) estimates, matching Figure 5 and Appendix Table A16. “Linear slope” is the coefficient on years-since-2014 in percentage points per year, with cluster-robust (by study) standard error in parentheses. The two right-hand columns report cluster-robust Wald tests of the terms each nonlinear specification adds to the linear model: the squared year term, and the two natural-spline (df = 2) basis terms jointly. Since no nonlinear term is distinguishable from zero for any outcome, we can conclude that the temporal stability of democracy’s effect is not an artifact of assuming linearity.

## O Variance-Standardized Effects

The main text reports effects in percentage points on a common 0–1 outcome scale. Because scale construction varies across studies, we also report effects in control-group standard deviations, a metric frequently used in psychological meta-analysis. For estimate  $i$  with control-group standard deviation  $s_i$ , we form  $d_i = \hat{\theta}_i/s_i$  and  $\text{SE}(d_i) = \text{SE}(\hat{\theta}_i)/s_i$ , and rescale the full variance-covariance matrix as  $V_{ij}/(s_i s_j)$  so that within-study covariances among multiple outcomes are preserved. The control group is the non-democracy arm of each experiment.

Table A8 reports the pooled standardized effects, and Figures A23 and A24 reproduce the two main-text figures on the same scale. The substantive conclusions do not change: every outcome category preserves the direction of its percentage-point counterpart, and every pooled estimate remains more than two standard errors from zero: democracy lowers support for the use of force by 0.20 standard deviations and raises support for cooperation by 0.23. Favorability remains the largest effect at 0.49 and cost the smallest at 0.08.

Table A8 presents its results in two phases, first for all designs, and the second only for vignette experiments. We exclude conjoint experiments here as a robustness check because in a forced-choice conjoint, the outcome is a binary choice indicator whose control-group standard deviation is mechanically  $\sqrt{p(1-p)}$ , so  $d$  is well defined but is *not* the standardized mean difference a Likert outcome would give. For most outcomes, this restriction doesn’t affect our results, because those categories don’t contain any conjoint studies. Favorability is one exception:  $k$  falls from 57 to 8, and while the point estimate moves only modestly (0.49 to 0.42), and its standard error grows from 0.03 to 0.15.




Figure A23: Effect of democracy manipulation on support for the use of force and cooperation, in control-group standard deviations.

*Note:* Appendix analog of Figure 2 in main text with effects expressed as Cohen's  $d$ . Small points are study-level OLS estimates with 95% confidence intervals, colored by design type and vertically jittered within each outcome category. Grey diamonds and bars are the random-effects pooled estimates and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A24: Effect of democracy manipulation on beliefs about the target country, in control-group standard deviations.

*Note:* Appendix analog of Figure 3 in main text with effects expressed as Cohen's  $d$ . Every outcome is on its own natural scale, so the negative threat estimate means that democracy lowers perceived threat. Small points are study-level OLS estimates with 95% confidence intervals, colored by design type and vertically jittered; grey diamonds and bars are the random-effects pooled estimates and 95% confidence intervals.

Table A8: Meta-analytic estimates of the democracy treatment effect, variance-standardized (Cohen's  $d$ )

| Outcome                  | All designs |               |        |                | Vignette only |               |        |                |
|--------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------|----------------|
|                          | $k$         | $\hat{\mu}_d$ | (SE)   | $\hat{\tau}_d$ | $k$           | $\hat{\mu}_d$ | (SE)   | $\hat{\tau}_d$ |
| <i>Preferences</i>       |             |               |        |                |               |               |        |                |
| Support for cooperation  | 41          | 0.23          | (0.03) | 0.15           | 26            | 0.26          | (0.04) | 0.18           |
| Support for use of force | 51          | -0.18         | (0.02) | 0.16           | 44            | -0.19         | (0.03) | 0.16           |
| <i>Perceptions</i>       |             |               |        |                |               |               |        |                |
| Favorability             | 57          | 0.49          | (0.03) | 0.23           | 8             | 0.42          | (0.15) | 0.42           |
| Threat perception        | 11          | -0.20         | (0.04) | 0.11           | 11            | -0.20         | (0.04) | 0.11           |
| Morality                 | 11          | 0.20          | (0.03) | 0.08           | 11            | 0.20          | (0.03) | 0.08           |
| Success                  | 15          | 0.19          | (0.04) | 0.15           | 15            | 0.19          | (0.04) | 0.15           |
| Cost                     | 8           | 0.08          | (0.03) | 0.06           | 8             | 0.08          | (0.03) | 0.06           |
| Resolve                  | 11          | -0.10         | (0.04) | 0.13           | 10            | -0.11         | (0.05) | 0.14           |

*Note:* Appendix analog of the main meta-analysis table with effects expressed in control-group standard deviations (Cohen's  $d$ ) rather than percentage points. Each estimate is divided by the standard deviation of its outcome among control (non-democracy) respondents, and the full variance-covariance matrix is rescaled as  $V_{ij}/(s_i s_j)$ , so within-study covariances are preserved. Random-effects meta-analysis (`rma.mv`) with cluster-robust standard errors (clubSandwich CR2) on OLS (covariate-adjusted) estimates.  $k$  = number of studies;  $\hat{\mu}_d$  is the pooled standardized effect;  $\hat{\tau}_d$  is the between-study heterogeneity SD on the same scale. The right-hand panel is restricted to vignette designs: in a forced-choice conjoint the outcome is a binary choice indicator whose control-group SD is mechanically  $\sqrt{p(1-p)}$ , so  $d$  is well defined but is not the standardized mean difference that a Likert outcome would give, and the two panels should be compared with that in mind.

## P Intermediate Regime Conditions

The analysis in the main text focuses on the comparison between democracies and their non-democratic counterparts. However, sixteen studies in ten papers include a third regime condition lying between these two poles: partial democracy in Levin and Kobayashi (2022) and Kiratli (2024), a partly democratic trading partner in Spilker, Bernauer and Umaña (2016), weak democracy in Alley (2023), a mixed regime in Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2021), anocracy in Donahue and Crescenzi (2023), a partially democratic ally in Kiratli (2025), illiberal democracy in Carnegie, Kertzer and Yarhi-Milo (2023), a partly democratic CO<sub>2</sub> storage partner in Rhein and Bernauer (2026), and two intermediate arms (“somewhat democratic” and “mostly democratic”) in Rzazade (2026). Our analysis in the main text excludes these conditions rather than folding them into the “Non-democracy” baseline but we consider them separately below.

Table A9 estimates the mean outcome at every level of these designs and Figure A25 plots the same quantities with 95% confidence intervals, using each study’s own outcome measures on the common  $[0, 1]$  scale. Standard errors are clustered by respondent in the ten designs that present more than one regime condition to each respondent. To compare across studies measured on different outcomes, we locate the intermediate arm on the scale defined by the study’s own two poles,  $p = (\bar{y}_{\text{int}} - \bar{y}_{\text{non-dem}}) / (\bar{y}_{\text{dem}} - \bar{y}_{\text{non-dem}})$ . Therefore,  $p = 0$  indicates that the intermediate arm generates the same response as the non-democracy pole,  $p = 1$  means it generates the same response as the democracy pole, and  $p = 0.5$  is the midpoint. Figure A26 reports  $p$  with delta-method confidence intervals for the 20 of 25 study-outcome combinations whose democracy (vs non-democracy) treatment effect is distinguishable from zero. In the other five, the denominator cannot be separated from noise, which leaves  $p$  undefined in practice; those cases appear in the table and in Figure A25 but are omitted from Figure A26.

Our results indicate that respondents do not treat intermediate regimes as autocracies. The median position is 0.58, seventeen of the twenty intervals exclude 0, and twelve fall above the midpoint. The pattern holds across outcome categories, across respondent countries, and across both vignette and forced-choice designs. Overall, respondents mostly interpreted intermediate arms as closer to democracies. These results suggest that aggregating intermediate arms into the “non-democracy” baseline studies would have attenuated the democracy ATE we estimated.




Figure A25: Outcome means at every regime level in the sixteen studies with an intermediate arm.

*Note:* Each panel is one study-outcome combination. Points are group means on the [0, 1] outcome scale with 95% confidence intervals, clustered by respondent in repeated-task designs. Red is the non-democracy pole, grey the intermediate arm, blue the democracy pole. Vertical scales differ across panels because the studies use different outcome measures. The intermediate arm is labelled differently across studies (partial democracy, partly democratic, weak democracy, mixed, anocracy, illiberal democracy); Table A9 reports each study's own wording.






Figure A26: Position of the intermediate arm on each study's own non-democracy-to-democracy scale.

*Note:* Each row is one study-outcome combination, sorted by position. A value of 0 means the intermediate arm generates the same response as the non-democracy pole, 1 the same as the democracy pole, and 0.5 exactly midway; values outside [0, 1] arise when the intermediate arm falls beyond one of the poles. Bars are 95% delta-method confidence intervals. The five combinations whose pole-to-pole gap is not distinguishable from zero are omitted.

Table A9: Outcome means at every regime level in studies with an intermediate arm

| Study                                 | Outcome                   | Non-dem.    | Interm.     | Dem.        | Position |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| Alley (2023) S1, Alliance maintenance | Alliance support (rating) | 0.55 (0.01) | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.60 (0.01) | 0.42     |
| Alley (2023) S1, Alliance maintenance | Alliance support (choice) | 0.58 (0.01) | 0.61 (0.01) | 0.67 (0.01) | 0.37     |
| Alley (2023) S2, Alliance formation   | Alliance support (rating) | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.54 (0.01) | 0.56 (0.01) | 0.48     |
| Alley (2023) S2, Alliance formation   | Alliance support (choice) | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.41     |
| Carnegie et al. (2023) S1             | Support for action        | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.43 (0.01) | 0.38 (0.01) | 0.60     |
| Carnegie et al. (2023) S1             | Vote for president        | 0.51 (0.01) | 0.41 (0.01) | 0.39 (0.01) | 0.80     |
| Donahue & Crescenzi (2023) S1         | Ally rating               | 0.53 (0.01) | 0.53 (0.01) | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.00     |

Table A9, continued

| Study                                      | Outcome                                      | Non-dem.    | Interm.     | Dem.        | Position |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| Donahue & Crescenzi (2023) S1              | Ally selected (choice)                       | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.47 (0.01) | 0.55 (0.01) | -0.21    |
| Kertzer et al. (2021) S1                   | More resolved (choice)                       | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.49 (0.01) | —        |
| Kertzer et al. (2021) S1                   | Resolve (estimate)                           | 0.60 (0.01) | 0.59 (0.01) | 0.59 (0.01) | —        |
| Kiratli (2024) S1, United States           | Send troops (choice)                         | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | —        |
| Kiratli (2024) S2, Turkey                  | Send troops (choice)                         | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.49 (0.01) | 0.49 (0.01) | 1.06     |
| Kiratli (2025) S1                          | Cooperation (avg. index)                     | 0.40 (0.01) | 0.45 (0.01) | 0.44 (0.01) | 1.08     |
| Levin & Kobayashi (2022) S1                | Cooperation support                          | 0.47 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.53 (0.01) | 0.44     |
| Levin & Kobayashi (2022) S2                | Cooperation support                          | 0.39 (0.02) | 0.45 (0.02) | 0.43 (0.02) | —        |
| Rhein & Bernauer (2026) S1, United Kingdom | CO2 storage partner (choice)                 | 0.49 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.51 (0.01) | —        |
| Rhein & Bernauer (2026) S2, Switzerland    | CO2 storage partner (choice)                 | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.51 (0.01) | 0.54     |
| Rzazade (2026) S1, United States           | Higher status (choice) [Mostly democratic]   | 0.38 (0.01) | 0.55 (0.01) | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.85     |
| Rzazade (2026) S1, United States           | Higher status (choice) [Somewhat democratic] | 0.38 (0.01) | 0.49 (0.01) | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.57     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S1, Costa Rica       | PTA support (rating)                         | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.55 (0.01) | 0.56 (0.01) | 0.92     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S1, Costa Rica       | PTA support (choice)                         | 0.41 (0.01) | 0.53 (0.01) | 0.56 (0.01) | 0.79     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S2, Nicaragua        | PTA support (rating)                         | 0.58 (0.01) | 0.63 (0.01) | 0.63 (0.01) | 0.98     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S2, Nicaragua        | PTA support (choice)                         | 0.43 (0.01) | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.54 (0.01) | 0.83     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S3, Vietnam          | PTA support (rating)                         | 0.57 (0.01) | 0.59 (0.01) | 0.61 (0.01) | 0.58     |
| Spilker et al. (2016) S3, Vietnam          | PTA support (choice)                         | 0.44 (0.01) | 0.50 (0.01) | 0.56 (0.01) | 0.47     |

*Note:* Outcome means on the  $[0, 1]$  scale at each level of the regime treatment, for every study whose design randomizes a third, intermediate regime condition that the primary meta-analysis ignores. Columns are the non-democracy pole, the intermediate arm, and the democracy pole. The intermediate arm’s own label varies by study (e.g., partial democracy, partly democratic, weak democracy, mixed, anocracy, illiberal democracy, somewhat or mostly democratic). Each study gets one row except for Rzazade (2026), which randomizes two intermediate levels and so occupies two rows. Standard errors in parentheses, respondent-clustered (CR2) in repeated-task designs. “Position”: 0 is the non-democracy pole, 1 the democracy pole, 0.5 midway. We report as “—” where the study’s pole-to-pole gap is not distinguishable from zero.

## Q Meta-Regression Specifications

This appendix reports the complete model specifications for every meta-regression figure in the main text, alongside information about how much of the between-study variation each moderator accounts for. Tables A10-A12 contain the vignette characteristics of Figure 7; Tables A13- A14 capture the treatment type, and Figure A27 plots the study-level estimates and predicted levels for those tables. Table A15 depicts the design comparison of Figure 8, while Tables A16-A17 contains the time trend of Figure 5, first by itself and then also adjusting for scenario abstraction. Tables A18-A20 covers the political-context moderation of Figure 6, once for operationalization of the respondent country’s regime type.

In each instance, we use a multilevel meta-regression (`rma.mv`, `random = ~ 1 | id`) with cluster-robust standard errors (`clubSandwich` CR2) clustered by study, reported in parentheses. Coefficients are in percentage points. Each table reports the results for one moderator, and each column within it reports the results for one outcome category, such that every column depicts is a separate regression. Alongside each, we report  $\tau$  from an intercept-only model estimated on the identical rows and the residual  $\tau$ . The final row is  $1 - \tau_{\text{residual}}^2 / \tau_{\text{baseline}}^2$ , which denotes the share of between-study variance accounted for by the moderator accounts for; negative values means the moderator accounts for none.

The most informative rows are the final ones in Tables A10 to A12. These suggest that word count, information cues, and abstraction account for essentially none of the between-study variance in the two well-populated outcome categories; in several columns the residual  $\tau$  actually exceeds the baseline. The one large positive share, 0.67 for word count on favorability in Table A10, is fitted on six studies, but caution should be taken in interpreting these results, since that same moderator accounts for no variation in the 43 use of force studies or 20 cooperation studies, and it is not clear why word length would affect favorability but not our two preference outcomes.

One exception to the pattern is how the regime contrast is manipulated. Among vignette studies of cooperation, studies that name a country a democracy without further content produce a 3.6 pp effect whereas studies that signal regime through electoral institutions produce 10.7 pp, and studies that signal it through civil liberties and norms produce 17.6 pp; residual  $\tau$  falls from 6.5 to 3.5 pp. We fit this moderator separately within design format because manipulation type and design format are strongly associated across the corpus.

Table A10: Meta-regression: vignette word count

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability | Resolve |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Intercept                       | 11.0*       | −6.3*        | 11.5*        | −2.9    |
|                                 | (1.5)       | (0.9)        | (3.2)        | (2.2)   |
| Log word count                  | −0.2        | 2.0          | −24.6        | 2.8     |
|                                 | (3.4)       | (1.2)        | (10.4)       | (9.1)   |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 20          | 43           | 6            | 4       |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 9           | 19           | 3            | 3       |
| Moderator mean (centered at)    | 4.82        | 5.00         | 5.25         | 4.75    |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 5.5          | 12.0         | 3.8     |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.5         | 5.5          | 6.9          | 4.6     |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | −0.07       | 0.00         | 0.67         | −0.51   |

*Note:* Vignette designs only, since this moderator is not comparably coded for conjoints.

The moderator is mean-centered, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for an average study in that column; the mean subtracted is reported in the table. Outcome categories with fewer than three studies are omitted. Word count is the mean of the democracy and non-democracy arm word counts, logged before centering. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A11: Meta-regression: number of information cues


|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability | Resolve |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Intercept                       | 8.8*        | −6.4*        | 10.7*        | −2.3    |
|                                 | (1.3)       | (0.9)        | (3.6)        | (1.1)   |
| Information cues                | −2.5        | 0.8          | −7.0         | −0.2    |
|                                 | (1.2)       | (0.8)        | (5.3)        | (0.4)   |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 26          | 43           | 8            | 10      |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 10          | 19           | 4            | 4       |
| Moderator mean (centered at)    | 3.46        | 4.42         | 3.25         | 1.70    |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.6         | 5.5          | 10.6         | 3.0     |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.1         | 5.6          | 9.5          | 3.2     |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.16        | −0.03        | 0.20         | −0.12   |

*Note:* Vignette designs only, since this moderator is not comparably coded for conjoints. The moderator is mean-centered, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for an average study in that column; the mean subtracted is reported in the table. Outcome categories with fewer than three studies are omitted. Information cues count the randomized or fixed scenario details presented alongside regime type. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A12: Meta-regression: scenario abstraction

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability | Resolve |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Intercept                       | 8.9*        | −6.4*        | 10.6*        | −2.2    |
|                                 | (1.4)       | (1.0)        | (3.9)        | (1.2)   |
| Abstraction (1–5)               | 0.3         | 0.0          | −0.9         | 0.0     |
|                                 | (1.3)       | (1.1)        | (1.8)        | (1.1)   |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 26          | 43           | 8            | 10      |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 10          | 19           | 4            | 4       |
| Moderator mean (centered at)    | 2.31        | 3.49         | 2.75         | 4.00    |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.6         | 5.5          | 10.6         | 3.0     |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.8         | 5.7          | 11.5         | 3.2     |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | −0.05       | −0.05        | −0.18        | −0.15   |

*Note:* Vignette designs only, since this moderator is not comparably coded for conjoints. The moderator is mean-centered, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for an average study in that column; the mean subtracted is reported in the table. Centering leaves the slope and both taus unchanged. Outcome categories contributing fewer than three studies are omitted. Abstraction scores the scenario, not the treatment wording; Appendix C gives the coding criteria. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.



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Figure A27: Democracy treatment effect by how the regime contrast is signaled, within design format.

*Note:* Panel A is vignette designs, Panel B conjoint designs. Coloured points are study-level OLS democracy treatment effects in percentage points with 95% confidence intervals, jittered horizontally. Black diamonds are the model-predicted level for each category with its 95% interval.

Table A13: Meta-regression: how the regime contrast is signaled, vignette and factorial designs

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 5.0*        | −7.3*        |
|                                 | (1.5)       | (1.6)        |
| + Electoral institutions        | 5.8         | 1.9          |
|                                 | (2.7)       | (1.9)        |
| + Civil liberties / norms       | 12.9*       |              |
|                                 | (3.2)       |              |
| + Combined (elections + rights) |             | 3.0          |
|                                 |             | (2.7)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 24          | 40           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 9           | 17           |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.9         | 5.9          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 5.2         | 6.1          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.43        | −0.09        |

*Note:* “Bare regime” is the reference category, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for studies that name a country a democracy or non-democracy without any institutional or rights content. Indented rows are deviations from that reference, not standalone effects. Levels with fewer than three studies are dropped, and a column appears only where the reference level and at least one other level survive. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A15 presents the design comparison of Figure 8 in full, and Tables A16 and A17 do the same for the time trend of Figure 5, first on its own and then also controlling for scenario abstraction. Tables A18- A20 report the political-context moderation summarized in Figure 6, once for each of the three ways we operationalize the respondent country’s regime. None of these moderators accounts for an appreciable share of the between-study variance.

Table A14: Meta-regression: how the regime contrast is signaled, conjoint designs

|                                 | Cooperation | Favorability |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 10.7*       | 11.3*        |
|                                 | (2.7)       | (1.4)        |
| + Electoral institutions        | −5.6        | 5.1*         |
|                                 | (2.8)       | (1.8)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 12          | 48           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 6           | 5            |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 5.9         | 6.7          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 5.4         | 6.4          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.15        | 0.09         |

*Note:* “Bare regime label” is the reference category, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for studies that name a country a democracy or non-democracy without institutional or rights content. Indented rows are deviations from that reference. Levels contributing fewer than three studies are dropped, and a column appears only where the reference level and at least one other level survive. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A15: Meta-regression: conjoint versus vignette design

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 8.8*        | −6.4*        | 10.4*        |
|                                 | (1.4)       | (0.9)        | (3.6)        |
| + Conjoint                      | −1.3        | −0.9         | 5.3          |
|                                 | (2.0)       | (3.5)        | (3.7)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 41          | 51           | 57           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 23           | 10           |
| $k$ vignette                    | 26          | 44           | 8            |
| $k$ conjoint                    | 15          | 7            | 49           |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.2          | 7.7          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.3          | 7.5          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | −0.02       | −0.03        | 0.06         |

*Note:* Vignette is the reference category, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for vignette designs and the indented row is the deviation for conjoint designs. Design type here is the format the respondent saw, not the scale of the outcome. A column appears only where at least two studies use each design. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A16: Meta-regression: time trend in the democracy effect

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability | Resolve |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Intercept                       | 9.1*        | −6.2*        | 24.2*        | −2.7    |
|                                 | (1.8)       | (0.9)        | (5.6)        | (1.2)   |
| Years since 2014                | −0.1        | −0.1         | −1.1         | 0.1     |
|                                 | (0.3)       | (0.2)        | (0.6)        | (0.4)   |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 41          | 51           | 57           | 11      |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 23           | 10           | 4       |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.2          | 7.7          | 2.8     |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.3         | 6.3          | 7.5          | 2.9     |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | −0.03       | −0.04        | 0.07         | −0.09   |

*Note:* The moderator is years since 2014, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for a study fielded in 2014 and the slope is the annual change. All designs, vignette and conjoint together. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A17: Meta-regression: time trend adjusted for scenario abstraction

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability | Resolve |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Intercept                       | 9.8*        | −5.4         | 23.9*        | −5.1    |
|                                 | (2.2)       | (4.1)        | (5.5)        | (5.6)   |
| Abstraction (1–5)               | −0.3        | −0.3         | 0.2          | 0.5     |
|                                 | (1.0)       | (1.1)        | (1.9)        | (1.1)   |
| Years since 2014                | −0.1        | −0.1         | −1.1         | 0.3     |
|                                 | (0.3)       | (0.3)        | (0.6)        | (0.4)   |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 41          | 51           | 57           | 11      |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 23           | 10           | 4       |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.2          | 7.7          | 2.8     |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.4         | 6.4          | 7.6          | 3.1     |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | −0.06       | −0.08        | 0.04         | −0.21   |

*Note:* The moderator is years since 2014, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect for a study fielded in 2014 at an abstraction score of zero. Abstraction is used as a control to test whether any apparent time trend reflects a change in how researchers *designed* scenarios (more abstract over time) rather than a change in the effect itself. Restricted to studies with both variables coded, and to outcome categories contributing at least five such studies. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.



Table A18: Meta-regression: political context, Freedom House civil liberties

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 9.2*        | −6.8*        | 14.9*        |
|                                 | (1.1)       | (0.9)        | (2.3)        |
| + Medium civil liberties (3–4)  | −0.5        | −3.7         | −1.1         |
|                                 | (5.6)       | (5.9)        | (2.5)        |
| + Low civil liberties (5–6)     | −6.1*       | 3.9*         | 3.4          |
|                                 | (1.4)       | (1.2)        | (3.3)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 40          | 49           | 55           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 22           | 9            |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.4          | 7.7          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.1         | 6.4          | 7.7          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.05        | 0.01         | 0.00         |

*Note:* The moderator is the political context of the country whose respondents were surveyed (not of the country whose regime is randomized). The most democratic category is the reference, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect there and indented rows are deviations from it. A column appears only where at least two categories are present. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

Table A19: Meta-regression: political context, Polity

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 9.2*        | −6.4*        | 14.3*        |
|                                 | (1.1)       | (0.8)        | (1.3)        |
| + Anocracy                      | −5.6*       | −5.7         | 3.3          |
|                                 | (1.4)       | (10.2)       | (2.5)        |
| + Autocracy                     | −6.8        | 3.5*         | −2.5         |
|                                 | (2.2)       | (1.3)        | (3.1)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 40          | 49           | 55           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 22           | 10           |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.3          | 7.9          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.0         | 6.3          | 8.0          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.06        | −0.02        | −0.01        |

*Note:* The moderator is the political context of the country whose respondents were surveyed, not of the country whose regime is randomized. The most democratic category is the reference, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect there and indented rows are deviations from it, not standalone effects. A column appears only where at least two categories are present. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. Those degrees of freedom fall with the number of clusters, so in a category carried by few studies the critical value is well above 1.96 and a coefficient more than twice its standard error need not be starred.

Table A20: Meta-regression: political context, V-Dem regime type

|                                 | Cooperation | Use of force | Favorability |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Intercept                       | 9.1*        | −6.6*        | 14.1*        |
|                                 | (1.1)       | (0.8)        | (1.4)        |
| + Electoral autocracy           | −2.1        | −2.1         | 3.2          |
|                                 | (3.4)       | (6.5)        | (2.3)        |
| + Closed autocracy              | −6.6        | 3.7*         | −3.5         |
|                                 | (2.2)       | (1.3)        | (2.1)        |
| $k$ (studies)                   | 40          | 49           | 56           |
| $p$ (papers)                    | 17          | 22           | 10           |
| $\tau$ baseline (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.3          | 7.8          |
| $\tau$ residual (pp)            | 6.2         | 6.4          | 7.8          |
| Share of $\tau^2$ accounted for | 0.01        | −0.04        | 0.01         |

*Note:* The moderator is the political context of the country whose respondents were surveyed (not of the country whose regime is randomized). The most democratic category is the reference, so the intercept is the predicted democracy effect there and indented rows are deviations from it. A column appears only where at least two categories are present. \* marks  $p < 0.05$  on the cluster-robust (CR2)  $t$  test with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom.

## R Effect Estimates from Studies We Could Not Obtain

One of our key inclusion criteria was the ability to obtain respondent-level data in order, enabling us to re-analyze all studies on a common scale. We identified an additional 10 studies, located in 5 papers, for which we were unable to obtain replication data, often either because they were fielded long before the rise of replication datasets in political science, or because they are currently unpublished working papers. Although we cannot access the replication data itself, we can compare the effect sizes from these studies with the distribution of effects from the papers in the main text, to assess how our conclusions about the attitudinal effects of democracy would be affected by these studies' inclusion in our corpus.

Table A21 describes these ten studies in the same format as Table A2: the design, the treatment contrast, and the outcome measure. Nine of the ten studies measure support for the use of force and one measures support for cooperation. When possible we took every quantity with an analogue in one of our eight outcome categories from the text of the studies and converted each to percentage points on the common 0–1 scale.<sup>33</sup> Table A22 reports them beside the corpus distribution for the same outcome.

The estimates from these ten studies are not statistically distinguishable from those in our main analysis. Every one of the nine use of force estimates falls inside the range our main dataset of estimates already spans.

Six of the nine are negative, consistent with the pattern of results in our corpus (Appendix H), and the three positives, +1.7, +0.6 and +0.3 pp, are all indistinguishable from zero, similar to the corpus's own near-zero exceptions. Bakker (2017)'s Chinese sample, at –4.6 pp, lands almost exactly at the corpus median.

The nine use of force estimates we extracted average –11.9 pp against a corpus mean of –7.0 pp, producing a –4.9 pp gap that is well inside sampling error<sup>34</sup> (Welch *t*-test  $p = 0.32$ , 95% CI –14.1 to +5.1; Wilcoxon rank-sum  $p = 0.44$ ). We test the point estimates by themselves rather than fitting an availability moderator, because four of the ten extracted rows carry no standard error at all; we also test only for support for use of force, because only one of these studies include support for cooperation.

One pattern bears mentioning. The four largest democracy effect estimates in the set are three studies from Mintz and Geva (1993) and one from Herrmann and Shannon (2001). All four studies were fielded between 1991 and 1997, and all four sit at the 4th percentile of the corpus distribution. The three post-2000 estimates average

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<sup>33</sup>Two were read directly from a regression table and the rest were derived from published cell means, a crosstab, a chi-square inversion, an analysis-of-variance error mean square, or a figure, and each derivation is documented row by row in our replication materials.

<sup>34</sup>The –7.0 pp figure is the unweighted mean of the 51 study-level estimates, which is the quantity a difference-in-means test compares against; it is not the pooled random-effects estimate of –6.5 pp reported in Table 4, which weights studies by precision.

−5.2 pp, which is much closer to the rest of the distribution of our main results. However, a simple explanation of earlier experiments carrying larger magnitudes does not fit cleanly either, as Healy et al. (2002) fielded two experiments in 1997–98 which yielded some of the only *positive* effects (indistinguishable from zero) in the dataset.

There are two potential explanations, though we cannot disentangle them. First, it is possible that the effect of democracy on support for force really was larger in the 1990s than it is now, and we cannot identify this effect because our earliest fielded study for which we have all the data is from 2008. A second possibility is the winner’s curse. The pre-2000 experiments tend to have small sample sizes, at  $N = 34, 39$  and  $44$  for the three Mintz and Geva studies; an experiment with roughly twenty subjects per arm has very little power against a  $-7$  pp effect, so a *published* effect from such a design is almost necessarily a large one.

The single cooperation estimate from this set deviates somewhat from the results in the main corpus. DeMuth and Dietrich (2024) find that respondents are 4.7 pp *less* willing to send humanitarian aid to a democracy, where all 41 corpus estimates of the cooperation effect are positive. However, in this study, the recipient of humanitarian aid is a government that has just fired on its own protesters, a context where it is understandable that democracies might actually be penalized more than other regime types.

Notably, the temporal stability we report in Section 4.2 in the main text is estimated over a window that begins in 2008 and therefore excludes every one of these large, older effects.

Table A21: Studies meeting the design criteria for which no respondent-level data exists

| Study                                                                 | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Outcome                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Support for use of force</b>                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                 |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)<br><i>US undergraduates</i><br><i>N = 44</i>      | Laboratory booklet vignette, between subjects, fielded autumn 1991. A hypothetical crisis, which the authors say “borrowed features from the recent Gulf crisis,” in which two nations dispute the world’s largest concentration of uranium, one invades the other and takes American hostages. Respondents rate their approval of three responses: use of force, a naval blockade, and isolationism. The article is a scanned image; its prose description of the instrument was recovered by OCR in 2026, but no appendix reproduces the booklet text. | <i>Dem:</i> The invasion is “a result of a democratic decision made by a vast majority of the parliament (including the support of the opposition parties),” with later decisions “subjected to a national referendum.”<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The decision is “undertaken by a military-backed dictator of a police state with no need for public approval.” The contrast is one of institutions and accountability, not a bare regime label. | Approval of using force against the invader.<br><i>Scale:</i> 0–10 approval rating<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)<br><i>US nonstudent adults</i><br><i>N = 34</i>   | Same design and instrument as the first experiment, fielded summer 1992 on adults recruited in church, neighbourhood and community-centre settings rather than on undergraduates.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Same as the row above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Approval of using force against the invader.<br><i>Scale:</i> 0–10 approval rating<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)<br><i>Israeli undergraduates</i><br><i>N = 39</i> | Same design and instrument, fielded on Tel Aviv University students in summer 1992. The adaptations are the president becoming the prime minister with Israeli advisors, the hostages becoming Israeli, and the military units being renamed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Same as the two rows above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Approval of using force against the invader.<br><i>Scale:</i> 0–10 approval rating<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force |

*Continued on next page*

Table A21 continued

| Study                                                       | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Healy et al. (2002)<br><i>US undergraduates</i><br>$N = 80$ | Laboratory experiment, fielded 1997–98. Respondents read simulated media reports of fictitious terrorist attacks on United States citizens over five rounds and choose a response after each. The attacking country, “Calderon,” has its regime randomized, crossed with the location of the attack (inside the United States or in a neutral country) and with the respondent’s gender. | <i>Dem:</i> Calderon “has common institutional characteristics that are usually identified with a democracy: free elections, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of political organization and expression.”<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The same sentence with “does not have.” The words democracy and nondemocracy are never applied to Calderon as labels. | Choice among twelve political and military responses to the attack, rank-ordered by level of conflict.<br><i>Scale:</i> 12-point conflict scale<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force<br><i>Note:</i> The paper reports the regime main effect only in words and prints no cell means, so a point estimate can be read off its Figure 2 but no standard error can be derived. |
| Healy et al. (2002)<br><i>US undergraduates</i><br>$N = 72$ | The paper’s third experiment, same laboratory, same 1997–98 fielding and the same background scenario. Calderon’s regime is again randomized between participants, this time crossed only with gender; the attack always occurs in Washington DC and the within-participant factor contrasts military with cultural or educational targets over six rounds.                              | <i>Dem:</i> Calderon “has common institutional characteristics that are usually identified with a democracy: free elections, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of political organization and expression.”<br><i>Non-dem:</i> The same sentence with “does not have.”                                                                               | Choice among twelve political and military responses to the attack, rank-ordered by level of conflict.<br><i>Scale:</i> 12-point conflict scale<br><i>Category:</i> Support for use of force<br><i>Note:</i> This experiment prints its four cell means in the text, so unlike the second experiment it yields a standard error as well as a point estimate.                         |

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Table A21 continued

| Study                                                           | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Herrmann & Shannon (2001)<br><i>US elites</i><br><i>N</i> = 491 | Telephone survey of US opinion leaders, June–September 1997. The Defend a Victim experiment crosses the victim country’s regime type with whether the conflict is cross-border or civil and with whether US interests are at stake. Only this one of the paper’s four experiments randomizes a regime. | <i>Dem</i> : The victim country is “an advanced democracy.”<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The victim country is “a backward dictatorship.”<br>Regime type is bundled with level of development, so the contrast is not regime alone.           | Whether the United States should use its military to push back the invaders or stay out.<br><i>Scale</i> : binary (repel vs. not)<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : The randomized regime belongs to the country the force would protect, so the estimate is reverse-coded to the convention this category uses throughout. |
| Bakker (2017)<br><i>Leiden students</i><br><i>N</i> = 167       | Paper-and-pencil decision vignette, fielded 2012. Two hypothetical countries, matched on power, economy, resources, population and geography, stand at the brink of war; the respondent advises their own government on what to do.                                                                    | <i>Dem</i> : The opponent is described through its civil liberties and political rights, with the word democracy deliberately avoided.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The opponent is described as granting limited and uncertain civil rights. | Advise a pre-emptive strike or advise negotiation.<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Bakker (2017)<br><i>Beijing students</i><br><i>N</i> = 189      | Same instrument, fielded in 2012 on students at the Communication University of China.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <i>Dem</i> : The opponent is described through its civil liberties and political rights, with the word democracy deliberately avoided.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The opponent is described as granting limited and uncertain civil rights. | Advise a pre-emptive strike or advise negotiation.<br><i>Scale</i> : binary<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : The paper describes 187 Chinese undergraduates on one page and gives arm sizes summing to 189 on the same page.                                                                                               |

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Table A21 continued

| Study                                                         | Design / scenario                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Treatment vs. control                                                                                                                       | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DeMuth & Dietrich (2024)<br><i>US MTurk</i><br><i>N</i> = 396 | Online vignette, fielded 2022. A foreign government has fired on its own protesters; the perpetrator country's regime type is crossed with whether the repression is a single episode or repeated, and respondents rate their support for each of four responses. | <i>Dem</i> : The perpetrator country is described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The perpetrator country is described as an autocracy. | Support for sending peacekeeping troops.<br><i>Scale</i> : 4-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Support for use of force<br><i>Note</i> : Peacekeeping is the only one of the paper's four responses that involves a military deployment.                                                                                                            |
| <b>Support for cooperation</b>                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| DeMuth & Dietrich (2024)<br><i>US MTurk</i><br><i>N</i> = 396 | Same experiment and sample as the row above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | <i>Dem</i> : The perpetrator country is described as a democracy.<br><i>Non-dem</i> : The perpetrator country is described as an autocracy. | Support for sending humanitarian aid.<br><i>Scale</i> : 4-point ordinal<br><i>Category</i> : Support for cooperation<br><i>Note</i> : While "aid to a country" is technically cooperation with it, the recipient in this study is a government that has just shot protesters, which is not comparable to the other studies in this outcome category. |

*Note*: The five papers that meet every inclusion criterion on design but for which no respondent-level data could be obtained. Columns and units match Table A2: one row per study and outcome category, with the design, the treatment contrast, and the outcome measure as we would have coded them. Mintz and Geva's article is a scanned paper without an appendix containing the study instrument; every other row quotes the instrument itself. Three further outcomes recorded from these papers have no analogue among our eight categories and are omitted here: Mintz and Geva's approval of a naval blockade and their "failure of foreign policy" item, and DeMuth and Dietrich's support for economic sanctions and for public condemnation.

Table A22: Extracted estimates from the data-unavailable studies, against the corpus distribution

| Paper                           | Study                                                                  | Fielded | N   | Effect (pp) | Uncertainty       | Pctile. |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----|-------------|-------------------|---------|
| <i>Support for use of force</i> | corpus $k = 51$ ; mean $-7.0$ , median $-5.1$ , range $-56.0$ to $3.3$ |         |     |             |                   |         |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)             | Exp. II, US adults                                                     | 1992    | 34  | $-30.6$     | $p < 0.01$ only   | 2nd     |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)             | Exp. III, Israeli students                                             | 1992    | 39  | $-26.8$     | $p < 0.01$ only   | 2nd     |
| Herrmann & Shannon (2001)       | Defend a Victim, US elites                                             | 1997    | 491 | $-19.5$     | SE 3.9 (derived)  | 4th     |
| Mintz & Geva (1993)             | Exp. I, US students                                                    | 1991    | 44  | $-17.3$     | $p < 0.05$ only   | 4th     |
| Bakker (2017)                   | Study 1, Netherlands                                                   | 2012    | 167 | $-11.2$     | SE 6.9 (derived)  | 14th    |
| Bakker (2017)                   | Study 2, China                                                         | 2012    | 189 | $-4.6$      | SE 6.0 (derived)  | 53rd    |
| DeMuth & Dietrich (2024)        | MTurk sample                                                           | 2022    | 396 | $0.3$       | SE 3.1 (reported) | 98th    |
| Healy et al. (2002)             | Exp. 3, US students                                                    | 1997-98 | 72  | $0.6$       | SE 4.0 (derived)  | 98th    |
| Healy et al. (2002)             | Exp. 2, US students                                                    | 1997-98 | 80  | $1.7$       | none available    | 98th    |
| <i>Support for cooperation</i>  | corpus $k = 41$ ; mean $8.6$ , median $6.2$ , range $0.3$ to $25.4$    |         |     |             |                   |         |
| DeMuth & Dietrich (2024)        | MTurk sample                                                           | 2022    | 396 | $-4.7$      | SE 3.0 (reported) | <1st    |

*Note:* Every quantity we could extract from the published pages of the five papers in Table A21, converted to percentage points on the common 0–1 scale. Negative values for use of force and positive values for cooperation are both in the “pro-democracy” direction. The percentile is the share of corpus estimates in the same outcome category that fall below the extracted estimate. In other words, a low percentile for “use of force” implies a large pro-democracy effect. Two of the ten estimates are from a regression table; the rest are derived from published cell means, crosstabs, chi-squares, error mean squares or figures.

Four of the ten have no standard error at all, and four of the remaining six have one only because we derived it, so the table is a distributional comparison rather than a true second meta-analysis. The nine use of force estimates average  $-11.9$  pp against our meta estimates of  $-7.0$  pp; the nearly  $-5$ pp gap is not distinguishable from zero (Welch  $t$ -test  $p = 0.27$ , 95% CI  $-14.5$  to  $4.6$ ; Wilcoxon rank-sum  $p = 0.42$ ). Herrmann and Shannon’s estimate is reverse-coded because its randomized regime belongs to the country the force would protect.